Sproates v. State

Decision Date13 April 1984
Docket NumberNo. 975,975
Citation58 Md.App. 547,473 A.2d 1289
PartiesWilliam Harry SPROATES, Jr. v. STATE of Maryland. Sept. Term 1983.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Cynthia E. Young, Assigned Public Defender, with whom was Alan Murrell, Public Defender, on brief, for appellant.

Valerie J. Monaghan, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Bernard A. Penner, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Frederick Price, State's Atty. for Kent County and Suzanne Schmoldt, Asst. State's Atty. for Kent County, on brief, for appellee.

Argued before WILNER, ALPERT, and BLOOM, JJ.

ALPERT, Judge.

A confidential informant advised the Maryland State Police that William Harry Sproates, Jr., appellant, was distributing marijuana and concealing that marijuana in trailers located on appellant's farm near Golts, Maryland. Because the informant's information was insufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant, Trooper Roger L. Layton was dispatched to verify the informant's assertions.

Appellant's five acres of property was bounded on the west and south by the Millington Wildlife Management Area and on the north by railroad tracks.

On the evening of December 6, 1982, the trooper followed directions provided to him by the informant and entered appellant's property by way of a logging path from the wildlife area. Trooper Layton was not aware he had trespassed upon appellant's property. There were no "No Trespassing" signs posted and no fence or gate restricted his entry onto the land. Almost immediately, Trooper Layton came upon one of the three trailers described by the informant. The trooper saw no signs of habitation in the silver-colored trailer and did not espy and type of residence nearby. The trailer was located in a "junky area" and was surrounded by old cars and cinderblocks. The door to the silver trailer was missing and an old board was acting as "a ragged type of door." Trooper Layton was able to observe the contents of the trailer by looking through the partially opened doorway. He viewed what he believed to be marijuana hanging inside the trailer. The trooper's criminal investigation training led him to believe that the marijuana was being dried prior to processing and packaging. Forthwith, Trooper Layton left this area in order to obtain a search warrant. The trooper had been in this area for no more than two minutes.

As he walked away from the trailer, Trooper Layton followed a boundary line marked with string and wire. When he reached the end of this line, the trooper noticed several "No Trespassing" signs on the property's main drive as well as a jug with the words "Bad Dog W. Sproates" printed on it. This was further confirmation that Trooper Layton had investigated the property described by the confidential informant.

Thereafter, Trooper Layton completed an affidavit seeking authorization to search appellant's property, the trailers and any person or vehicle found on that property. District Court Judge H. Thomas Sisk Jr. reviewed the affidavit and issued the warrant at approximately 8:00 p.m. on December 7, 1982.

Two hours later the warrant was executed by Trooper Layton and three other members of the Maryland State Police. Large quantities of suspected marijuana were seized from the silver trailer observed the previous evening by Trooper Layton. Also discovered in that trailer was a shotgun with a cord hooked around the trigger. The troopers then proceeded to a red and white trailer located 100-150 yards away. After checking for possible boobytraps, the troopers cut a padlock off the trailer's door. Trooper Layton observed more suspected marijuana. Two rifles and a single beam balance were also discovered. The troopers then walked to a gray-colored trailer. More suspected marijuana was located.

Troopers Pinder and Price were assigned to stake out appellant's property while the seizures were taking place. At approximately 1:25 a.m., on the morning of December 8, 1982, Trooper Pinder observed a vehicle leaving the property without its headlights illuminated. The lights of the vehicle, a pick-up truck, were turned on at the end of the property's driveway. The truck was stopped; its occupants were identified as appellant and William Harry Sproates, III, appellant's son. The two men were "patted down." Several shotgun shells were found in appellant's pocket. An unloaded single-barrelled shotgun was found in the truck's floorboards, a loaded Magnum was found beneath clothing on the front seat, and eleven shotgun shells were found in the truck.

Trooper Layton was summoned to the area where appellant, his son, and the truck had been stopped. He observed that both men had a "leafy material and residue on their clothing." Trooper Layton then conducted his own search of the truck and found a small quantity of marijuana in the glove compartment. At this point, Trooper Layton decided there was a need to search the property's residence. Thereafter, he left the property and applied for a second warrant. Included in this warrant's affidavit was the aforementioned activity. Judge Sisk issued the second search warrant between 4:00-5:00 a.m. on December 8, 1982 and the premises were searched at approximately 6:00 a.m. Seized were suitcases, jars, boxes, and bags of suspected marijuana and other paraphernalia commonly used to manufacture, package and distribute illegal substances.

All evidence seized from the trailers, the truck and appellant's house were determined to be marijuana. Two State pick-up trucks carted away the marijuana on appellant's property. A total of 600 pounds was seized. In walking distance, the trailers were located more than a mile 1 from the property's residence.

A State motion to consolidate the cases against appellant and his son was granted. Both defendants moved to suppress all evidence seized pursuant to the two search warrants, alleging that the warrants had been issued without probable cause. The defendants argued that Trooper Layton's December 6, 1982 entry onto the property was illegal and that the trooper's observation of the trailer and its contents was constitutionally impermissible. Moreover, appellant and his son prayed that all evidence seized from the truck and house also be suppressed because these items were not described with particularity in the search warrants.

A suppression hearing was duly conducted and the motion was denied. A court trial before Chief Judge George B. Rasin, Jr. in the Circuit Court for Kent County ensued and both defendants were convicted for possession of and intent to distribute marijuana arising out of the violations discovered on December 7, 1982 (execution of first search warrant), possession of and intent to distribute marijuana arising out of the violations discovered on December 8, 1982 (execution of the second warrant), possession of drug paraphernalia, and a handgun violation. Appellant received a five year sentence and a $5,000. fine for the December 7, 1982 violations, a five-year sentence and a $5,000 fine for the December 8, 1982 violations, and a one-year sentence on the handgun charge. All sentences were ordered to run consecutively.

Aggrieved at these developments, appellant 2 seeks reversal of his convictions and argues that:

I. The trial court erred in failing to grant appellant's motion to suppress.

II. The convictions of appellant for possession in a sufficient quantity to indicate manufacture and simple possession under both the indictment relating to December 7, 1982 and December 8, 1982 constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution.

III. Appellant was not properly convicted for a violation of Article 27 Section 36B, for unlawful possession of a handgun.

IV. Appellant was entrapped as to commission of the handgun offense.

We perceive no error and shall affirm.

I. Motion to Suppress

Appellant contends that his motion to suppress should have been granted because there was no probable cause for the issuance of the first warrant. From this, he asserts that the illegality of the first search has a domino effect precluding the admissions of evidence seized when his truck was stopped and pursuant to the second warrant. Appellant reasons that no probable cause existed for the first warrant because Trooper Layton's observation of the marijuana in the trailer was effectuated by way of an impermissible warrantless search. Appellant overlooks the possibility that the trooper may not have needed a warrant to make his observation. Instead, he has leapt headlong into the merits of a Fourth Amendment controversy without "lingering at the threshold to inquire whether the Fourth Amendment is applicable so as even to require satisfaction." R. Gilbert & C. Moylan, Maryland Criminal Law: Practice and Procedure § 25.0 at page 279 (1983).

Chief Judge Rasin denied appellant's suppression motion because Trooper Layton's activities occurred in an uninhabited open area. Even though the trooper had committed a technical trespass, the trial judge found, "under the circumstances ... he had a right to make the investigation and attempt to verify the information that was furnished him."

The term "open area" used by Chief Judge Rasin alludes to the Open Fields Doctrine first articulated in Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 L.Ed. 898 (1924). Internal Revenue Service agents had received a tip that Hester was manufacturing moonshine. Based on this information, the federal investigators trespassed upon Hester's property, remaining 50-100 yards from the house. Hester was observed with a bottle of moonshine, a chase occurred, and a jug and bottle of moonshine whiskey were recovered and introduced over objection at Hester's trial. Hester argued that the seizure had been illegal due to the warrantless seizure and the agents' trespass. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction in a three-page opinion. The Court observed that the evidence had not been obtained by entry into...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • Powell v. State, 2321 Sept. Term, 2000.
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • July 10, 2001
    ...(recognizing de novo review concerning question of whether defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy); Sproates v. State, 58 Md.App. 547, 563, 473 A.2d 1289 (1984) ("A trial court's determination that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists `is a legal conclusion involving substa......
  • Blasi v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • March 2, 2006
    ...individual's `legitimate expectation of privacy.'" Stanberry v. State, 343 Md. 720, 731, 684 A.2d 823 (1996); see Sproates v. State, 58 Md.App. 547, 563, 473 A.2d 1289 (1984) (describing the principle as a "legitimate or reasonable" expectation of privacy).8 When the teachings of Katz and i......
  • Sparks v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 1, 1991
    ...Dravo v. State, 46 Md.App. 622, 420 A.2d 1012 (1980); Grindstaff v. State, 57 Md.App. 412, 470 A.2d 809 (1984); Sproates v. State, 58 Md.App. 547, 473 A.2d 1289 (1984). In summary, in 31 of the 34 post-Callahan, post-Sorrells Maryland cases to have considered the subject of entrapment, 25 t......
  • Mcgurk v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 7, 2011
    ...“the Fourth Amendment applies only to ‘constitutionally protected areas' such as a person's house or curtilage.” Sproates v. State, 58 Md.App. 547, 557, 473 A.2d 1289 (1984). Thus, the first question we must determine is whether the second story balcony in question was part of the curtilage......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT