Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Mills

Decision Date27 August 1999
Docket NumberNo. 99 CIV. 1041(BDP).,99 CIV. 1041(BDP).
Citation65 F.Supp.2d 148
PartiesSPRINT SPECTRUM L.P. d/b/a Sprint PCS Plaintiffs, v. Richard P. MILLS, individually and as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Education, Charles A. Szuberla, individually and as Coordinator, Facilities Management and Information Services of the New York State Department of Education, and Carl T. Thurnau, individually and as Acting Supervisor of the New York State Department of Education, Office of Facilities Planning, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

David L. Snyder, Snyder & Snyder, White Plains, for Plaintiff.

Lynette P. Phillips, New York State Attorney General's Office, New York, NY, for Defendants.

FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Jr., District Judge.

Plaintiff, Sprint Spectrum, L.P. ("Sprint"), commenced this action under the Federal Telecommunications Act of 1996 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the Act as well as of various constitutional provisions. Before this Court is plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 65(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, directing the New York State Department of Education to approve its application to install at the Ossining High School an antenna for the wireless telephone service plaintiff operates under license from the Federal Communications Commission. The Court concludes that the New York State Department of Education has failed to produce substantial evidence to support its denial of the application, and thus plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief is granted. The Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law follow.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Sprint is a provider of cellular telephone service in the New York-New Jersey area. In 1995, Sprint paid more than $449 million to obtain a Personal Communication Services ("PCS") wireless broadcast license at an auction held by the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"). PCS technology is a new generation of wireless service that uses digital transmission to enhance and improve wireless communication. Compared to the more conventional analog technology, PCS Technology provides a clearer connection and fewer dropped calls, as well as other advantages.

As an FCC-licensee, Sprint is obligated to provide wireless communication service to at least 33% of the population located in an area defined by the FCC as the New York-New Jersey Major Trading Area ("MTA") within five years from the date the license was granted. The area includes Ossining, New York. The license has a term of ten years. In order to meet its obligation under the FCC license, Sprint must create a network of individual "cell sites," which are facilities consisting of a radio antenna and attached equipment which send and receive radio signals to and from customers' portable wireless communication handsets and mobile telephones. The antenna feeds low power radio signals received from mobile phones through the attached electronic equipment and into ordinary phone lines so calls can be routed anywhere in the world.

To maintain effective, continuous, uninterrupted service to its subscribers, Sprint is attempting to create a PCS network — an interconnected series of cells which overlap in a grid pattern resembling a honeycomb. Each cell must be precisely located to insure reliable coverage of a given area. If there are too few cell sites or the sites are located too far apart, telephone users may experience inadequate service, including the disconnection of calls, static and difficulty placing calls. Cell sites also have height requirements which vary according to local topography and the configuration of existing structures.

In its effort to provide seamless coverage to the licensed area, Sprint identified Ossining High School (the "high school") as an essential cell site. On September 23, 1998, Sprint signed a lease with the Ossining School District (the "District"), permitting it to locate the cell site on the roof of the high school and requiring the site to be disguised as a flagpole. Under the lease, Sprint is required to pay the School District an annual rent of $30,000, escalating at three percent per year. Sprint also agreed to provide, free of charge, three Sprint PCS wireless telephones to the School District.

The regulations of the New York State Department of Education (the "Department") provide that when construction of any alteration to a school exceeds $10,000, the alteration plans must be approved by the Department's Office of Facilities Planning. See Title 8, New York Codes, Rules and Regulations, Part 155.2. Because the cost of the installation of the cell site at Ossining High School would exceed $10,000, on December 3, 1998, the plans and specifications for the site were filed with the Department's Office of Facilities Planning for its approval.

By letter dated January 12, 1999, the Department denied Sprint's application. The letter, written by defendant Charles A. Szuberla, Coordinator of Facilities Management and Information Services, informed Sprint that the application was denied because of the Department's belief that (1) "arrangements between public and private entities violate Article 8, Section 1 of the New York State Constitution if they primarily benefit the private party," (2) the proposal would likely fail to comply with Education Law Section 403-a, and (3) the School District lacked the authority to enter into the contract with Sprint. Defendants do not assert that Sprint's application was denied because it failed to comply with any Office of Facilities Planning regulations governing such applications. Sprint asserts that without the site, a gap in coverage exists, preventing it from adequately serving the area.

Sprint has brought suit against Richard P. Mills, Commissioner of the New York State Department of Education, Charles A. Szuberla, Coordinator, Facilities Management and Information Services of the New York State Department of Education, and Charles T. Thurnau, Acting Supervisor of the Office of Facilities Planning. Sprint alleges in its complaint that the Department's denial of its application violated several provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Specifically, Sprint contends that: the denial of the application was not supported by substantial evidence in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii) (Claim 1); the defendants' action prohibits or has the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal wireless services in the area in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(II) (Claim 2); defendants unreasonably discriminated against Sprint in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(i)(I) (Claim 3), and defendants violated 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) which provides in part: "No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service" (Claim 4). Finally in Claim 5, Sprint alleges under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violations of its federally protected rights under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and the New York Constitution, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and the Fifth Amendment takings clause. Plaintiff seeks a mandatory injunction ordering defendants and related persons to issue the required permit and remove all further barriers to the construction of the facility.1 Sprint also seeks monetary damages.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Telecommunications Act of 1996

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "Act") is an omnibus overhaul of the federal regulation of communications companies. Cellular Telephone Co. v. Oyster Bay, 166 F.3d 490, 493 (2d Cir.1999). The Act was intended to promote the development of telecommunications technology and accelerate its availability by opening telecommunications markets to competition. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 857, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 138 L.Ed.2d 874 (1997) (the 1996 Act's "primary purpose was to reduce regulation and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies."). While generally preserving the authority of local governmental entities in zoning and placement matters, the Act limits local authority to regulate personal wireless services.2 Section 704 of the Act established the National Wireless Telecommunications Siting Policy, with the goal of establishing "a federal regulatory framework to govern the offering of all commercial mobile services." Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1993, 107 Stat. 312; H.R. Conf.Rep. No. 103-213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 490 (1993) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1993, pp. 1088, 1179. Congress' intent in establishing this federal regulatory strategy was to "foster the growth and development of mobile services that, by their nature, operate without regard to state lines as an integral part of the national telecommunications infrastructure." H.R.Rep. No. 103-111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 260 (1993) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1993, pp. 378, 587.

Substantial Evidence

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides that "[a]ny decision by a State or local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless service facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record." 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). In determining whether a denial was supported by substantial evidence, a court must employ "the traditional standard used for judicial review of agency actions." Cellular Telephone, 166 F.3d at 494 (citation omitted). This standard of review is deferential, and a Court may neither engage in its own fact-finding nor supplant the local authority's reasonable determinations. Id.; see also Prime-Co Personal Communications, L.P. v. Village of Fox Lake, 26 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1063 (N.D.Ill.1998). Substantial evidence,...

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