Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. Native Am. Telecom LLC
| Decision Date | 01 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | CIV. 10-4110-KES |
| Parties | SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY, L.P., Plaintiff, v. NATIVE AMERICAN TELECOM, LLC; B.J. JONES, in his official capacity as Special Judge of Tribal Court; and CROW CREEK SIOUX TRIBAL COURT, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota |
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR A STAY AND MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Defendants, Native American Telecom (NAT) and the Crow Creek Sioux Tribal Court (CCSTC), move for an order staying this action until CCSTC determines if it has jurisdiction over this matter. Plaintiff, Sprint Communications Company, resists the motion and moves for a preliminary injunction to enjoin CCSTC from hearing this matter. Defendants also move to strike Sprint's memorandum in support of its motion for a preliminary injunction because it violates the local rules of civil procedure.
BACKGROUND
The facts viewed in the light most favorable to NAT pertinent to this order are as follows: Sprint provides nationwide long-distance telephone services and is known under the telecommunications regulatory framework as an interexchange carrier (IXC). Sprint delivers long-distance telecommunication calls to a local exchange carrier (LEC) for termination. Sprint pays the LEC a terminating access charge based on the LEC's filed tariff.
In 1997, the Crow Creek Sioux Tribe established the Crow Creek Sioux Tribal Utility Authority (Tribal Utility Authority). In October of 2008, the Tribal Utility Authority authorized NAT, a tribally owned limited liability company organized under the laws of South Dakota, to provide telecommunications service on the Crow Creek Reservation subject to the tribe's laws. Under the telecommunications regulations, NAT is known as an LEC because NAT terminates calls on the reservation. NAT then filed two access service tariffs for telephone traffic on the reservation, one with the FCC for interstate traffic and one with the Tribal Utility Authority for intrastate traffic within the reservation.
Shortly after NAT began operating as an LEC, Sprint refused to pay NAT's terminating access tariffs. In March of 2010, NAT filed a complaint against Sprint with the Tribal Utility Authority seeking enforcement of its access tariffs. On March 29, 2010, the Tribal Utility Authority entered an ex parte order finding that Sprint's refusal to pay NAT's tariffs violated the "filed rate doctrine." In response, Sprint filed a complaint with the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission (SDPUC) to enjoin NAT's collection efforts with respect to interstate traffic.1 On July 12, 2010, NAT filed a complaint in CCSTC to collect the unpaid access service tariffs. CCSTC has directed the parties to brief the tribal court jurisdiction issue and has not determined whether it has jurisdiction over this matter. On August 16, 2010, Sprint filed a complaint with this court to enjoin CCSTC from further proceedings.
DISCUSSION
Defendants move to strike Sprint's memorandum in support of its motion for a preliminary injunction for failure to seek leave before filing an overlength brief. Defendants request that this court strike pages 26-47 of Sprint's brief.
Local Civil Rule 7.1(B)(1) requires that a brief not exceed 25 pages or 12, 000 words unless the court granted prior approval. If the brief does exceed 25 pages, it must be accompanied by a certificate stating that the brief complies with the type-volume limitation. D.S.D. Civ. LR 7.1(B)(1).
Sprint's brief in support of its motion for a preliminary injunction is 47 pages and contains 10, 656 words. Because the brief is under the 12, 000 word limit, Sprint did not need prior approval to file an overlength brief, but it should have filed a word count compliance certificate. D.S.D. Civ. LR 7.1(B)(1).
Sprint failed to comply with Local Rule 7.1(B)(1). After receiving notice of its failure, Sprint rectified the situation by filing a "Word Count Compliance Certificate." Docket 42. While the court prefers that parties comply with the local rules without prompting by the opposing party, NAT and CCSTC suffered no prejudice because Sprint failed to file a word count certificate. To strike almost half of Sprint's brief would work an injustice against Sprint and preclude a full resolution of the issues pending before this court. Defendants' motion to strike is denied.
Before a federal court grants preliminary relief, it must have jurisdiction over the matter. Bruce H. Lien Co. v. Three Affiliated Tribes, 93 F.3d 1412, 1422 (8th Cir. 1996). Whether a tribal court has adjudicative authority over a non-tribal member presents a federal question. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709, 2716-17 (2008) (citing Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987)). Federal law governs the outcome. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852 (1985). Accordingly, the question falls under this court's "arising under federal law" jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 483 (1999).
The Supreme Court has long recognized that Indian tribes are " 'distinct, independent political communities.' " Plains Commerce, 128 S. Ct. at 2718 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832)). "Tribal courts play a vital role in tribal self-government, and the Federal Government has consistently encouraged their development." Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 14-15 (internal citation omitted). Given these long-held policy considerations, the doctrine of tribal exhaustion requires parties to exhaust their case in tribal court before seeking relief in a federal court, including questions of jurisdiction. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369 (2001). Exhaustion is appropriate because " " Neztsosie, 526 U.S. at 484 (alteration in original) (quoting Nat'l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856).
While the policy considerations favoring tribal courts are strong, the tribal court exhaustion rule is only a prudential rule based on comity. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 450-51 (1997) (citing Nat'l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 857); see also Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16 n.8 (). Generally, when the tribal court has jurisdiction, however, comity requires that tribal courts handle the matter. Bruce H. Lien, 93 F.3d at 1420.
In National Farmers Union, the Supreme Court recognized three exceptions to the tribal exhaustion doctrine: (1) where "tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith;" (2) where the case "is patently violative of express jurisdictional prohibitions;" and (3) "where exhaustion would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court's jurisdiction." 471 U.S. at 856-57. The Supreme Court has also recognized that "[a]ny generalized sense of comity toward nonfederal courts is obviously displaced by the provisions of preemption." Neztsosie, 526 U.S. at 485. A federal preemption defense, however, affects tribal exhaustion only in rare situations where "statutory provisions for conversion of state law claims to federal ones and removal to federal courts express congressional preference for a federal forum." Id. at 485 n.7
The question here is, with regard to claims arising under an interstate tariff, whether Congress expressed a preference for a federal forum both by federal preemption of claims and by limiting jurisdiction over a claim to a federal forum.
Both Sprint and NAT seek relief under the FCA, specifically under 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203, and 206. The Supreme Court has concluded that the Interstate Communications Act, the FCA's predecessor, 2 "was an exertion of Congress of its authority to bring under federal control the interstate business of telegraph companies and therefor was an occupation of the field by Congress which excluded state action." Postal Tel.-Cable Co. v. Warren Godwin Lumber Co., 251 U.S. 27, 31 (1919) (citations omitted). More recent courts have agreed: "The Supreme Court has held that the establishment of this broad scheme [the FCA] for the regulation of interstate service by communication carriers indicates an intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field to the exclusion of state law." Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. AT&T Co., 391 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1968).
The Supreme Court has held that the federal tariff laws preempt state-law causes of action. See AT&T Co. v. Central Office Tele., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 226-27 (1998) (). From the FCA's sweeping claim preemption, the Supreme Court has concluded that the FCA is "a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of interstate communication." Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 104 (1957). If a cause of action arises under an FCA provision, it is governed by federal law. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Garden State Inv. Corp., 981 F.2d 385, 387 (8th Cir. 1992).
As in Neztsosie, here Congress has determined that the regulation of interstate tariffs is governed exclusively by federal law, and state-law or tribal-law claims regarding these interstate tariffs are completely preempted.
While Sprint and NAT seek relief under 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 203, and 206, it is § 207 that gives parties aggrieved under the FCA the right to sue and enforce their rights. 47 U.S.C. § 207; see also Global Crossing Telecomms., Inc. v. Metrophones...
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