Spring v. Allegany-Limestone Cent. Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 30 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–CV–476S.,14–CV–476S.
• Citation: 138 F.Supp.3d 282
• Parties: Keri SPRING; Eugene Spring; Julianne Spring; Eugene Spring and Keri Spring on behalf of Gregory Spring; and Keri Spring, as the duly appointed administrator of the Estate of Gregory Spring, Plaintiffs, v. ALLEGANY–LIMESTONE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

138 F.Supp.3d 282

Keri SPRING; Eugene Spring; Julianne Spring; Eugene Spring and Keri Spring on behalf of Gregory Spring; and Keri Spring, as the duly appointed administrator of the Estate of Gregory Spring, Plaintiffs,

v.ALLEGANY–LIMESTONE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.

No. 14–CV–476S.

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed Sept. 30, 2015.

A.J. Bosman, Daniel William Flynn, Bosman Law Firm, LLC, Rome, NY, for Plaintiffs.

Aimee Lafever Koch, Osborn, Reed & Burke, LLP, Rochester, NY, Daniel T. Cavarello, Sugarman Law Firm LLP, Hilary C. Banker, Burgio, Kita & Curvin, Buffalo, NY, Jenna W. Klucsik, Sugarman Law Firm, LLP, Syracuse, NY, William J. McPartland, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Scranton, PA, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER

WILLIAM M. SKRETNY

, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs commenced this action in June 2014 asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

; the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("A.D.A."); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 ("Rehabilitation Act"); New York Civil Rights Law § 79–n ; New York Estate Powers & Trusts Law § 5–4.1; and New York State common law. Following the filing of motions to dismiss the Complaint by several of the Defendants, Plaintiffs timely filed an Amended Complaint as of right, thereby mooting the initial motions. Presently before this Court are Defendants' subsequently filed motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint.

This action follows the tragic suicide of high school student Gregory Spring on June 17, 2013. As described in the Amended Complaint, Gregory was a special education student who suffered from disabilities including, but not limited to, Tourette's Syndrome

, ADHD, and Callosum Dysgensis.¹ (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 32–33.) Plaintiffs allege that for an extended period of time during middle school and high school, Gregory "was subjected to numerous acts of fear and intimidation including, but not limited to, teasing, taunting, bullying, name calling, violence, offensive touching, hitting, interference with relationships, and public and private humiliation—conduct motivated in whole or part by his disabilities." (Am. Compl. ¶ 41.) This conduct was "minimized, dismissed and ignored by the school district's staff and officials, including the named Defendants." (Am. Compl. ¶ 41.)

Plaintiffs' more specific allegations describe an incident in April 2012 when Gregory was disciplined and removed from the school's baseball team as a result of "horseplay" by Defendants Eric Hamphill and Christopher Kenyon, who were both teachers and coaches. (Am. Compl. ¶ 49.) "These Defendants tolerated the same or similar horseplay and conduct by others without disability and then allowed Plaintiff to be ridiculed by teammates without consequence." (Am. Compl. ¶ 49.) Plaintiffs further assert that:

Defendant Kenyon failed to take action to stop or prevent further torment of [Gregory,] causing him severe emotional distress and a manifestation of his disabilities to react and he used a swear word referencing the team. Defendant Kenyon implemented further discipline and sent Gregory home early from practice and notified his mother, Plaintiff Keri Spring, that Gregory was removed from the team.

(Am. Compl. ¶ 50.)

Further, on November 8, 2012:

In response to unrelenting harassment and bullying by [fellow student] Defendant Michael Easton, Gregory Spring physically responded to Easton. Upon information and belief, Gregory Spring's conduct was a manifestation of his disability. Gregory Spring was immediately suspended and punished by Defendant [Assistant Principal] Straub for this incident. No manifestation hearing² was provided or waived by Plaintiffs even though multiple students came forward to support Gregory's claim that said student engaged in acts of bullying toward him. Upon information and belief, Defendant Straub failed to discipline [Easton].

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 27, 42.) Plaintiffs further allege that following this incident, Defendant Easton, "with the aid, encouragement, sanction, and facilitation of the School District Defendants, on or about November, 2012 initiated criminal prosecution against Gregory Spring. Upon information and belief, Defendant Straub met with Defendant Easton and his parents, encouraged and facilitated the contact of law enforcement authorities to bring charges against Gregory Spring." (Am. Compl. ¶ 56.) Defendants Easton and fellow student Defendant Jacob Roewe subsequently escalated their harassment of Gregory, and although Gregory's mother, Plaintiff Keri Spring, met with Defendant Straub on "no less than six (6) different occasions between January and June 2013" to complain "regarding Defendant Easton and his behavior," no action was taken against Easton. (Am. Compl. ¶ 56.)

Plaintiffs also allege that "[d]ue to Defendants' acts and omissions, including negligence, gross negligence, recklessness and/or deliberate indifference to disabilities, bullying, and discriminatory conduct against Gregory Spring, they caused him severe emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment, and self-loathing causing and/or contributing to his suicide on June 17, 2013." (Am. Compl. ¶ 54.) Two days after Gregory's suicide, on June 19, 2013, Defendant Diane Lowry, a teacher's assistant, "authored and spoke statements and posted comments via internet and on-line pertaining to Gregory Spring and his death, falsely accusing him of misconduct and otherwise disparaging him and inflicting severe emotional distress upon the Plaintiffs herein."³ (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 22, 57.) "Upon information and belief, Defendant Lowry breached her duty to protect the rights of students and also violated Gregory Spring's constitutional and educational rights of confidentiality concerning his education and records therefore." (Am Comp ¶ 58.)

For the reasons that follow, the motions of the School Defendants and Diane Lowry⁴ (Docket Nos. 40, 42) are granted to the extent that these Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' first seven causes of action. (See Koch Decl. ¶ 6, Docket No. 40–1 (Defendant Lowry incorporated by reference the arguments of codefendants).) The remainder of these motions, as well as the motions for dismissal of Defendants Roewe and Easton (Docket Nos. 60, 62), are dismissed as moot inasmuch as this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

II. DISCUSSION

Rule 12(b)(6)

allows dismissal of a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this Court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and make all reasonable inferences in a plaintiff's favor. ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir.2007) ; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (assumption of truth applies only to factual allegations and is inapplicable to legal conclusions). As summarized by the Supreme Court:

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)

, a pleading must contain a "short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." As the Court held in [ Bell Atl. Corp. v.] Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929

, the pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require "detailed factual allegations," but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. Id., at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) ). A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." 550 U.S., at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Id., at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78, 129 S.Ct. 1937

. Instead, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ); ATSI Commc'ns, Inc., 493 F.3d at 98.

A. Constitutional Claims

Plaintiffs' first five causes of action allege that "Defendants Allegany–Lim[e]stone School District and its Defendant employees and agents," presumably although not clearly referencing all named Defendants save the two students, violated the rights of Gregory Spring and his mother, Plaintiff Keri Spring, under the U.S. and New York state constitutions. The first three causes of action seek damages for these violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

. This section imposes civil liability upon persons who, acting under color of state law, deprive an individual of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not itself provide a source of substantive rights, but instead provides the mechanism by which a plaintiff may seek vindication of federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989).

With respect to the individual defendants, liability under § 1983

may be imposed only for an actor's personal involvement in a constitutional tort, and may not be imposed under a theory of vicarious liability. See Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352 F.3d 733, 753 (2d Cir.2003) ; see also Back v. Hastings On Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 127 (2d Cir.2004) (individual liability may not be based merely on a position of high authority). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Iqbal, it was generally held that the personal involvement of a defendant, particularly supervisors, could be shown by allegations that:

(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation through a

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