Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Vill. of Keeseville
Decision Date | 19 December 1895 |
Citation | 42 N.E. 405,148 N.Y. 46 |
Parties | SPRINGFIELD FIRE & MARINE INS. CO. v. VILLAGE OF KEESEVILLE. |
Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from supreme court, general term, Third department.
Action by the Springfield Fire & Marine Insurance Company, of Springfield, Mass., against the village of Keeseville. A judgment sustaining a demurrer to the complaint was reversed by the general term (29 N. Y. Supp. 1130), and defendant appeals. Reversed.
The complaint sets forth that the plaintiff is a Massachusetts corporation, and that the defendant is a village organized under the provisions of chapter 291 of the Laws of the State of New York, passed in 1870, and the amendments thereto; that the plaintiff carried on the business of fire insurance within the limits of the defendant, and for the privilege of so doing, and of having the protection of the waterworks and fire department and appliances of defendant, had paid an annual tax to the defendant; that the defendant had a system of waterworks and fire appliances which were maintained by taxes levied upon all its taxable inhabitants, including plaintiff and other insurance companies, and by water rents paid by such inhabitants. The complaint then proceeds to set forth the insurance by the plaintiff of property of one Emily E. Brewer, for a percentage less than for like property outside the limits of the water and fire protection, and the destruction by fire thereof, in consequence whereof the plaintiff had paid to her, under its contract of insurance, $4,450. The complaint then sets forth the assignment to plaintiff by Emily E. Brewer of all claims and damages against the defendant, by reason of said fire and damages, and alleges that ‘at the time of the aforesaid fire, the defendant had wrongfully and negligently allowed and caused its said waterworks, pumps, pipes, and fire appliances to become and be out of repair, broken and weakened, stopped with mud and other foreign objects, and unfit for use, to such extent that water could not be thrown or put upon said dwelling house to extinguish the fire therein; that when the hose was laid and opened, and ready to throw water upon the fire in said house, said fire was very slight, and had done very little damage; that if said fire appliances and waterworks had been in proper working order, said fire would and could have been extinguished without damaging said house to exceed $300; that at the time of said fire, and for several years previous thereto, the defendant, under and in pursuance of the powers granted it by the laws of the state of New York, had assumed to maintain waterworks and fire appliances and a fire department for the purpose, among other things, or protecting the property of the inhabitants of defendant against loss by fire, of all which plaintiff and its assignor had notice, and in reliance thereon said assignor paid taxes to defendant to maintain the same, and plaintiff paid taxes to defendant for said purpose, and insured property at reduced rates as aforesaid; * * * that plaintiff's aforesaid loss of $4,450, to the extent of at least $4,150, was caused solely by the negligence and wrongful and unlawful acts of defendant, in failing to keep its waterworks and fire appliances in proper working order, and in failing to employ competent men to manage and care for the same.’ The complaint then demanded judgment for the said sum of $4,150. The defendant demurred to the complaint, on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. At special term the demurrer was sustained and judgment went for the defendant, dismissing the complaint; but, upon appeal to the general term, that court reversed the judgment, and overruled the defendant's demurrer. from the general term judgment the defendant has appealed to this court; the general term having certified the question as one of sufficient importance to render the decision of this court desirable before proceeding further.
Chester B. McLaughlin, for appellant.
A. W. Boynton, for respondent.
GRAY, J. (after stating the facts).
The learned justice who spoke for the general term, in a very elaborate and interesting opinion, proceeded, very correctly, as I think, upon the assumption that the negligence charged against the defendant in the complaint related entirely to its waterworks system. In the view which we take of the matter, it is of comparatively little consequence whether the plaintiff based its right of action upon negligence with respect to the fire department as such, or to the water department as such. But the fair reading of the complaint undoubtedly warrants the assumption of the learned justice at general term. If I correctly apprehend the reasoning which led the general term to the conclusion that there was a municipal liability upon an admission of the facts set forth in the complaint, it rests, in the main, upon two theories. In the first place, it is held that, by the voluntary assumption on the part of the defendant of the power conferred by statute to construct and maintain waterworks, it became responsible for the proper exercise of such power, and that such responsibility is necessarily demanded in the interest of an efficient public service, and the inhabitants, who have contributed to the maintenance of such a public work, have a right to hold the defendant to the exercise of reasonable care and diligence and to a liability for a failure to do so. In the next place, it is held, while not leeming that the defendant had engaged in a private corporate business, conducted for its own benefit, and not for the general public, nevertheless that the defendant having agreed to erect and take charge of the public work and enterprise for the public within its boundaries, if there is a failure to exercise reasonable care and diligence in maintaining it, there has been a breach of an implied contract, for which, if injury results, an action will lie. Holding these views, the learned general term felt compelled, because of the admission by the defendant, through its demurrer, of the allegations of wrongful and neglectful conduct in relation to the maintenance of its waterworks, to hold that the plaintiff made out a good cause of action.
The proposition that such a liability rests upon a municipal corporation, as is asserted here, is somewhat startling, and I think the learned general term justices have misapprehended the nature of the responsibility which devolved upon the defendant in connection with its maintenance of a waterworks system, as well as the character of the power which it was authorized to exercise in relation thereto. I might remark, in the same spirit of criticism which was assumed by the learned justice at general term, that while the efficiency of the public service would be promoted by holding municipal corporations to the exercise of reasonable care and diligence in the performance of municipal duties, and to a liability for injury resulting from a failure in such exercise, the application of that doctrine to such a case as this might, and probably would, be highly disastrous to municipal governments. A little reflection will show that a multitude of actions would be encouraged, by fire insurance companies, as by individuals, and that cases have arisen, and may still arise, where an extensive conflagration might bankrupt the municipality, if it could be rendered liable for the damages or losses sustained. The distinction between the public and private powers conferred upon municipal corporations, although the line of demarkation at times may be difficult to ascertain, is generally clear enough. it has been frequently the subject of judicial discussion, and, among the numerous cases, it is sufficient to refer to Bailey v. Mayor, etc., 3 Hill, 531;Lloyd v. Mayor, etc., 5 N. Y. 369; and Maxmilian v. Mayor, etc., 62 N. Y. 160....
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