Springfield v. State

• Decision Date: 30 December 1986
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 118
• Citation: 506 So.2d 376
• Parties: Michael Warren SPRINGFIELD v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 376

506 So.2d 376

Michael Warren SPRINGFIELD v. STATE.

6 Div. 118.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

Dec. 30, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1987.

Certiorari Denied May 1, 1987

Alabama Supreme Court 86-656.

Daniel J. Burnick, Birmingham, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Beth Slate Poe, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

TYSON, Judge.

Michael Warren Springfield, alias, was charged in three separate indictments with the illegal possession of controlled substances, the alteration of the identification numbers on a firearm and receiving stolen property in the first degree. The jury found the appellant "guilty of possession of stolen property in the first degree as charged in the indictment." Ala.Code § 13A-8-17 (1975). The jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict with respect to the other two charges. They were subsequently nol prossed upon recommendation of the State. The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to the Habitual Felony Offender Statute.

James Rainey testified that in January, 1985 he purchased a 1984 silver Thunderbird automobile for "just over ten thousand dollars." He owned the car and was in possession of it during October, 1985.

At approximately 7:00 a.m. on the morning of October 22, 1985, Rainey noticed that the car was missing from his garage. He reported the theft to the police and received a call from them several days later advising him that the car had been recovered and that he would be able to pick it up in a few days.

Rainey subsequently recovered his automobile from the Fultondale police. He testified that he had not given anyone permission to use his automobile on the night of October 21, 1985. He had no weapons or prescription drugs in his car at the time it was stolen.

Sergeant M.N. Sharp of the Fultondale Police Department testified that several days prior to October 24, 1985, he had been instructed by a judge to pick up a white female named Tammy Yeager for violation of parole. Sgt. Sharp had told a street informant that he was looking for her. His informant had supplied Sgt. Sharp with reliable information in the past and he knew of at least three arrests that had been made as a result of this informant's tips.

On October 24, 1985, Sgt. Sharp's dispatcher received a telephone call from the informant stating that Yeager and a white male named Michael Warren Springfield were in a stolen silver Thunderbird automobile near Finley Avenue. Drugs were reportedly in the car along with a .38 pistol with an altered identification number. Sgt. Sharp received this information from the dispatcher while he was in his police car near Highway 78 and the Westgate shopping area.

When he received the information from the dispatcher, he requested that a tag number for the vehicle be obtained and run through the computer to determine if the car was, in fact, stolen. This was done. The tag number was registered to a Mr. Findlay and there was no indication that the car with this tag number had been stolen.

Sgt. Sharp then called Mr. Findlay on the telephone. Findlay reported to Sharp that, at that time, his car was being driven by his wife who had gone shopping at the Five Points West Shopping Center. Findlay absolutely denied that his car had been stolen.

Sgt. Sharp's informant called back and again relayed the information concerning the appellant.

Sgt. Sharp then drove his patrol car toward Finley Avenue. As he was turning onto Highway 78 from Finley Avenue he saw "this" Thunderbird driven by the appellant turn into the Westgate shopping area. He called the dispatcher to send a backup unit to the scene.

The appellant drove the automobile in front of a Bargain Town Store. Both Springfield and Yeager exited the vehicle and walked toward the store. Yeager entered the store while the appellant waited outside, pacing back and forth on the sidewalk in front of the store. Yeager was in the store for approximately ten to fifteen minutes. When she exited the store, the appellant walked back to the car and sat in the driver's seat and shut the car door. Yeager remained outside the car and began talking to the appellant through the window on the driver's side of the car. During this period of observation, Sgt. Sharp was sitting in his patrol car parked out of sight nearby.

Deputy Blanton from the Jefferson County Narcotics Division then pulled up beside Sgt. Sharp in his vehicle. At this point Yeager got inside the Thunderbird and sat on the passenger's side. Sgt. Sharp and Deputy Blanton then drove up to the Thunderbird and arrested the appellant and Yeager.

Sgt. Sharp observed what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette on the floor of the car beneath the appellant's feet at the time he arrested Yeager for parole violation.

A few minutes later, after the appellant and Yeager had been removed from the Thunderbird and placed in separate police vehicles, Deputy Blanton determined that the Thunderbird had indeed been stolen from the Bessemer area.

The automobile was taken to the impound lot of the Fultondale Police Department and was later released to the owner, James Rainey.

The tag on the automobile was later returned to its owner, Mr. Findlay.

Mr. and Mrs. Findlay testified that they did not know who stole the tag from their automobile, a 1985 green Thunderbird. Mr. Findlay testified that he picked up his car tag from Sgt. Sharp at the Fultondale Police Department after it had been stolen.

Deputy Blanton testified that he had known Ms. Yeager prior to her arrest on October 24, 1985 and had recognized her immediately before she was arrested for violating parole.

Following the arrest of Yeager and the appellant, the automobile was searched. Various controlled substances and a pistol with an altered identification number were found inside of the car.

Tammy Yeager testified on the appellant's behalf. Yeager, who was arrested with the appellant, testified that the drugs and the pistol found in the car were hers. She pled guilty to related charges and was serving time in the penitentiary during the appellant's trial. Yeager stated that the appellant picked her up on the day in question from a Mrs. Carabelle Taylor's house where her car was being repaired. She testified that the appellant had initial possession of the automobile and had not told her where he had gotten it. She stated that the appellant had been driving the car all over Birmingham that day.

Mrs. Clarabelle Taylor testified that she was the appellant's landlord and that she had known him for approximately three years. She said that Yeager called her house on or about October 23, 1985 and asked for the appellant. Shortly thereafter Yeager came to Mrs. Taylor's house and picked up the appellant. Later, (the next evening) the appellant called Mrs. Taylor from a service station and asked her to give him a ride home because Yeager had left him there.

Mrs. Taylor did not know what kind of car Yeager was in when she picked the appellant up. She stated that Yeager had tried to sell her a pistol at that time.

I

The appellant contends that his warrantless seizure and arrest was conducted without probable cause. Specifically, he argues that, since the policeman's attempts to corroborate the information received by the informant were unsuccessful, the informant's tip was insufficient to supply probable cause for the appellant's arrest. He alleges error in the trial court's refusal to grant his motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained as a result of the allegedly illegal arrest.

In determining whether or not the facts in this case warrant a finding of probable cause to arrest, we must apply the "totality of the circumstances" test outlined in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983).

"[There] [t]he Court observed that probable cause is a fluid concept, unsuited to rigid technical requirements, and that existence of probable cause necessarily turns upon assessment of probabilities in particular fact situations. The Court emphasized that the standard of probable cause is that of probability, not prima facie showing of criminal activity."

Houk v. State, 455 So.2d 115, 117, (Ala.Crim.App.1984).

"The Court in Gates, supra, clarified its prior holdings in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969), by stating:

'[A]n informant's "veracity", "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are all highly relevant in determining the value of his report. We do not agree, however, that these elements should be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly exacted in every case.... Rather, as detailed below, they should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is "probable cause" to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.' 103 S.Ct. at 2327, 2328.

"The existence of probable cause must be determined from the facts of each case. Carter v. State, 435 So.2d 137, 139 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); Moore v. State, 415 So.2d 1210 (Ala.Crim.App.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1041, 103 S.Ct. 459, 74 L.Ed.2d 610 (1982); Hatton v. State, 359 So.2d 822 (Ala.Crim.App.1977), cert. quashed, 359 So.2d 832 (Ala.1978). One does not have probable cause unless he is possessed of information upon which, if submitted to a magistrate, a warrant would be issued. Ex parte Meeks, 434 So.2d 844 (Ala.), on remand Meeks v. State, 434 So.2d 848 (Ala.Crim.App.1983); Knight v. State, 346 So.2d 478, 481 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, Ex parte State ex rel. Attorney General, 346 So.2d 483 (Ala.1977), appeal after remand. Knight v. State, 356 So.2d 765 (Ala.Crim.App.1978). It has been stated that probable cause exists 'where the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonable trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant...