Sprouse v. Settle
| Decision Date | 12 February 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 16358.,16358. |
| Citation | 274 F.2d 681 |
| Parties | Doctor Irby SPROUSE, Jr., Appellant, v. Dr. R. O. SETTLE, Warden, Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri, Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Irby Sprouse, pro se.
Before JOHNSEN, Chief Judge, and SANBORN and VAN OOSTERHOUT, Circuit Judges.
The appeal is from a denial by the District Court, without a hearing, of appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Appellant is an inmate of the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners at Springfield, Missouri. He is under recommitment as a conditional-release violator, for service of the balance of a three-year sentence against him. Warrant for his retaking had been duly executed upon him under 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 4205 and 4206, and revocation of his conditional release was made pursuant to § 4207.
The controlling factor on his petition for a writ is on what date service of the sentence that is involved must be regarded as having been initially commenced by him. This is, of course, determinative of the extent or portion of his sentence which had been executed by him at the time he was conditionally released, and so of whether the warrant for his retaking had, within the requirement of § 4205, been "issued * * * within the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced", and in relation to the jurisdictional restriction imposed upon the Board of Parole by the amendment made to § 4164 in 1951, 65 Stat. 98, the effect of which is to permit the Board to take cognizance of and to act upon only such violations of a conditional release as have occurred more than 180 days before the release would become final or absolute.1
Under amended § 4164 a release granted by the Board of Parole, pursuant to § 4163, is therefore not subject to revocation for violation, where the release was not issued more than 180 days before the expiration of the maximum term or terms for which the prisoner was sentenced. The same is true also as to any other release under § 4163, which has been issued before such time, but which has not been the subject of any violation of its terms until 180 days or less prior to the expiration of the maximum term or terms for which the prisoner was sentenced. See U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. Service, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1951, Vol. 2, pp. 1544-1547; Schiffman v. Wilkinson, 9 Cir., 216 F.2d 589, 591.
This appears to be the extent of the significance of the 180-days provision of § 4164. It does not operate as a legal commutation of the term or terms for which a prisoner was sentenced. It is without any effect as to a prisoner who has not earned the right to be released for good-conduct and industrial-time allowances under §§ 4161 and 4162. Similarly, it does not prevent the retaking of a prisoner into custody during such 180-days period, as to a conditional release granted to him more than 180 days before the expiration of his maximum term or terms, whose conditions he has violated, and in relation to which a warrant has been issued against him under § 4206, before the 180-days period has been reached.
In short, the object and consequence of the 1951 amendment to § 4164 would seem to be simply to leave a prisoner not subject to the control, supervision and prescriptions of the Board during the last 180-days period of the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced, provided that he is on release under good-conduct and industrial-time allowances.
Appellant contended, as a basis for the writ application which he made, that at the time of his conditional release there were only 108 days remaining of the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced, and that the Board therefore was in any event without jurisdiction to retake him into custody. This contention, however, rests on a number of fallacious premises. It misconceives the nature and effect of the 180-days provision in § 4164, which has been discussed above, but which appellant insists constitutes a statutory commutation in the maximum term or terms of all prisoners and has no relation to whether they are on release for good-conduct and industrial-time allowances. Appellant's contention as to his sentence balance misconceives also the object and significance of the legislative provision allowing consecutive sentences to be aggregated as a basis for computing good-conduct and industrial-time allowances under §§ 4161 and 4162, in that he seeks to have accorded to such a record accumulation the effect of accelerating the dates when the service of subsequent sentences will have been commenced.
The provisions of § 4161 for good-conduct allowances to a prisoner, and for aggregation of the lengths of the consecutive sentences against him as a basis for arriving at the rate and amount of book-credits necessary to entitle a conditional release to be issued, do not change or affect the legal length of the sentence or sentences against the prisoner, or the time when service of any such sentence is made to commence by the judgment of the court. Sections 4161 and 4162, in conjunction with §§ 4163 and 4164, simply provide a means by which it is possible for a prisoner to achieve a different form or mode of effecting service of part of the term or terms of sentence existing against him, when his accumulation of good time has reached the point where it is entitled to become effective in conditional release.
But the right of a prisoner to make such a substituted form of sentence-service is conditional and not absolute. The prisoner cannot engage in any legal or moral misconduct while he is on conditional release. And for any such misconduct in which he may engage, while on conditional release, up until the last 180 days of his maximum term or terms of sentence are reached, he is subject to being retaken into custody by Board warrant; having all of his previously earned good time forfeited; and being required to take up the prison-service of his sentence at the point where this had been left off when he was conditionally released.
Thus, the date when service of the sentence that is here involved legally commenced was not controlled or affected by the amount of good-conduct and industrial-time credits standing on appellant's penitentiary record at any time. Those credits or allowances had no significance for any legal purpose, until they reached an amount sufficient to...
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Shelton v. United States Board of Parole, 20591
...Cir. 1966); Jenkins v. Madigan, 211 F.2d 904 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 842, 75 S.Ct. 63, 99 L.Ed. 664 (1954); Sprouse v. Settle, 274 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1960); Zavada v. Taylor, 285 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 5 However, since appellant was released on parole, not as a mandatory releasee, it......
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Mustain v. Pearson, 78-1723
...as an unconditional discharge from the FYCA sentence and terminated jurisdiction over him under FYCA. He argues, Citing Sprouse v. Settle, 274 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1960), that service of his consecutive sentence could not legally commence until the FYCA sentence had been completed, that he wa......
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Tirado v. Blackwell, 24283
...F.2d 234; Taylor v. Godwin, 10 Cir. 1960, 284 F.2d 116; Taylor v. United States Marshal, 10 Cir. 1965, 352 F.2d 232; cf. Sprouse v. Settle, 8 Cir. 1960, 274 F.2d 681; Birch v. Anderson, 1965, 123 U.S.App.D.C. 153, 358 F.2d 520. On November 27, 1964, the date on which the full term of the ap......
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United States v. Franklin, 69-Cr-28 and 69-C-67.
...v. United States, 186 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1950); Kay v. United States, 279 F.2d 734 (6th Cir. 1960); and quoting from Sprouse v. Settle, 274 F.2d 681 (8th Cir. 1960) at 684: "Legally, a sentence made consecutive to another is not able to be commenced to be served until the other has been exe......