Springer v. McLANE COMPANY, INC.

• Decision Date: 11 February 2010
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 09-1439 (RHK/JJG).
• Citation: 692 F. Supp.2d 1050
• Parties: Naomi SPRINGER, Plaintiff, v. McLANE COMPANY, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

692 F. Supp.2d 1050

Naomi SPRINGER, Plaintiff, v. McLANE COMPANY, INC., Defendant.

Civ. No. 09-1439 (RHK/JJG).

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

February 11, 2010.

Mark E. Dooley, Neaton & Puklich, PLLP, Chanhassen, MN, for Plaintiff.

Alec J. Beck, Corie J. Tarara, Seaton, Beck & Peters, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RICHARD H. KYLE, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Naomi Springer has sued her former employer, Defendant McLane Company, Inc. ("McLane"), alleging pregnancy discrimination and reprisal in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn.Stat. § 363A.01 et seq. Presently before the Court is McLane's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant the Motion.

BACKGROUND

The relevant facts are not in dispute. McLane is a grocery company with a distribution center in Northfield, Minnesota. The center distributes groceries throughout the upper midwest, primarily to convenience stores. In July 2008, McLane hired Springer as a "candy selector" at the Northfield center. A candy selector works on an elevated production assembly line, selecting certain candy from pallets passing down the line and placing it in "totes" in order to fill customer orders.

When Springer was hired, she was told that she would be a probationary employee for her first 90 days, meaning that she would be held to a higher standard than regular employees. In particular, she was advised that a probationary employee was subject to termination in the event she had two or more unscheduled absences during the probationary period. In addition, she was informed that the use of cell phones was banned on the production floor.

On August 4, 2008, Springer called in sick and was given an unexcused absence. The following day, she left work early after again becoming sick, and she was given another unexcused absence. Later in the day on August 5, she went to her doctor and was told that she was pregnant. When she came to work the following morning, August 6, she informed her supervisor, Sue Ohman, of her pregnancy.

On August 7, Springer again called in sick. When she returned to work the following day, Ohman notified her that any additional unscheduled absences during her probationary period would result in her termination.

Slightly more than one month later, on September 15, 2008, Springer was at work when she telephoned the father of her (unborn) child, Phil Boehne, during her morning break. She mentioned that she had not felt the baby move for several days, and Boehne told her to call her doctor. Springer did so and left a message for her doctor to call her back on her cell phone. She then went back to the production floor, where she received a call from her doctor's office a short time later.

The warehouse supervisor in training, Tyrone McGee, saw Springer on the production floor on her cell phone. He approached her and yelled at her to either get off the phone or clock out. Springer responded non-verbally to McGee by either holding up her index finger to him or holding up her entire hand, in a "talk to the hand" fashion. McGee again told her to either hang up or clock out. She responded, "Gladly," and then started walking down from the elevated production platform to clock out. McGee followed behind, repeatedly insisting that she either hang up or clock out. Springer finally responded, "Where do you think I'm going?" She then finished her telephone call and clocked out. For unknown reasons, McGee then demanded that Springer turn over her employee badge to him; she refused. Instead, she told McGee that she was going to speak to human resources, located back upstairs.

As Springer walked toward the office of the human resources manager, Michelle Pufahl, McGee followed behind. At the top of the staircase, just outside of Pufahl's office, he told Springer, "Have a seat, honey." He then went into Pufahl's office and spoke to her for several minutes while Springer waited outside. A few minutes later, McGee emerged, told Springer she could speak with Pufahl, and walked away.

Springer entered Pufahl's office visibly agitated. She angrily told Pufahl and Michael Bodenbach, another McLane supervisor who was in Pufahl's office at the time, about her conversation with McGee. Specifically, she said that "at five months pregnant, I am not going to be told I cannot take a call from my doctor." Pufahl told her to sit down and "watch her attitude." Springer retorted, "Don't tell me to calm down. This is the health of my child and I need to go to the doctor." Pufahl told her that she could go to the doctor and that she should return with a note. Springer went to her doctor's office later that day and was told that it is uncommon to feel a baby moving so early in a pregnancy, and all was well.

While at McLane the following day, Bodenbach apologized to Springer for "the situation" with McGee, which he termed a "misunderstanding." Pufahl also apologized later that same day. The following morning, Springer met with her supervisor, Ohman, and told her that she had another doctor's appointment. Springer apparently had cleared that appointment with Pufahl previously, although she is unable to remember exactly when that occurred, and there is no dispute that she filled out a McLane "absentee form" for the first time on the 17th. This doctor's visit was considered an unexcused absence by McLane. On September 18, Springer's employment was terminated for "attendance issues."¹

Springer later commenced the instant action against McLane in Rice County District Court, which McLane removed to this Court. In her Complaint, Springer asserted four claims: pregnancy discrimination (Count I), disability discrimination (Count II), and reprisal (Count III), all in violation of the MHRA; and negligent supervision (Count IV). McLane now moves for summary judgment on each of Springer's claims.²

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper if, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of showing that the material facts in the case are undisputed. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Mems v. City of St. Paul, Dep't of Fire & Safety Servs., 224 F.3d 735, 738 (8th Cir. 2000). The Court must view the evidence, and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Graves v. Ark. Dep't of Fin. & Admin., 229 F.3d 721, 723 (8th Cir.2000); Calvit v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., 122 F.3d 1112, 1116 (8th Cir.1997). The nonmoving party may not rest on mere allegations or denials, but must show through the presentation of admissible evidence that specific facts exist creating a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir.1995).

ANALYSIS

I. The discrimination claim (Count I)

Count I alleges that McLane's decision to terminate Springer's employment was motivated, at least in part, by her pregnancy. Under the MHRA, an employer may not terminate an employee based upon his or her sex. Minn.Stat. § 363A.08, subd. 2. The term "sex" is statutorily defined to include pregnancy. Minn.Stat. § 363A.03, subd. 42.

In analyzing pregnancy-discrimination claims under the MHRA, courts "apply the principles developed in the adjudication of claims under Title VII because of the substantial similarities between the two statutes." Hanenburg v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 118 F.3d 570, 574 (8th Cir.1997); accord, e.g., Fjelsta v. Zogg Dermatology, PLC, 488 F.3d 804, 809 (8th Cir.2007) ("The Pregnancy Discrimination Act amended Title VII to provide that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is a form of sex discrimination. The MHRA includes the same prohibition, and the Minnesota courts apply the same Title VII analysis."). Under Title VII, a plaintiff may prove a discriminatory discharge through either "direct evidence" or "indirect evidence." Id. at 809-10; Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir.2004). Since direct evidence—that is, evidence "showing a specific link between the alleged discriminatory animus and the challenged decision," id. at 736—is rarely available, most plaintiffs take the latter route. E.g., EEOC v. Liberal R-II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 922-23 (8th Cir. 2002). In that situation, the well-known McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies. Fjelsta, 488 F.3d at 810.

Here, Springer has conceded a lack of direct evidence, focusing her argument on McDonnell Douglas. (See Mem. in Opp'n at 3.)³ Hence, she must first state a prima facie case of discriminatory termination, which requires her to proffer evidence indicating that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position she was performing, (3) she was discharged, and (4) the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. E.g., Shaffer v. Potter, 499 F.3d 900, 905 (8th Cir. 2007). If she makes out a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises that may be rebutted by McLane offering a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. E.g., Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1037-38 (8th Cir.2010). The burden then "returns to Springer to prove that McLane's proffered reason for firing her is pretextual." Id.

Springer's claim falters on McDonnell Douglas's fourth prong, because she cannot show that her termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. To satisfy this prong, Springer argues that other employees missed as much work during their probationary periods but were not fired. (Mem. in Opp'n ...