Springfield v. State

• Decision Date: 07 June 1892
• Citation: 96 Ala. 81,11 So. 250
• Parties: SPRINGFIELD v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

11 So. 250

96 Ala. 81

SPRINGFIELD v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 7, 1892

Appeal from circuit court, Walker county; JAMES B. HEAD, Judge.

James Springfield was convicted of murder in the second degree, and appeals. Affirmed.

The testimony for the state tended to show that the deceased Wilder, on the day of the killing had been to Jasper, in Walker county, to attend the trial of his brother-in-law for selling whisky without a license; that the defendant Springfield, and one Jones were witnesses against Wilder's brother-in-law, but Springfield was not examined; that while the said Jones and three or four other men were riding home in Wilder's wagon, the defendant who was riding a "young, wild, and skittish mule," overtook them; that the deceased and the said Jones got into a dispute, and that Wilder knocked Jones out of the wagon between the wheels thereof, and that thereupon the defendant rode up and shot Wilder in the breast, instantly killing him. The testimony for the defendant tended to show that after Wilder had knocked Jones out of the wagon, and while he was lying motionless on the ground between the wheels of the wagon, which was standing still, the defendant got down off his mule, and threw the reins of his bridle on his left arm, and stooped down, and attempted to lift Jones from the ground; that while he was thus stooping down he looked up, and saw Wilder leaning over the body of the wagon, holding a drawn knife in his hand, about to strike him; that he careened his body to one side, falling up against the wheel of the wagon, and thereby escaped from the blow with a wound in his shoulder, about one half an inch; that when Wilder again attempted to cut him with the knife, he drew his pistol, and fired. The defendant made exhibit of the wound in his shoulder, and also his shirt and coat, which showed that a knife had pierced them. On the examination of the defendant as a witness "the solicitor asked him why he did not turn the mule loose, and get out of the way of the knife;" to which he replied "that he was afraid his mule would get away from him." There was evidence tending to prove the defendant's good character as a quiet, peaceable, and law-abiding man.

The court gave its general charge in writing, and the defendant separately excepted to the following portions thereof as given: "(1) One remark of counsel in addressing you, gentlemen, might mislead you. It was something to the effect that you are above this court and the supreme court in your right to decide this case. The statement, gentlemen, is only partially correct. So far as determining what the facts are, what the evidence shows, it is true, for you are the sole judges of the facts, and in judging them you are above and beyond every other tribunal, personage or agency; but so far as determining what the law is which is to be applied to the facts, and by such application a true verdict to be reached, the statement of the counsel is not correct." (2) "In the system [of self defense] so established no balm or protection is provided for wounded pride or honor in declining combat, or sense of shame in being denounced as cowardly. Such thoughts are trash, as compared with the inestimable right to live." (3) "If the defendant did not exercise prudence by reason of indulgence in strong drink, or for other cause, and therefore formed an unjustifiable belief that it was necessary for him to shoot in his defense, he cannot avail himself of such a belief." (4) "The defendant, in his testimony, mentioned, as obstacles to escape, the wagon wheel, the body of Jones on the ground, and that he was holding his mule by the reins. Do these circumstances, or any other circumstance disclosed in evidence, considered with them, show sufficient reason why defendant did not get out of the way of the threatened danger? When asked by the solicitor why he did not turn loose the mule and get out of the way, he replied that he was afraid his mule would get away. I need not charge you, gentlemen, that if it became a matter of choice between letting go the mule and destroying a human life, the law would declare that the mule should go, and the life be saved." The defendant then requested the following charges in writing, and separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of them: (4) "The jury is charged that if the evidence satisfies them of the good character of defendant, this good character of the defendant may raise a reasonable doubt of the killing of deceased being done with a criminal intent." (13) "If the jury find from the evidence that the defendant, with no intention of bringing on a difficulty, approached the deceased in a peaceable manner, and the deceased made the first hostile demonstration by drawing a knife, and that the defendant was in such proximity to the deceased as to render it hazardous to attempt flight, then the jury should acquit the defendant." (14) "If the jury find from the evidence that the defendant, with no intention of bringing on a difficulty, approached or went near to deceased, in a peaceable manner, and that the deceased assaulted him with a deadly weapon, or a knife calculated to produce death, and the assault was open and direct, and in perilous proximity, then the law would not require the defendant to endanger his safety by attempted flight, and the jury must acquit the defendant." (15) "If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant, with no intention of bringing on a difficulty, approached or went near to deceased in a peaceable manner, and deceased made the first hostile demonstration by drawing a weapon, and if the defendant was in such proximity to deceased as to render it hazardous to attempt flight, or if the assault was with a deadly weapon, and was open and direct, and in perilous proximity, then the law would not require the defendant to endanger his safety by attempted flight, and the jury should acquit the defendant."

Wm. L. Martin, Atty. Gen., for the State.

THORINGTON J.

Appellant was tried under an indictment charging him with murder. The plea was self-defense, and he was found guilty of murder in the second degree.

The only questions reserved on the trial for consideration by this court are to portions of the general charge given by the court to the jury, and to the refusal of the court to give several special charges requested by appellant. The general charge, on demand of appellant, was given by the court in writing. We have examined it carefully as a whole, and find it to be a fair, clear, and correct statement of the law, and to cover fully every phase of the case made by the testimony. The first exception is to that portion of the charge which is in the following words: "One remark of counsel, in addressing you, gentlemen, might mislead you. It was something to the effect that you are above this court and the supreme court in your right to decide this case. The statement, gentlemen, is only partially correct. So far as determining what the facts are, what the evidence shows, it is true, for you are the sole judges of the facts, and in judging them you are above and beyond every other tribunal, personage, or agency; but so far as determining what the law is which is to be applied to the facts, and by such application a true verdict to be reached, the statement of the counsel is not correct." The bill of exceptions recites that "one of defendant's counsel stated to the jury that they, the jury, were above this court and the supreme court in their right to decide this case." This remark should not have been made by counsel without accompanying it with such an explanation as the court gave, and it clearly imposed upon the court the duty to see that the jury were not misled or improperly influenced by it. The mode adopted by the court of explaining and limiting it was proper, and the distinction drawn by the court between the province of the jury and that of the court is in accord with the law of this state, and amply supported by authority. Marcus v. State, 89 Ala. 23, 8 South. Rep. 155; Harrison v. State, 78 Ala. 5.

The second exception is to that part of the charge in which the court, after laying down the law of self-defense, uses the following language: "In the system [of...