Spring v. the Collector of The City of Olney.
| Decision Date | 30 June 1875 |
| Citation | 1875 WL 8429,78 Ill. 101 |
| Parties | HENRY SPRING et al.v.THE COLLECTOR OF THE CITY OF OLNEY. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Richland county; the Hon. JAMES C. ALLEN, Judge, presiding.
Messrs. CANBY & EKEY, for the appellants.
Messrs. WILSON & HUTCHINSON, for the appellee.
This was a bill for an injunction to restrain the collector of the city of Olney from collecting the municipal tax of one per cent levied and assessed against the complainants for the year 1874, on the ground that such levy is without authority of law.
The court below, on motion, dissolved the preliminary injunction which had been granted, and dismissed the bill, and assessed defendant's damages at $200, and complainants bring this appeal to reverse the decree.
The principal question presented is, whether the act of April 15, 1873, “in regard to the assessment of property, and the levy and collection of taxes by incorporated cities in this State” (R. S. 1874. p. 254), is applicable to, and in force in, cities incorporated by special acts of the legislature.
The city of Olney was incorporated by special act in 1867, the act conferring upon the city council authority to levy a tax, for city purposes, not exceeding one-half of one per cent per annum. The city council levied a tax of one per cent, for municipal purposes, in the year 1874, and this is the tax sought to be enjoined. It is insisted that the limitation imposed, by the special charter of 1867, to a levy of only one-half of one per cent, must control, and that the levy of a tax of one per cent was in excess of the authority of the common council.
The act of April 15, 1873, is a general statute. It is by the first section enacted, “that, in all incorporated cities in this State, the city council may, by ordinance, annually levy and collect city taxes on real and personal property within the city, first, for,” etc. (proceeding to enumerate seven specified purposes). The ninth section limits the levy for any one year to three per cent. This act draws no distinction between cities incorporated under a general law and those incorporated by a special act of the legislature; and contains no indication of any purpose to confine its operation to any particular class of cities, or reason for so confining it, or that it was framed with reference to any one class more than to another. The enactment is in respect to “ all incorporated cities in this State,” and we do not see why the language employed should not be allowed to have its plain and natural meaning, and be held to mean what it says, and to include all such cities, and not be restricted to a part only of them.
It is much dwelt upon by appellants' counsel, that, as the act of April 15, 1873, does not expressly repeal the provision of the charter of the city of Olney, which restricts the power to levy a tax to one-half of one per cent, the repeal thereof can only be by implication; that the law does not favor a repeal by implication, and that it is a principle that statutes of a general nature do not repeal, by implication, charters and special acts passed for the benefit of particular municipalities, citing, in support thereof, Dillon on Mun. Corp., sec. 54, State v. Stoll, 17 Wall. 425, The President and Trustees, etc. v. The County of La Salle, 12 Ill. 339, and other like authorities; and reference is made to provisions in the special city charters of a large number of cities in the State restricting the limit of taxation to one per cent and one-half of one per cent, and it is insisted that the legislature could not have intended, by the general statute of April 15, 1873, to repeal all these restrictive provisions in these numerous special charters, and enlarge their power to tax to three per cent, and that it is inadmissible to hold them to be repealed by implication.
The general principle, that the provisions of a special charter, or special authority derived from the legislature, are not affected by general legislation on the subject, applies, in this State, in respect to city charters, with a diminished force, since the adoption of the constitution of 1870. Art. 4, sec. 22, of that constitution, prohibits the General Assembly from incorporating cities, towns or villages, or changing or amending the charter of any town, city or village, except by a general law. Suppose, in the case of any one of the many cities referred to by counsel, where the limit of taxation is fixed by their special charters at one-half of one per cent,...
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Brazos River Authority v. City of Graham
...'Section' may sometimes mean 'Sections', Ellis v. Whitlock, 10 Mo. 781, and at other times a subdivision of a section, Spring v. Collector of City of Olney, 78 Ill. 101; State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman, 187 Wis. 180, 204 N.W. that 'Section' may mean 'Provision' and hence not relate to all ......
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Rintoul v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada
...is construed to apply to the provision or clause immediately preceding. It affects the paragraph to which it is annexed, Spring v. Collector, 78 Ill. 101, 105; DeGraff v. Went, 164 Ill. 485, 492, 45 N.E. 1075, and where no contrary intention appears, refers solely to the last antecedent. Th......
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State ex rel. Ekern v. Zimmerman
...included the forestry amendment. The word “section” has also been interpreted as meaning a subdivision or subsection. See Spring v. Collector of Olney, 78 Ill. 101;Graves v. Scales, 172 N. C. 915, 90 S. E. 431; Ex parte Pea River Power Co., 207 Ala. 6, 91 So. 920. But defendant's counsel fu......
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Deneen v. Town of Thornton
...to municipal charters with a diminishing force since the adoption of article 4 of section 22 of the constitution of 1870. Spring v. City of Olney, 78 Ill. 101. The maxim, ‘Generalia specialibus non derogant,’ imposes a well-recognized rule in the interpretation of statutes. It has its basis......