Springer v. Ford

• Decision Date: 20 February 1901
• Citation: 189 Ill. 430,59 N.E. 953
• Parties: SPRINGER v. FORD.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

189 Ill. 430

59 N.E. 953

SPRINGER

v.FORD.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 20, 1901.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Action by Samuel Ford against Warren Springer. From a judgment of the appellate court (88 Ill. App. 529) affirming a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

W. N. Gemmill, for appellant.

Seth F. Crews and Ralph Crews, for appellee.

HAND, J.

This is an action brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for an injury to his person. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, which judgment has been affirmed by the appellate court for the First district. The plaintiff was in the employ of the Kinsella Glass Company, a tenant of the defendant, occupying the sixth floor of an eight-story building of which the defendant is the owner, located on Canal street, in the city of Chicago. The building was equipped with a passenger and a freight elevator, both of which were operated and controlled by the defendant. The falling of the freight elevator while plaintiff, in the discharge of his duty, was a passenger thereon, caused the injury complained of. At the close of the plaintiff's testimony, and again at the close of all the testimony, the defendant moved the court to instruct the jury to find the defendant not guilty, which the court declined to do, and the action of the court in that behalf has been assigned as error.

The law is well settled that persons operating elevators in buildings for the purpose of carrying persons from one story to another are common carriers of passengers. Deposit Co. v. Sollitt, 172 Ill. 222, 50 N. E. 178;Goodsell v. Taylor, 41 Minn. 207,42 N. E. 873,16 Am. St. Rep. 700, 4 L. R. A. 673;Mitchell v. Marker, 10 C. C. A. 306, 62 Fed. 139, 25 L. R. A. 33;Treadwell v. Whittier, 80 Cal. 574, 22 Pac. 266,13 Am. St. Rep. 175, 5 L. R. A. 498;Hodges v. Percival, 132 Ill. 53, 23 N. E. 423;Hotel Co. v. Camp, 97 Ky. 424, 30 S. W. 1010;Lee v. Knapp, 55 Mo. App. 390;Tousey v. Roberts, 114 N. Y. 312, 21 N. E. 399,11 Am. St. Rep. 655;Association v. Lawson, 97 Tenn. 367, 37 S. W. 86. In Deposit Co. v. Sollitt, supra (on page 225, 172 Ill., and page 179, 50 N. E.), we say: ‘Persons operating elevators are carriers of passengers, and the same rules applicable to other carriers of passengers are applicable to those operating elevators for raising and lowering persons from one floor to another in buildings.’ In Treadwell v. Whittier, supra, it was said: ‘The defendants used their elevator in lifting persons vertically to the height of forty feet. That they were carriers of passengers, and should be treated as such, we have no doubt. The same responsibilities as to care and diligence rested on them as on the carriers of passengers by stagecoach or railway.’ In Goodsell v. Taylor, supra, the court say: ‘The relation between the owner and manager of an elevator for passengers and those carried in it is similar to that between an ordinary common carrier of passengers and those carried by him.’ The operators of such elevators, upon the grounds of public policy, are required to exercise the highest degree of care and diligence. The lives and safety of a large number of human beings are intrusted to their care, and the law requires them to use extraordinary diligence in and about the operation of such elevators to prevent injuryto passengers being carried therein. In Deposit Co. v. Sollitt, supra, it is said (page 225, 172 Ill., and page 179, 50 N. E.): ‘It is a duty of such carriers of passengers to use extraordinary care in and about the operation of such elevators, so as to prevent injury to persons therein.’ And in Treadwell v. Whittier, supra, the court say: ‘Persons who are lifted by elevators are subjected to great risks to life and limb. They are hoisted vertically, and are unable, in the case of the breaking of the machinery, to help themselves. The person running such elevator must be held to undertake to raise such persons safely, as far as human care and foresight will go. The law holds him to the utmost care and diligence of very cautious persons, and responsible for the slightest neglect. Such responsibility attaches to all persons engaged in employments where human beings submit their bodies to their control, by which their lives or limbs are put at hazard, or where such employment is attended with danger to life or limb. The utmost care and diligence must be used by persons engaged in such employments to avoid injury to those they carry. The care and diligence required is proportioned to the danger to the persons carried. In proportion to the degree of danger to others must be the care and diligence to be exercised. Where the danger is great, the utmost care and diligence must be employed. In such cases the law requires extraordinary care and diligence.’ And in Goodsell v. Taylor it is said (page 209, 41 Minn., page 874, 42 N. W., and page 702, 16 Am. St. Rep.): ‘The same reason exists for requiring on the part of the owner [of an elevator] the utmost care and foresight and for making him responsible for the slightest degree of negligence.’

When a passenger is injured by reason of the giving way of some portion of the machinery or appliances by which the elevator is operated, the presumption of negligence from such breaking, unexplained, arises. In Railroad Co. v. Blumenthal, 160 Ill. 40, 43 N. E. 809, we say, on page 48, 160 Ill., and page 811, 43 N. E.: ‘The happening of an accident to a passenger during the course of his transportation raises a presumption that the carrier has been negligent. The burden of rebutting this presumption rests upon the carrier. Undoubtedly, the law requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant has been negligent. But, where the plaintiff is a passenger, a prima facie case of negligence is made out by showing the happening of the accident. If the injury to a passenger is caused by apparatus wholly under the control of the carrier, and furnished and applied by it, a presumption of negligence on its part is raised.’ And in Deposit Co. v. Sollitt, supra, it is said (page 225, 172 Ill., and page 179, 50 N. E.): ‘The fact of the falling of the elevator is evidence tending to show want of care in its management by the operator or...