Spring Valley Development, In re

• Decision Date: 09 February 1973
• Citation: 300 A.2d 736
• Parties: , 3 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,589 In the Matter of SPRING VALLEY DEVELOPMENT By Lakesites, Inc.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 736

300 A.2d 736

5 ERC 1127, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,589

In the Matter of SPRING VALLEY DEVELOPMENT By Lakesites, Inc.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Feb. 9, 1973.

Verrill, Dana, Philbrick, Putnam & Williamson by Loyall F. Sewall, Portland, for Spring Valley.

E. Stephen Murray, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for Environmental Improvement Comm.

Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEBBER, WEATHERBEE, POMEROY, WERNICK and ARCHIBALD, JJ.

WEATHERBEE, Justice.

Raymond Pond is located in the town of Raymond and is slightly more than one mile in length.Lakesites, Inc. is the owner of a large tract of land containing about 92 acres located on one side of the Pond.Lakesites' development of this land into a residential subdivision has been interrupted by an order of the Environmental Improvement Commission directing it to cease the operation of this development until Lakesites has applied for and received the Commission's approval of its development.

The Commission claims to have derived its authority for this order from 38 M.R. S.A. §§ 481-488, Site Location of Development Law, hereinafter referred to as the Site Location Law.Lakesites' appeal attacks both the Commission's interpretation of the Act as including residential subdivisions and the Act's constitutionality.We conclude that the authority of the Commission does extend to residential subdivisions and that the statute represents a valid exercise of the police power.We deny the appeal.

The agreed statement of facts and the testimony presented at hearing before the Commission reveal that Lakesites' property extends along the shore of the Pond at least 3400 feet.¹Lakesites has subdivided this tract into 90 lots ranging in size from 20,000 square feet to 53,000 square feet with several other areas reserved from sale.It refers to this property as its Spring Valley Development.

Lakesites has cleared and graded portions of this land, has built a road for ingress and egress and has surveyed the property, marking off the boundaries of the individual lots.While it contemplates that purchasers will build year-round or part-time homes on their lots it does not intend to construct or participate in the construction of the buildings or to control the use of the lots 'except insofar as there are any required deed restrictions'.No action has been taken with respect to providing services for any of the lots.

Lakesites proposes that the selling of these lots be a profitable venture and it has placed their sale in the hands of licensed real estate brokers.

Lakesites submitted its subdivision plan to the Raymond Planning Board which, after some changes had been made, approved it as satisfying the only subdivision requirement then existing in the town ordinance-that of lot size.The subdivision plan was then recorded in the Cumberland County Registry of Deeds.

There was in effect at this time the Site Location Law the constitutionality of which is under attack.This law required persons intending to construct or operate a development which may substantially affect local environment to notify, before commencing the construction or operation, the Environmental Improvement Commission of their intent and the nature and location of the development.If the Commission determines it to be necessary, a hearing shall be held at which the developer has the burden of satisfying the Commission that the development will not substantially adversely affect the environment or pose a threat to the public's health, safety or general welfare.38 M.R.S.A. §§ 483, 484.

The Legislature defined developments which may substantially affect environment as meaning

'. . . (1) any commercial or industrial development which requires a license from the Environmental Improvement Commission, (2) or which occupies a land area in excess of 20 acres, (3) or which contemplates drilling for or excavating natural resources, excluding borrow pits for sand, fill or gravel, regulated by the State Highway Commission and pits of less than 5 acres, (4) or which occupies on a single parcel a structure or structures in excess of a ground area of 60,000 square feet.'38 M.R.S.A. § 482(2).

Although Lakesites' development did occupy a land area in excess of 20 acres, it did not notify the Commission of its intentions.However, the Commission eventually learned of Lakesites' plans and proceeded at once to schedule and conduct a hearing as it is authorized to do by section 485.Notice of the hearing was given Lakesites.

Lakesites was represented at the hearing by its attorney who challenged the Commission's jurisdiction to regulate Lakesites' activity contending that the mere subdivision of land does not constitute a 'commercial or industrial development' within the scope of the Site Location Law.The attorney made a formal objection to all testimony other than that relating to jurisdiction.He elected to waive his right to contest as to the merits of the case although he was offered full opportunity to do so, choosing not to offer evidence or to cross-examine witnesses who testified regarding the proposed development.

These witnesses testified at length as to various aspects of the environment which they said would be substantially adversely affected by the proposed development.Later, after consideration of the matter, the Commission made findings of fact ² and held that Lakesites had failed in its burden to prove that its proposed development meets the standards for approval established by the Legislature in section 484³ and had failed to demonstrate that it had plans that would adequately protect the public's health, safety and general welfare.It issued an order denying Lakesites the right to proceed with its development until such time as it has made a proper application to the Environmental Improvement Commission and has received the Commission's approval.

From this decision of the Commission, Lakesites has appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court sitting as the Law Court, (38 M.R.S.A. § 487) raising specifically the issue as to whether the offering for sale of subdivided lots of the type owned by Lakesites is either a commercial or an industrial development ⁴ subject to the provisions of 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488 and, secondarily, if the Site Location Law is applied to this developer, are there constitutional violations of Equal Protection and Due Process.

The intent of the Legislature.

As to the first issue, we seek the Legislature's intent.

'Legislative intent is the fundamental rule in the construction or interpretation of statutes. . . .Such a construction ought to be put upon a statute as may best answer the intention which the Legislators had in view, and when determinable and ascertained, the courts must give effect to it. . . .'King Resources Co. v. Environmental Improvement Commission, Me., 270 A.2d 863, 869(1970).

In 1970 the 104th Legislature, meeting in special session, enacted several pieces of legislation directed toward reducing the destruction of our natural environment.One of the pieces of legislation introduced was L.D. 1834 entitled 'AN ACT to Regulate Site Location of Development Substantially Affecting Environment' with which we are now concerned.After amendment it was enacted as P.L.1969, ch. 571, § 2 and became 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 481-488.

The Legislature's concise statement of its Findings and Purpose ⁵ makes clear to us the basis for its conclusion that state action was essential to insure that commercial and industrial developments, which because of their nature or their size, will impose unusually heavy demands upon the natural environment, shall not be located in areas where the environment does not have the capacity to withstand the impact of the development.But did the Legislature intend to bring residential developments within the application of the law?If so, did it intend to include mere subdivisions?

In seeking the legislative intentwe turn first to the language which the lawmakers chose to use to carry out their purpose.

In reference to real estate, a 'development' may be defined as 'a developed tract of land' and 'to develop' as 'to convert (as raw land) into an area suitable for residential or business purposes' . . . 'to alter raw land (into an area suitable for building)'.Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1967.

When we analyze the legislative definition of developments which may substantially affect environment we find that the Legislature saw fit to concern itself with two kinds of developments-1) those the operating procedures of which include the consumption of the natural resources themselves or which have a propensity to discharge, in the course of their processes, wastes and residues which lower the quality of surrounding air, soil or water and 2) those which are not inherently ecologically destructive but which because of their size are likely to impose great demands upon the environment.

The Legislature's concern for the first class is obvious.The operation of many industrial and some commercial developments-whether large or small-are likely to be direct assaults upon the environment itself.The ecological danger from the members of the second group, unlike the first, comes not principally from the type of activity to be performed on the property after it is developed but rather from the size and concentration of such developments.The Legislature's concern was that large developments, apart from the type of activity located thereon, have an inherent potential for over-taxing the involved land, air and water upon which the public depends to sustain an acceptable quality of human living.

But the Legislature chose to apply the Act only to large developments which are industrial or commercial.The word 'commercial' broadly means 'from the point of view of profit' . . . 'having profit as the primary aim'.Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1967.

We think that the use of the word 'commercial' was intended to describe the...