Springer v. Collins

• Decision Date: 29 December 1977
• Docket Number: Civ. No. K-76-1084.
• Parties: Robert Bruce SPRINGER v. George COLLINS, Warden of the Maryland Penitentiary.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

444 F. Supp. 1049

Robert Bruce SPRINGER v. George COLLINS, Warden of the Maryland Penitentiary.

Civ. No. K-76-1084.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

December 29, 1977.

Roland Walker and Walker & McCadden, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.

Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, and John P. Stafford, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, Md., for defendant.

FRANK A. KAUFMAN, District Judge.

After waiving trial by jury, Springer was convicted on March 29, 1974 in the Circuit Court for Cecil County, Maryland, by Judge J. Albert Roney, Jr. of carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of fourteen years and additionally of distribution of secobarbital, amobarbital and methaqualone and of possession of secobarbital and marijuana. Springer was also charged in connection with certain other matters. As to them, Judge Roney either found Springer not guilty, or determined that merger had occurred with one or more of the charges of which he found Springer guilty. Herein, Springer seeks federal habeas corpus relief, contending that his trial counsel failed to investigate and/or raise an insanity defense.¹ The facts are in essence not disputed.²

On the night of September 2, 1973, at about 9:00 P.M., Springer visited the home of his girlfriend, the mother of the victim. During the course of that evening, Springer consumed certain drugs and alcohol and also induced his girlfriend and the victim to take drugs. Additionally, Springer made sexual advances toward the young girl who was then eleven years old and talked of having intercourse with her. Becoming alarmed, the girlfriend left her home, drove to the police station, and asked the police for assistance. Several officers returned to her house with her, where they found Springer and the victim lying seemingly unconscious and naked on a couch in the living room. The officers took several photographs of Springer and the victim, and then managed to awaken Springer. The latter refused to dress himself, and insisted upon remaining naked while being taken into custody. The daughter was taken to the hospital where it was ascertained that she had consumed drugs and had been sexually molested.

Thereafter, Springer retained, as his attorney, counsel who had been practicing law in Cecil County for 14½ years. That attorney had been involved in 20 or more serious felony cases, and in as many as four or five cases in which insanity defenses and psychiatric testimony had been involved. The attorney had known Springer for 8-10 years, and from those previous contacts, which were both business and social, knew of Springer's background, including Springer's use of drugs and alcohol. The attorney had also previously represented Springer in other criminal and civil proceedings. The records of the Cecil County Jail, in which Springer was confined between his arrest on September 3, 1973 and the commencement of trial on March 28, 1974, reflect that counsel conferred with Springer on three occasions during that period:

October 31, 1973, 5:35 P.M. — 5:50 P.M. (15 minutes)

December 18, 1973, 5:15 P.M. — 5:40 P.M. (25 minutes)

March 27, 1974, 1:45 P.M. — 3:30 P.M. (1 hour 45 minutes)

In the course of those conferences and other trial preparation, counsel learned that:

(1) Springer had ingested a large quantity of tranquilizers (Tuinal and/or Quaalude) and of alcohol, and had also smoked marijuana, during the twelve-hour period prior to the incident.

(2) Springer described his mental state at and around the time of the incident as "messed up." During his investigation, Springer's counsel spoke to certain witnesses who confirmed that Springer's mental capacity at the time appeared to have been very seriously impaired and stated that they regarded such impairment as a manifestation of his being drunk and/or "stoned."

(3) Two days prior to the incident, Springer was involved in an automobile accident, apparently caused by his passing out while driving after having consumed large quantities of tranquilizers and possibly of alcohol as well. After that accident, Springer was arrested and confined overnight, and had his stomach pumped out.

(4) Springer had extensively used tranquilizers for at least six weeks, marijuana for at least two years, and alcohol for an indefinite period of time.

(5) Springer stated that he had no recollection of having committed the offense, or of having taken part in most of the alleged occurrences during the night of the incident.

(6) Springer informed his counsel that he had never previously done anything similar to the offense charged, or even entertained any thought thereof.

(7) Springer had been in the Marine Corps and had received something other than an honorable discharge.

(8) Springer had been twice convicted in the past of assault and battery, but not in connection with any occurrences similar to those herein involved.

Additionally, prior to trial, counsel was informed that Springer had held the same job for a number of years, and had never participated in any psychiatric examination, counseling or treatment.³ Counsel knew of his own knowledge that Springer had consulted him on another legal matter a week or two prior to the incident and at that time had appeared normal.

In further preparing for trial, counsel obtained the hospital records pertaining to the diagnosis and treatment of the victim subsequent to the incident, but did not attempt to talk to any of the medical personnel so involved. Those hospital records reveal that sperm was present in the victim's vagina. Counsel also learned of the existence of the photographs taken by the police on the night of the incident. Additionally, counsel discussed the effects of the various substances Springer had ingested with a local doctor, in the course of a social conversation at a service club to which both belonged.

Prior to trial, counsel unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a satisfactory plea bargain from the prosecutor. Thereupon, he advised his client to elect a court trial, rather than a jury trial. At trial he attempted to raise doubt in the Court's mind regarding the occurrence of intercourse by suggesting that the hospital records were sloppily maintained and that Springer had "played with himself" but had subsequently inserted only his fingers into the victim's vagina. That latter argument was advanced in the absence of direct testimony regarding the occurrence of intercourse,⁴ and in light of the generally known depressant effect on sexuality of large quantities of tranquilizers and liquor. During trial counsel also sought to raise doubt in the Court's mind as to whether the evidence showed the requisite degree of intent on Springer's part to support a carnal knowledge charge, contending that Springer was too intoxicated to have that intent and relying upon State v. Gover, 267 Md. 602, 298 A.2d 378 (1973), a case in which the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that intoxication is a defense to a specific intent crime.

Counsel did not, however, investigate or present an insanity defense. It is not clear whether the thought of that defense occurred to him, or whether he did not deem that defense to be appropriate for factual, tactical or other reasons. He did testify during the post-conviction hearing that he could not recall whether he had read the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in Parker v. State, 7 Md.App. 167, 178-79, 254 A.2d 381 (1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984, 91 S.Ct. 1670, 29 L.Ed.2d 150 (1971). In that case, Judge Orth wrote that an alcoholic psychosis resulting from long continued habits of excessive drinking may under certain circumstances constitute an insanity defense. Further, defense counsel was apparently not aware, prior to trial, of the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in Frank v. State, 6 Md.App. 332, 251 A.2d 249 (1969), in which the Court held (at 334, 251 A.2d at 251) that the crime of rape does not "require proof of a specific intent to support a conviction" and (at 336, 251 A.2d 249) indicated by its holding that, in the absence of a plea of insanity, voluntary intoxication does not constitute a defense to such a charge. Rape was defined in Frank (at 337, 251 A.2d at 252) as "unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent . . .." That case was relied upon, at trial, by the prosecutor and subsequently by Judge Roney.

At trial defense counsel called the following witnesses:

(1) Springer, who testified about his ingestion of drugs and alcohol and his mental state at and around the time of the offense.

(2) Officer Ellis, of the Maryland State Police, who had taken Springer into custody in the early morning of September 1, 1973 after his automobile accident. Ellis testified to Springer's apparent mental and physical incapacitation at that time.

(3) Deputy Beck, of the Sheriff's Department of Cecil County, who testified that late on September 3, 1973, some 18 hours after the incident, Springer was still incoherent. Deputy Beck also testified that, based on his training in connection with drug enforcement duties, it was his opinion that combining alcohol with barbiturates or amphetamines tripled the impact of the drugs.

Judge Roney found that intercourse had taken place between Springer and the young victim. During legal argument concerning the defense of lack of requisite intent, the State cited Frank. Judge Roney, referring to that case, commented (Trial Record at 300-01):

Now then, the question comes up as to intent, and the case cited by the State's Attorney, the issues in that case, and I quote "Does the crime of rape require proof of a specific intent to support a conviction?" And The Court held that it does not.

And in discussing that, they said that it is not required in an offense of this kind where the intent is presumed from the very nature of the act; a person having committed the act, that the intent is presumed.

Now, what they refer to, when you refer to a lacking of any intent, is a

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