Springfield School Committee v. Doe

Decision Date08 June 2009
Docket NumberNo. C.A. 08-CV-30132-MAP.,C.A. 08-CV-30132-MAP.
Citation623 F.Supp.2d 150
PartiesSPRINGFIELD SCHOOL COMMITTEE, Plaintiff v. Quetzal DOE, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

Bryan K. Clauson, James S. Whitcomb, Office of Attorney General, Springfield, MA, for Defendants.

Alisia E. St. Florian, Regina W. Tate, Murphy, Hesse, Toomey & Lehane, LLP, Quincy, MA, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION WITH REGARD TO CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Dkt. Nos. 15, 25, 28 & 31)

PONSOR, District Judge.

This is an action brought by the Plaintiff Springfield School Committee, following a decision on June 4, 2008 by the Bureau of Special Education Appeals of the Massachusetts Department of Education. ("BSEA"). The complaint names both a student with the pseudonym "Quetzal Doe" ("Doe") and the BSEA. The parties filed Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, which were referred to Magistrate Judge Kenneth P. Neiman for report and recommendation.

On May 11, 2009, Judge Neiman issued his Report and Recommendation, to the effect that Defendants' motions should be allowed and Plaintiff's denied. He also recommended that counsel for Defendant Doe be awarded attorney's fees limited to "efforts expended on his behalf in this forum. . . ." Dkt. No. 31 at 164.

The conclusion of the Report and Recommendation admonished the parties that objections to the Report and Recommendation had to be filed within ten days, with the understanding that the failure to file such objections would preclude any further appellate review. See Id. at 164 n. 8. No objections were filed.

Having reviewed the substance of Judge Neiman's Report and Recommendation and finding it meritorious, and noting that there is no objection, the court, upon de novo review, hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 31).

Based upon this, the court hereby ALLOWS the cross-motions filed by Defendants Doe and BSEA (Dkt. Nos. 15 & 28). Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 25) is hereby DENIED. The court awards counsel for Defendant Doe attorney's fees in the amount of $4,075.00, covering the work done in federal court. See Dkt. No. 32, Ex. 6.

The clerk is ordered to enter judgment for Defendants, including the award of attorney's fees to Defendant Doe's attorney. The attorney's fee award is to be paid by Plaintiff within thirty days. This case may now be closed.

It is So Ordered.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION WITH REGARD TO THE PARTIES' CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Document Nos. 15, 25, and 28)

NEIMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

This case, brought by the Springfield School Committee ("Plaintiff"), follows a June 4, 2008 decision by a hearing officer of the Bureau of Special Education Appeals of the Massachusetts Department of Education ("BSEA"). In a two-count complaint, Plaintiff has sued both a student with the pseudonym "Quetzal Doe" ("Quetzal") and the BSEA (together "Defendants").1 In essence, Plaintiff alleges that the hearing officer's decision violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., and parallel state law. As a counter-claimant, Quetzal alleges that he is a prevailing party and, hence, entitled to an award of attorney's fees.

Soon after the pleadings were joined, Quetzal moved for summary judgment and Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. In turn, the BSEA compiled and filed the two-volume administrative record as well as its own cross-motion for summary judgment. All three motions have been referred to this court for a report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

Although the file is extensive, the two legal issues raised by the parties are relatively precise, namely, (1) whether Plaintiff has carried its burden of showing that the hearing officer's decision ought to be overturned and (2) whether Quetzal is entitled to attorney's fees. Although the court questions whether this matter truly presents a case or controversy, it believes that the answer to the first question is no and that the answer to the second question is yes as to fees earned before this court, but not otherwise.

I. BACKGROUND

The following background comes verbatim from the undisputed findings of fact in the hearing officer's June 4, 2008 decision (hereinafter "Decision").2 See Lenn v. Portland Sch. Comm., 998 F.2d 1083, 1086 (1st Cir.1993) (noting that in the usual course, the court's facts are taken from the administrative record); Hampton Sch. Dist. v. Dobrowolski, 976 F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir.1992) (noting that "the court must recognize the expertise of" the hearing officer "and consider carefully administrative findings") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

1. Quetzal was initially found eligible for special education on February 13, 2008, when he was in the 8th grade. A psychological evaluation conducted by the Springfield Public Schools found Quetzal to have impaired cognitive functioning. Teacher reports highlighted Quetzal's difficulties with attention, concentration, lack of background information, and overall poor academic skills. The Team noted that Quetzal demonstrated significant and persistent behavioral and discipline issues. He was inappropriate and disruptive in all school settings. He also had a history of poor school attendance.

2. The Team developed an IEP ["Individualized Education Program"] calling for Quetzal to receive intensive, specialized instruction in math and English language, as well as academic support, in a substantially separate classroom program. It also provided for special education assistance in all other school settings; for counseling and for implementation of a behavior plan. The proposed February 2007February 2008 IEP was accepted in May, 2007. The plan was implemented at the Kennedy Middle School during the remainder of the 2006-2007 school year. The Plan continued to be in effect when Quetzal transitioned to high school for 9th grade in the 2007-2008 school year.

3. Quetzal reached the age of 16 in August of 2007.

4. Quetzal moved out of Springfield in January 2008. He enrolled in an adjoining school district on January 14, 2008.

5. Between the beginning of Springfield's school year in September 2007 and his move out of Springfield in January 2008, Quetzal missed 33 days of school. Quetzal's special education team did not reconvene as a result of these absences. Springfield took no other independent action to address Quetzal's absenteeism.

6. Between September 2007 and January 2008, Quetzal received supervision and services from time to time from the Department of Social Services and the Department of Youth Services.

7. The special education placement and services offered to Quetzal, and accepted by his guardian, remained available to Quetzal throughout the life of the 2007-2008 IEP and specifically between September 2007 and January 2008.

8. The Educational Surrogate Parent requested a Team meeting on November 30, 2007. The Team reconvened on December 20, 2007. It developed a new Individualized Education Plan for Quetzal calling for his placement in a partial inclusion social/emotional/behavioral support program within the regular high school.

9. The Springfield Public Schools High School attendance policy provides that after four days of absence in a marking period no credit will be awarded for an affected course. It further states that:

any student who accumulates 13 or more absences during the academic year will be ineligible to move successfully from one grade to the next unless there are valid extenuating circumstances and a successful appeal.

The policy further sets out specific actions to be taken by the attendance officer and the building principal including phone contacts, investigations and referrals to attendance support and enforcement agents.

10. There is no indication in this record that Susan Carplunk, the Educational Team Liaison listed on Quetzal's accepted IEP, contacted the Student or his guardian to determine why he did not attend school in the fall of 2007. There is no indication in his record of any contact by any high school administrative staff, counselors, special education teachers, attendance officers, or other public school personnel, with Quetzal or his guardian during the fall of 2007.

11. Springfield generated official records of Quetzal's attendance during the fall of 2007. These records show that Quetzal had missed four days of at least one period of class by September 19, 2007. The record also shows that Quetzal had accumulated 13 full days marked "TRU" by October 24, 2007. There are no report cards, progress notes, or other teacher generated reports in the record.

(A.R. Vol. I at 204-07.)

There are several other facts reflected in the record which the court believes round out the picture and provide more context for the parties' dispute. First, as noted in the hearing officer's recitation, the instant matter concerns actions taken on Quetzal's behalf by an Educational Surrogate Parent ("ESP"), Bryan Clauson, who is also acting as Quetzal's attorney here; Mr. Clauson was appointed by Associate Justice Judith A. Locke of the Hampden County Juvenile Court on November 2, 2007, as "Guardian ad Litem/Next Friend to serve additionally as Educational Surrogate Parent on behalf of [Quetzal] . . . with the authority to sign educational plans and make educational decisions" (Id. at 9.)

Second, on December 6, 2007, at about the same time that the ESP requested a Team meeting, he also requested an expedited hearing before the BSEA. (Id. at 1-8.) The ESP sought four forms of relief against Plaintiff, only two of which had some continued viability by the time the hearing was held:

1. to immediately conduct a Team Meeting to determine whether [Quetzal]'s poor attendance and/or behaviors and resulting lack of effective progress are related to his disability; [and]

....

4. to provide appropriate educational...

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