Springville v. Johnson

• Citation: 37 P. 577,10 Utah 351
• Decision Date: 27 July 1894
• Docket Number: 511
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: SPRINGVILLE, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, RESPONDENT, v. DON C. JOHNSON, APPELLANT

37 P. 577

10 Utah 351

SPRINGVILLE, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, RESPONDENT, v. DON C. JOHNSON, APPELLANT

No. 511

Supreme Court of Utah

July 27, 1894

APPEAL from the District Court of the First Judicial District, Hon H. W. Smith, Judge.

Action by Springville, a municipal corporation, against Don C Johnson, to quiet title to land and to have a tax sale thereof declared illegal and void. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Mr. A D. Gash and Messrs. Williams, Van Cott & Sutherland, for appellant.

The land involved was held by the city for no public purpose, and is liable for county and territorial taxes. The city holds the property for private and speculative purposes, and if it may escape the burden of taxation it compels other property holders to pay taxes for it. Surely such a result can never have been within the contemplation of the framers of the statute in question. Notwithstanding the broad language of the statute, we think the court should restrict its meaning by interpretation. Sedg. on Con. Stat. and Con. Law, 261, 296; Pierce v. Cambridge, 2 Cush. 611; Proprietors v. Lowell, 1 Met. 538; Orr v. Baker, 4 Ind. 86; Ill. Cent. R. R. v. Irvin, 72 Ill. 452; Mayor of Balt. v. Greenmount Cemetery, 7 Md. 517. The usual rule is that the effects and consequences of a particular construction are to be considered, and when the literal interpretation would operate unjustly, the intent of the statute should be followed. Sedg. 255, 261, 296, 195, 201; Jackson v. Collins, 3 Cow. 89, 96; Ryegate v. Woodsboro, 30 Vt. 746; Ex parte Ellis, 11 Cal. 222; State v. Clark, 5 Dutch. 96; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107 (81); Briggs v. Easterly, 62 Barb. 61; Kennedy v. Gies, 25 Mich. 83. It is the duty of the court to restrain the operation of a statute within narrower limits than its words import, if satisfied that the literal meaning of its language would extend to cases which the legislature never designed to embrace in it. Brewers' Lessee v. Blougher, 14 Pet. 198; Reiche v. Smythe, 13 Wall. 164. General words will be restricted or enlarged to meet the legislative intent. Suth. Stat. Con. § 218; Eureka Case, 4 Saw. 302, 317. Where property is held by a city in a private capacity and revenue is derived, the reasons for exempting such property from taxation entirely fail. Under a general granting of power to buy and hold real property, cities may buy and hold real estate for corporate purposes only. 2 Dillon Mun. Corp. 562-3, 573-76. This tract of land was held by the city for profit or speculation. It certainly could not have been the intent of the legislature to exempt such land from taxation. Appellant contends: (1) That the general purpose of the statute is to exempt the property of the territory, county, city and school district, because its use is public and produces no revenue. (2) That the property being such as the city could not legally acquire, its exemption could not have been within the legislative intent.

Messrs. Sutherland & Howatt, for respondent.

The state is the sovereign. All public corporations partake of sovereignty, and the rules exempting sovereigns apply to such public corporations. Endlich on Stat. §§ 161-3; Van Brocklin v. State of Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151-173; U. S. v. R. R. Co., 17 Wall. 322, 329; Low v. Lewis, 46 Cal. 550; Cooley on Taxation, 172; Trustees of Public Schools v. City of Trenton, 30 N. J. Eq. 677 and note; Rochester v. Rush, 80 N.Y. 302; Louisville v. Commonwealth; 1 Duv. 295. The statute of this territory contains an express exemption. 1 Comp. Laws 1888, § 2009. By its charter, Springville is permitted to own real property and to improve and protect it as a natural person. 1 Comp. Laws § 1037.

MERRITT, C. J. MINER and BARTCH, JJ., concur.

OPINION

MERRITT, C. J.:

This action was brought by plaintiff to quiet title. The plaintiff is a municipal corporation organized under a special charter (1 Comp. Laws, p. 474). For many years prior to 1892, it was the owner of about 900 acres of land, situate within its corporate limits, which was not used for any corporate purpose, but was rented for pasturage of cattle, from which the city derived revenue. Taxes for county and territorial purposes were assessed against this land in 1892, and upon failure, of the city to pay such taxes the lands were sold to defendant. A bill was filed by plaintiff in the court below for a decree that the land was exempt from taxation, and that the tax sale thereof was void; that plaintiff be quieted and confirmed in its title and ownership of the land. On the trial of the case the court found (1) that the facts stated in the complaint were true; (2) that the real property described in the complaint, in 1892, was situated within the limits of Springville, a municipal corporation having a charter as a city, and the same was then owned, and had been for many years, by the said city, and used for profit by the said city, by renting the said lands for pasturage. As conclusions of law, the court below held that the plaintiff was the owner in fee of the land, that it was not liable to taxation, and the proceedings to tax the same were illegal and void; and a decree was entered annulling the sale of said premises, and quieting and confirming title of plaintiff.

The only question in the case is whether the real estate owned by the plaintiff, and described in the complaint, was liable to taxation for county, school, and territorial purposes in 1892. By legal implication and by express statute, it was so exempt. By a general provision the revenue law professes to make all property within the territory taxable. Even in the absence of any express exemptions, it is settled by the authorities that the property of a municipal corporation could not be subject to taxation under such general provision. It is a principle of interpretation of statutes that they do not apply to the sovereign, unless named. The state is sovereign, and all...