Spruce Creek Dev. Of Ocala v. Drew, 98-2004.
Decision Date | 24 September 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 98-2004.,98-2004. |
Citation | 746 So.2d 1109 |
Parties | SPRUCE CREEK DEVELOPMENT CO., OF OCALA, INC., Appellant, v. Wilma DREW and William Drew, her husband, Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert E. Bonner and Ernest J. Myers, of Meier, Lengauer, Bonner, Muszynski & Doyle, P.A., Orlando, for appellant.
Steven L. Brannock, Chris N. Kolos and Thomas M. Burke, of Holland & Knight— Maguire, Voorhis & Wells, Orlando, for appellees.
Spruce Creek Development Company of Ocala, Inc.["Spruce Creek"], appeals a final judgment in favor of Wilma and William Drew["the Drews"], arising out of a head-on motor vehicle accident killing one driver and permanently maiming the other, Mrs. Drew.The Drews contend that the accident was caused by improper signage at the entrance to appellant's retirement community in Marion County.Because we conclude that the jury was erroneously instructed, we reverse.
Six years before the accident, on March 29, 1989, through its roadway engineer Joseph Martone, P.E., Spruce Creek applied for and was granted a "Single Family Residential III Connection Permit" from the Florida Department of Transportation["FDOT"], to construct an entrance and exit to its retirement development.Specifically, Spruce Creek sought to construct "one two way driveway, and 82' cross-over and left and right turn lanes" connecting the access road, S.E. 176th Street to U.S. 441, a divided four lane highway.It is undisputed that the access road did not extend beyond U.S. 441 and that the connection would result in a "T" intersection.
The application contained several provisions, including:
The connection(s) will be constructed in accordance with regulations adopted by the Department of Transportation and covered in its "Policy and Guidelines for Vehicular Connections to Roads on the State Highway System."
The application also contained special provisions including:
5.The applicant shall construct and maintain any and all traffic control devices required or called for by application of the U.S. Department of Transportation's Federal Highway Administration Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways.
At the time of the permit, the FDOT's "Policy and Guidelines for Vehicular Connections to Roads on the State Highway System(1985)" provided at page 44 that:
All traffic control devices shall be installed in accordance with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices(MUTCD) and the current Department standards and specifications.(Emphasis original).
Section 2B-29 of the U.S. Department of Transportation's Federal Highway Administration Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways ["MUTCD"], entitled "One Way Sign," provides in pertinent part:
Section 2A-31 of the MUTCD, entitled "Wrong-Way Traffic Control," provides in pertinent part:
The FDOT approved Spruce Creek's permit on May 12, 1989, and construction began.Spruce Creek did not submit a traffic control device plan or drawing with its application.During construction, FDOT inspected the connection to determine whether the construction complied with the permit and FDOT did require Spruce Creek to install a stop sign and stop bar at the intersection.One-way signs were not required.
Prior to the construction of the connection, Acting State Traffic Engineer, Jack Brown["Brown"], had issued an instructional memorandum on October 10, 1988, and a revised memorandum on November 18, 1988, entitled, "One-Way Signs on Divided Highway Intersections," regarding ambiguities in recent revisions of the MUTCD.The stated purpose of the memoranda to district traffic engineers was: "To establish the need for and location of one-way signs ... and other signs and pavement markings for crossroads on divided highways."
Both memoranda contained the identical background section detailing the ambiguity:
Accordingly, Brown outlined guidelines interpreting the MUTCD revisions:
Therefore, in order to provide clear guidelines and ensure uniformity in application statewide, the following criteria have been established ...
The guidelines articulated the new policy for placement of signs on divided highways with medians greater than 30 feet and contained the following comment concerning "T" intersections:
These guidelines (as well as the MUTCD) are only intended for crossroads and not crossovers(including "T" intersection).A crossroad is any roadway, paved or unpaved, which is maintained by a public agency.Driveways and entrances to businesses are not considered crossroads.However, if large malls or office complex type developments exist, it may be necessary to install the signs and markings noted herein.This decision is left to the discretion of the engineer.(Emphasis original).
After construction had been completed on the Spruce Creek connection at issue, Brown, now the State Traffic Operations Engineer, issued another instructional memorandum to district traffic engineers on July 2, 1990, entitled "One-way Signs on Divided Highway Intersections":
On June 15, 1991, the FDOT published the Traffic Engineering Manual referred to in Brown's memorandum.The manual section entitled "Signs and Markings at Nonsignalized Intersections of Divided Highways and Crossroads" contained the following definition:
Crossroad.Any intersecting roadway, paved or unpaved, which is maintained by a public agency.It does not include crossovers or "T" intersections.Driveways and entrances to businesses are not considered crossroads.However, if large malls or office complex developments exist, it may be necessary to install the...
Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI
Get Started for FreeStart Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 3-day Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting

Start Your 7-day Trial
-
Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc.
...Sod, Inc. v. Willis Shaw Express, Inc., 817 So.2d 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), which certified conflict with the decisions in Flight Express, Inc. v. Robinson, 736 So.2d 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), and
Spruce Creek Development Co. of Ocala, Inc. v. Drew, 746 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we approve the decision of the district court The facts of the instant case as stated by the district"mandates greater detail in settlement proposals, which will hopefully enable parties to focus with greater specificity in their negotiations and thereby facilitate more settlements and less litigation"). We therefore hold that under the plain language of rule 1.442(c)(3), an offer from multiple plaintiffs must apportion the offer among the plaintiffs. Accordingly, we approve the decision below, and disapprove Flight Express and Spruce Creekto the extent that those decisionsthe amount and terms of the offer that are attributable to each offeror in order to evaluate the offer as it pertains to that party."). The district court below then certified conflict with Flight Express, 736 So.2d at 797, and Spruce Creek, 746 So.2d at 1116, both of which held that the lack of apportionment in offerors' proposal for settlement did not render the proposal invalid. Willis Shaw Express, Inc., and Edward McAlpine now petition this Court to quash the district... -
Matetzschk v. Lamb
...(section 768.79, Florida Statutes) on the basis that the lack of apportionment between the claimants was a matter of indifference to the defendant, who would be entitled to a release by both claimants upon his acceptance of their offer.
Spruce Creekhas now been expressly disapproved with respect to this point by the recent opinion of the Florida Supreme Court in Willis Shaw. Therein, the opinion of Justice Wells emphasized the language of Florida Rule of Civilagreement on a single "Proposal for Settlement," not an agreement as to all three proposals. There is case precedent in this district in regard to undifferentiated offers of judgment. In Spruce Creek Development Co. of Ocala, Inc. v. Drew, 746 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999),disapproved of by Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So.2d 276, 2003 WL 1089304 (Fla. 2003), we held that a single and undifferentiated offer of an injured driver and her husband, who... -
D'ANGELO v. Fitzmaurice
...his or her individual claims, in violation of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3). The district court of appeal denied the motion for attorney's fees and certified conflict with
Spruce Creek Development Co. v. Drew, 746 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), and Flight Express, Inc. v. Robinson, 736 So.2d 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). II. CERTIFIED QUESTION OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE The district court failed to note in its opinion and certified question the distinction betweenthe injury where the settling tortfeasor was not included on the verdict form. However, there should be no setoff for noneconomic damages. We also review D'Angelo for certified conflict with Spruce Creek Development Co. v. Drew, 746 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), and Flight Express, Inc. v. Robinson, 736 So.2d 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), on an attorney's fees and cost question under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1997). We accept jurisdiction in this$98,096.22.12 III. CERTIFIED CONFLICT The certified conflict in this case was resolved by this Court in Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So.2d 276 (Fla.2003), which disapproved the holdings in Flight Express and Spruce Creek. This Court held in Willis Shaw that a joint proposal of settlement which did not specifically apportion damages between plaintiffs was invalid and that the plaintiffs were, therefore, not entitled to attorney's... -
Meyer v. Hutchinson
...amounts attributable to the personal injury and consortium claims. The trial court awarded attorney's fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2002), based on this court's holding in
Spruce Creek Development Co. of Ocala v. Drew, 746 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Spruce Creek held that the lack of apportionment in an offeror's proposal for settlement did not render the proposal invalid. Meyer contends that the joint proposals for settlement served inconsortium claims. The trial court awarded attorney's fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2002), based on this court's holding in Spruce Creek Development Co. of Ocala v. Drew, 746 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Spruce Creekheld that the lack of apportionment in an offeror's proposal for settlement did not render the proposal invalid. Meyer contends that the joint proposals for settlement served in this case are invalid for failing to apportiontrial court found the Hutchinsons' proposal to be valid based on Spruce Creek. This court in Matetzschk v. Lamb, 849 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), has previously acknowledged that the Florida Supreme Court expressly disapproved of Spruce Creekin Willis Shaw Express, Inc., finding unapportioned proposals of settlement void under rule 1.442(c)(3) and section 768.79, Florida Statutes. Complying with Willis Shaw Express, Inc., we...
-
Proposals for settlement: minding your p's and q's under rule 1.442.
...of South Florida, Inc., 761 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 2000). (10) Id. (11) Id. (12) Id. (13) Liguori v. Daly, 756 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2000). (14) Spruce Creek Devel. Co. of Ocala, Inc. v. Drew,
746 So. 2d 1109, 1116 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. (15) Committee Notes to Rule 1.442 (1996 Amendment). (16) McFarland & Son v. Basel, 727 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1999), rev. denied, 743 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1999). (17) C&S Chemicals, Inc. v.... -
Proposals for settlement: more traps for the unwary.
...for joint offerors, it may be harmless error for joint defendants to fail to apportion the offer if "the theory for the [offeror's] joint liability does not allow for apportionment." (38) In Spruce Creek Development Co. v. Drew,
746 So. 2d 1109(Fla. 5th DCA 1999), the joint offer was made on behalf of the injured driver and her husband, who brought a loss of consortium claim. (39) Relying on the Third District's holding in Flight Express, Inc. v. Robinson, 736 So. 2d 796D.C.A. 2001); Ford Motor Co. v. Myers ex rel. Myers, 771 So. 2d 1202, 1204 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2000); McGarland & Son, Inc. v. Basel, 727 So. 2d 266, 270 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1999). (7) Spruce Creek Dev. Co. of Ocala, Inc. v. Drew, 746 So. 2d 1109, 1116 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1999); Flight Express, Inc. v. Robinson, 736 So. 2d 796, 797 n.1 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. (8) Eagleman v. Eagleman, 673 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1996). (9) Unicare Health Facilities,Id. at 972 n.1. (32) White, 27 FLA. L. WEEKLY S331. (33) Id. (34) Id. (35) See supra note 7. (36) See, e.g., Safelite Glass Corp. v. Samuel, 771 So. 2d 44, 45-46 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2000); Spruce Creek Dev. Co. v. Drew, 746 So. 2d 1109(Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1999); Flight Express, Inc. v. Robinson, 736 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1999). (37) See, e.g., Hilyer Sod, Inc. v. Willis Shaw Express, Inc., 2002 WL 1223140 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. June 6, 2002); Clipper v. Bay...