Springfield Bank v. Caserta, Bankruptcy No. 3-80-02389
| Decision Date | 04 March 1981 |
| Docket Number | Adv. No. 3-80-0487.,Bankruptcy No. 3-80-02389 |
| Citation | 10 BR 57 |
| Parties | The SPRINGFIELD BANK, Plaintiff, v. Louis B. CASERTA, Defendant. In the Matter of Louis B. CASERTA (and) Jo F. Caserta, Debtors. |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Barry P. Reich, Springfield, Ohio, for plaintiff.
George Ledford, Englewood, Ohio, Trustee.
John P. Petzold, Dayton, Ohio, for defendant.
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, The Springfield Bank, filed a complaint on 26 August 1980 for relief from the stay provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) with regard to a 1979 Buick Riviera automobile; on 18 September 1980 the Defendant, Louis B. Caserta filed his answer and counter claim alleging contempt of court for wrongful and malicious repossession, seeking damages in the amount of $1,500.00 for devaluation of the vehicle and punitive damages in the amount of $100,000.00; on 30 September 1980, Plaintiff filed its Reply to Defendant's Counter Claim.
After the conclusion of discovery proceedings, the case came on for trial on 19 January 1981 and was submitted on the evidence; pretrial order; and memorandum of law filed in behalf of Defendant on 28 January 1981 and in behalf of Plaintiff on 30 January 1981.
Louis B. Caserta and Jo Frances Caserta instituted a joint Chapter 13 case on 7 August 1980. Notices were transmitted on 13 August 1980, the hearing on confirmation having been set for September 11. The debtors scheduled secured debts in the sum of $28,400.00 and unsecured in the sum of $510.00. At the hearing debtors requested a continuance to increase the payments from $200.00 monthly to $350.00 monthly and for disposition of three adversarial proceedings. As requested, the hearing on confirmation was continued and immediate payments to the Trustee were inaugurated by an interim order. To date an order of confirmation has not been entered.
On 12 August 1980 Plaintiff Bank repossessed the 1979 Buick, before receiving the court notice. The seizure was made from Caserta's home driveway during a time span of less than one minute in a situation and condition of turmoil — children playing in front of the house, a large german shepherd barking, the frustration and desperation of entering the vehicle and backing out of the driveway, and Caserta's shouts as he ran from the house. The bank employee did not hear what Caserta was shouting and a "blonde female" employee of the Bank, identified by Caserta waiting in a vehicle on the street, was in fact a male employee with less than a profuse head of hair. The bank employee already had keys to the vehicle from a prior repossession and return.
At the time of repossession Caserta was over two months delinquent in installment payments and the insurance on the vehicle had lapsed.
After the repossession, the Bank continued to hold the vehicle and refused to deliver it to Caserta for thirty-four or thirty-five days, despite repeated requests by Caserta on the strength of the pending Chapter 13 proceedings as advised by his attorney over the telephone on August 12.
Caserta's claim that scratches were discovered on one side of the vehicle when it was returned to his possession has not been proven. His personal estimate of damages runs from $25.00 or $30.00 to $800.00 (if the paint could not be matched). The Bank has established that the vehicle was inspected and photographed before it was returned and no scratches were observed and the inspection report and photographs substantiated the inspection. Hence, this aspect must be ignored for lack of proof. If any conclusion be drawn from the photographs, such would be that Caserta's opinion of damages (if any) is extremely exaggerated.
Plaintiff relies primarily on the decision In re Abt, 1 C.B.C.2d 374, 2 B.R. 323, 5 B.C.D. 1237 (Bkrtcy.,E.D.Pa.1980); and the Defendant relies primarily on In re MacDonald, 2 C.B.C.2d 511, 6 B.R. 23 (Bkrtcy.,N.D. Ohio 1980) and In re Womack, 2 C.B.C.2d 575, 4 B.R. 632, 6 B.C.D. 543 (Bkrtcy.,E.D. Tennessee, 1980).
In analyzing these and similar cases on the subject of contempt of court, it is the opinion of this court that the initial conclusion must be to draw a distinction between illegal actions or conduct between litigants and such conduct which constitutes contempt of court.
Even though fine distinctions often accompany such truisms, contempt prosecution is only designed to preserve the power and dignity of the court, and punishment becomes necessary to prevent abuse of the court's orders or an obstruction of its function. If instituted to compel obedience to court orders, it is civil or coercive in nature. As recent as December 8, 1980, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit teaches that, "Unlike criminal contempt, civil contempt is not designed to be punitive or to vindicate the honor of the court." See Reed v. Rhodes, 635 F.2d 556 (6th Cir. 1980).
At the time the instant litigation came on for hearing, the Bank was no longer in violation of the automatic stay, having returned the vehicle.
Without laboring further the contempt aspects of the clear violation of the court's jurisdiction over the debtors' estate, the tort aspects are not equivocal. The provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) and 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) do not require actual notice to be effective, thereby adopting encrusted doctrines. Classic case law may be found in Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. 1, 14, 22 S.Ct. 269, 274, 46 L.Ed. 405 (1902) that, "It is as true of the present law as it was of that of 1867, that the filing of the petition (in bankruptcy) is a caveat to all the world, and in effect an attachment and injunction."
In the same vein, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (in a similar context) has succinctly put this ancient principle in different semantics worthy of repeating, as follows:
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