Springfield Park Dist. v. Buckley

• Decision Date: 28 January 1986
• Docket Number: 4-85-0137,Nos. 4-85-0136,s. 4-85-0136
• Citation: 488 N.E.2d 1071,94 Ill.Dec. 824,140 Ill.App.3d 524
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois
• Parties: , 94 Ill.Dec. 824 SPRINGFIELD PARK DISTRICT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Patrick BUCKLEY, Defendant-Appellant. and SPRINGFIELD PARK DISTRICT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond H. CHRISTIE, Defendant-Appellant.

Page 1071

488 N.E.2d 1071

140 Ill.App.3d 524, 94 Ill.Dec. 824

SPRINGFIELD PARK DISTRICT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Patrick BUCKLEY, Defendant-Appellant. and SPRINGFIELD PARK DISTRICT, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond H. CHRISTIE, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 4-85-0136, 4-85-0137.

Appellate Court of Illinois Fourth District.

Jan. 28, 1986.

George Tinkham, Springfield (Samuel J. Cahnman of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Robert C. Walbaum, Springfield, for plaintiff-appellee.

WEBBER, Justice:

Defendants were charged in the circuit court of Sangamon County with violations of a Springfield Park District (District) ordinance No. 209-83, which in effect prohibits the operation of motorcycles on park roadways. The cases were consolidated for hearing, and after motions to dismiss the citations were denied, both defendants were found guilty at a bench trial and fined $50. Defendants have appealed.

The facts are not in dispute. Both defendants admit that they violated the ordinance. However, they contest the validity of the ordinance itself, which provides:

"No person shall drive, ride, propel or operate any motorcycle, motor bike, motor scooter, motor propelled two wheel drive vehicle or snowmobile within any park or upon any drive or driveway within any park." (Springfield, Ill., Park District Ordinance No. 209.83, sec. 3.1 (1983).)

The ordinance was initially enacted in 1966 and reenacted in 1983.

At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the major witness was Clifford Riley, who was called by the District. He had been employed by the District as its police chief from 1966 to the time of his retirement in 1978. He stated that the ordinance had been enacted in 1966 as a result of problems encountered by off-the-road operation of motorcycles in the park system. He explained that cyclists would sometimes leave the road system and enter picnic areas posing danger to children playing there. He also maintained that the cyclists would cut across golf courses leaving tracks on the putting greens. Speeding was also a problem, and enforcement of ordinances against speeding was difficult because the cyclists would cut through the parks in an effort to elude District police officers.

According to Riley most of the problems arose in the middle 1960's with the advent of imported, two-cycle motorcycles designed for off-the-road operation. Defendants presented Jeffrey Norris, executive secretary of the Illinois Motorcycle Dealers' Association. He stated that in 1979 the Federal government had imposed emission pollution standards with such stringent requirements that two-cycle machines could no longer be sold in the United States. He explained that since that time there are only two classes of motorcycles: off-the-road dirt bikes which are not street-legal and motorcycles licensed for highway use.

Norris also stated that he had conducted a survey of downstate park districts similar in size to Springfield's and that none of these districts prohibited the use of motorcycles in their parks.

Defendants have raised two principal arguments on appeal: (1) whether the District was empowered to enact the ordinance, and (2) assuming such power, whether the ordinance is overbroad and hence constitutionally impermissible.

As to the first, park districts are nonhome rule units of government and hence have only the powers delegated to them by the legislature. (Ill. Const.1970, art. VII, sec. 8.) At issue are two sections of the Park District Code (Code) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 105, par. 1-1 et seq.). Section 8-1(d) describes the general regulatory power of park districts:

"To pass all necessary ordinances, rules and regulations for the proper management and conduct of the business of the board and district and to establish by ordinance all needful rules and regulations for the government and protection of parks, boulevards and driveways and other property under its jurisdiction, and to effect the objects for which such districts are formed." (II.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 105, par. 8-1(d).)

Section 8-7 grants park districts specific authority to control and regulate park driveways and provides in pertinent part:

"Any park district shall have power within its jurisdiction to designate by ordinance the whole or any part of two or more streets, roads, or, boulevards under the jurisdiction of any city, town or village within the boundaries of said district, as a public driveway, to be used for pleasure driving only; and also to lay out, establish, alter, extend, pave or otherwise improve and maintain the same and designate the same as pleasure driveways, to be used for pleasure driving only. Such park districts may, by ordinance, regulate, restrain and control the speed of travel upon the same, and in all things may regulate, restrain and control the use of said pleasure driveways and parks by the public or individuals, and may exclude therefrom funeral processions or anything other than pleasure vehicles; provided, that any and all roads, streets, boulevards or parks lying wholly or in part within the corporate limits of any city, town or village situated within any park district shall first, from and after the organization of such district, by ordinance of such city, town or village be turned over and placed under the control of such park district and accepted, by ordinance, by such district." Ill.Rev.Stat. 1983, ch. 105, par. 8-7.

The interrelationship of these sections requires an examination of the history of the Code. This is set forth in Hoff, History of the Park District Code (Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 105, pages XIII-XIX (Smith-Hurd 1952)). From this it will be seen that the District was organized in 1900 as "The Pleasure Driveway and Park District of Springfield" pursuant to "An Act to provide for the creation of pleasure driveway and park districts" approved June 19, 1893. Hoff also notes sections 1-2(a) and 1-2(b) of the Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 105, pars. 1-2(a), 1-2(b)) which provide:

"(a) It is the intent of this codification that from and after its effective date, all existing park districts heretofore organized, together with all districts hereafter organized under this code, shall have identical powers, duties and purposes except for those instances where specific powers, duties or forms of organization are expressly conferred upon or prescribed for Submerged Land Park District, Pleasure Driveway and Park Districts or Township Park Districts, as in this code provided by specific designation.

(b) Construction. The provisions of this code, so far as they are the same or substantially the same as those of any prior statute, shall be construed as a continuation of such prior provisions and not as a new enactment."

It follows from these sections that the District possesses both the general powers conferred under section 8-1 and the special power conferred under section 8-7. The latter derives from the Act of 1893 under which the District was organized.

Under the plain language of section 8-1(d) the District is authorized to regulate generally all traffic on its roadways. Under section 8-7 the District may designate certain roadways as pleasure driveways and may exclude therefrom "funeral processions or anything other than pleasure vehicles." Since both statutes are concerned with the same subject matter, i.e., regulation of traffic in parklands, under a familiar principle of law they should be construed in pari materia. We therefore do not agree with the defendants that section 8-7 operates as a limitation on section 8-1(d).

Nor do we agree with the interpretation of the trial court that section 8-7 applies only to roads outside the boundaries of the parks. It is altogether possible under the language of section 8-7 that certain roads within a park could be designated as a pleasure driveway. However, the record in the instant case is devoid of any indication as to whether the roadways upon which defendants were arrested were, or were not, so designated.

Assuming, arguendo, that such a designation had been made, it would still not follow that defendants violated section 8-7. That section allows a park district to prohibit anything other than "pleasure vehicles." That term is apparently not one of art and hence should be given its ordinary meaning.

In our opinion a pleasure vehicle is one used for other than business purposes. "Vehicle" is a broad term. Under the Illinois Vehicle Code it is defined as:

"Every device, in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices moved by human power, devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks and snowmobiles as defined in the Snowmobile Registration and Safety Act." Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 95 1/2, par. 1-217.

Thus a motorcycle not being used for business purposes is a pleasure vehicle within the meaning of section 8-7 and the District could not prohibit a motorcycle on a pleasure driveway. Defendant Buckley testified at the motion to dismiss that he was taking a pleasure drive at the time he was arrested.

The ordinance, then, cannot be justified under section 8-7. If it is to be upheld, it must be under section 8-1(d). We find that the ordinance sweeps too broadly and is an unreasonable and arbitrary classification which unduly discriminates against motorcycles on park driveways.

The general principles governing the validity of ordinances are well known. A unit of local government may regulate, restrain or prohibit that which is harmful to the public welfare even though the prohibition may interfere with personal liberty. (Chicago National League Ball Club v. Thompson (1985), 108 Ill.2d 357, 91 Ill.Dec. 610, 483 N.E.2d 1245.) Where no suspect classifications or fundamental rights are implicated, an ordinance may be upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest, and there is a presumption in favor of the validity of the ordinance. The party challenging it bears the...