Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Dunn

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: JENNEY
• Citation: Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Dunn, 243 Mass. 7, 136 N.E. 622 (Mass. 1922)
• Decision Date: 11 October 1922
• Parties: SPRINGFIELD SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST CO. et al. v. DUNN et al.

243 Mass. 7

136 N.E. 622

SPRINGFIELD SAFE DEPOSIT & TRUST CO. et al.

v.DUNN et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.

Oct. 11, 1922.

Appeal from Probate Court, Hampden County; Charles L. Long, Judge.

Suit by the Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Company and another, as trustees under the will of Michael Dunn, deceased, against Kieran L. Dunn and others, for construction of a provision of the will of Michael Dunn. From the decree, Joseph C. Sullivan appeals. Affirmed.

The provisions of the will in controversy are stated in the opinion. The answer of the respondent Joseph C. Sullivan asked that the will be so construed as to provide for the payment to him of the income which, prior to her death, was paid to Rachel Griffin Sullivan; he being her administrator, heir, and next of kin. The other grandchildren mentioned in the will alleged that the income was given to the grandchildren as a class, and that on the death of Rachel Griffin Sullivan, the share of the income belonged to the survivors of the class.

Joseph A. Love, of Webster, for appellant.

Raymond D. Houlihan and John B. Shea, both of Springfield, for respondents Grace Griffin Anthony and others.

JENNEY, J.

The will of Michael Dunn of Springfield was admitted to probate on May 7, 1913. After specific devises, all the rest, residue and remainder of his property was given in trust to the Springfield Safe Deposit & Trust Company and Kieran L. Dunn.

The trustees were directed to make payments not here in controversy from the income, and to give to his wife in case she survived him $3,000 annually.

The testator provided that the remaining income should be paid--

‘in equal shares, semiannually to my children Kieran L. Dunn, Katherine Kilroy, Mary H. Maguire, Joseph J. Dunn, and to Grace D. Griffin, Rachel Griffin, Gerald Griffin, Joseph Griffin and Bartholomew Griffin, children of my deceased daughter Margaret Griffin, said grandchildren to take by right of representation the share which my said daughter would have taken if living. In the event of the subsequent death of any of my children above named, the share of the income given to such deceased child shall be paid to his or her issue by right of representation.’

The will continued:

‘Upon the death of the last survivor of my children, the said trust shall terminate, and the said Trust Company, as surviving trustee, or its successor in the trust, shall divide said trust property into as many equal shares as there are then living grandchildren, and grandchildren who have died leaving issue then living, and to each of my said surviving grandchildren shall be paid and transferred one share per capita, and to the said surviving issue of any deceased grandchildren shall be paid and transferred per stirpes the share which their parent, if living, would have received.’

All the beneficiaries named in these clauses of the will survived the testator and are now living except his granddaughter Rachel, who died on August 19, 1921, intestate, leaving no issue. Her only heirs and next of kin were her husband, Joseph C. Sullivan, who is administrator of her estate, and her father, Barte J. Griffin.

The trustees ask instructions as to the disposition of the part of the income to which Rachel Griffin Sullivan had been entitled in her lifetime. The case is here upon an appeal from a decree entered in the probate court.

The clause to be construed is contained in what purports to be a disposition of the residue of the testator's estate. See Smith v. Haynes, 202 Mass. 531, 533, 89 N. E. 158. No provision is made therein for the payment of income after the death of a beneficiary except to issue; and those entitled to share in the principal upon the termination of the trust are restricted to the then surviving grandchildren and to issue of deceased grandchildren.

We think that a right to income did not vest under the statute of distribution and descent in those claiming under a deceased beneficiary as...