Spruce Creek Dev. Of Ocala v. Drew, 98-2004.

Decision Date24 September 1999
Docket NumberNo. 98-2004.,98-2004.
Citation746 So.2d 1109
PartiesSPRUCE CREEK DEVELOPMENT CO., OF OCALA, INC., Appellant, v. Wilma DREW and William Drew, her husband, Appellees.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Robert E. Bonner and Ernest J. Myers, of Meier, Lengauer, Bonner, Muszynski & Doyle, P.A., Orlando, for appellant.

Steven L. Brannock, Chris N. Kolos and Thomas M. Burke, of Holland & KnightMaguire, Voorhis & Wells, Orlando, for appellees.

GRIFFIN, J.

Spruce Creek Development Company of Ocala, Inc.["Spruce Creek"], appeals a final judgment in favor of Wilma and William Drew["the Drews"], arising out of a head-on motor vehicle accident killing one driver and permanently maiming the other, Mrs. Drew.The Drews contend that the accident was caused by improper signage at the entrance to appellant's retirement community in Marion County.Because we conclude that the jury was erroneously instructed, we reverse.

Six years before the accident, on March 29, 1989, through its roadway engineer Joseph Martone, P.E., Spruce Creek applied for and was granted a "Single Family Residential III Connection Permit" from the Florida Department of Transportation["FDOT"], to construct an entrance and exit to its retirement development.Specifically, Spruce Creek sought to construct "one two way driveway, and 82' cross-over and left and right turn lanes" connecting the access road, S.E. 176th Street to U.S. 441, a divided four lane highway.It is undisputed that the access road did not extend beyond U.S. 441 and that the connection would result in a "T" intersection.

The application contained several provisions, including:

The connection(s) will be constructed in accordance with regulations adopted by the Department of Transportation and covered in its "Policy and Guidelines for Vehicular Connections to Roads on the State Highway System."

The application also contained special provisions including:

5.The applicant shall construct and maintain any and all traffic control devices required or called for by application of the U.S. Department of Transportation's Federal Highway Administration Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways.

At the time of the permit, the FDOT's "Policy and Guidelines for Vehicular Connections to Roads on the State Highway System(1985)" provided at page 44 that:

All traffic control devices shall be installed in accordance with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices(MUTCD) and the current Department standards and specifications.(Emphasis original).

Section 2B-29 of the U.S. Department of Transportation's Federal Highway Administration Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways ["MUTCD"], entitled "One Way Sign," provides in pertinent part:

One Way signs shall be placed on the near right-hand and the far-left hand corners of the intersection at non-signaled intersections so as to face traffic entering or crossing the one-way street (figure 2-3), except that intersections of divided highways with median widths of 30 feet or more1 may be signed as in section 2A-31 ... A One Way sign should always be used, where applicable, and may be supplemented by a Turn Prohibited Sign (sec.2B-15).
One Way signs are not ordinarily needed on the one-way roadways of divided highways, where the design of interchanges indicates the direction of traffic on the separate roadways.

Section 2A-31 of the MUTCD, entitled "Wrong-Way Traffic Control," provides in pertinent part:

Efforts should be made to identify and make practical corrections at grade intersections on divided highways where wrong-way usage is being experienced or where a wide median, a rural unlighted environment or other contributing factors indicate the likelihood of wrong-way movements.
Where roadways are separated by median widths of 30 feet or more, the intersections with the crossroad shall be signed as two separate intersections and ONE WAY signs (section 2B-29) should be visible to each crossroad approach on the near right-hand and far left-hand corners of each intersection with the directional roadways as shown in Figure 2-3.However, when an engineering study has demonstrated that placement of ONE WAY signs in the median area may create confusion, the near right-hand signs in the median may be omitted and ONE WAY signs placed in the far right quadrant of the intersection.Figure 2-3a shows this alternate scheme with one pair of ONE WAY signs in the median replaced by YIELD signs.Turn Prohibition, DO NOT ENTER and WRONG WAY signs may be used to supplement ONE WAY sign layouts in Figures2-3, 2-3a,2-4.
* * * * * *
If used, DO NOT ENTER and WRONG WAY signs should be placed on a divided highway at a location to be directly in view of a driver making a wrong-way entry from the crossroad.Additional signs may be placed where the median width is 30 feet or more ...

The FDOT approved Spruce Creek's permit on May 12, 1989, and construction began.Spruce Creek did not submit a traffic control device plan or drawing with its application.During construction, FDOT inspected the connection to determine whether the construction complied with the permit and FDOT did require Spruce Creek to install a stop sign and stop bar at the intersection.One-way signs were not required.

Prior to the construction of the connection, Acting State Traffic Engineer, Jack Brown["Brown"], had issued an instructional memorandum on October 10, 1988, and a revised memorandum on November 18, 1988, entitled, "One-Way Signs on Divided Highway Intersections," regarding ambiguities in recent revisions of the MUTCD.The stated purpose of the memoranda to district traffic engineers was: "To establish the need for and location of one-way signs ... and other signs and pavement markings for crossroads on divided highways."

Both memoranda contained the identical background section detailing the ambiguity:

The requirements for the placement of signing and pavement markings for intersections on divided highways were revised in the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) in RevisionNo. 3 dated 9/84.The guidelines provided in the MUTCD in Section 2A-31 and the Figures 2-3 and 2-3a for RevisionNo. 3, were somewhat confusing.Section 2A-31 was subsequently revised via the Federal Register(Vol. 53 No. 51) on March 16, 1988 and became effective March 21, 1988.In spite of these revisions, the intent of the Manual is still unclear in part.The standards for signing and marking intersections on divided highways with median widths over 30 feet are shown in Figures 2-3 (page 2A-11) and 2-3a (bottom of page 2A-12).The text on Page 2A-18 explains that Figure 2-3 should be used except "... when an engineering study has demonstrated that placement of ONE WAY signs in the median may create confusion, the near right-hand signs in the median may be omitted and ONE WAY signs placed in the far right quadrant of the intersection.Figure 2-3a shows this alternate scheme with one pair of ONE WAY signs in the median replaced with YIELD signs.TURN PROHIBITION, DO NOT ENTER and WRONG WAY signs may be used to supplement ONE WAY sign layouts in Figures2-3, 2-3a or 2-4."
Accordingly, it is not clear as to what pavement markings are required in the median area and what criteria should be used to determine the need for TURN PROHIBITION, DO NOT ENTER, and WRONG WAY signs.
This instructional memorandum is temporarily pending the processing of a procedure on this subject.

Accordingly, Brown outlined guidelines interpreting the MUTCD revisions:

Therefore, in order to provide clear guidelines and ensure uniformity in application statewide, the following criteria have been established ...

The guidelines articulated the new policy for placement of signs on divided highways with medians greater than 30 feet and contained the following comment concerning "T" intersections:

These guidelines (as well as the MUTCD) are only intended for crossroads and not crossovers(including "T" intersection).A crossroad is any roadway, paved or unpaved, which is maintained by a public agency.Driveways and entrances to businesses are not considered crossroads.However, if large malls or office complex type developments exist, it may be necessary to install the signs and markings noted herein.This decision is left to the discretion of the engineer.(Emphasis original).

After construction had been completed on the Spruce Creek connection at issue, Brown, now the State Traffic Operations Engineer, issued another instructional memorandum to district traffic engineers on July 2, 1990, entitled "One-way Signs on Divided Highway Intersections":

To clarify an issue raised over an instructional memorandum on the above subject dated November 18, 1988, the use of one-way signing at T-intersections on divided highways with medians over 30 feet is allowed.One-way signing should also be used for signalized intersections with medians over 30 feet.Typical applications are show in Figures2-3, 2-3a of the MUTCD, (the yield signs would not be used for signalized intersections).
One-way signing for divided highway intersections was the subject of a procedure initially proposed by this office.However, since the document presented guidelines for signing, it will not appear as a procedure but will be included in the Traffic Engineering Manual, to be published later this year.

On June 15, 1991, the FDOT published the Traffic Engineering Manual referred to in Brown's memorandum.The manual section entitled "Signs and Markings at Nonsignalized Intersections of Divided Highways and Crossroads" contained the following definition:

Crossroad.Any intersecting roadway, paved or unpaved, which is maintained by a public agency.It does not include crossovers or "T" intersections.Driveways and entrances to businesses are not considered crossroads.However, if large malls or office complex developments exist, it may be necessary to install the
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18 cases
  • Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc.
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • Marzo 13, 2003
    ...Sod, Inc. v. Willis Shaw Express, Inc., 817 So.2d 1050 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002), which certified conflict with the decisions in Flight Express, Inc. v. Robinson, 736 So.2d 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), and Spruce Creek Development Co. of Ocala, Inc. v. Drew, 746 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons that follow, we approve the decision of the district court The facts of the instant case as stated by the district"mandates greater detail in settlement proposals, which will hopefully enable parties to focus with greater specificity in their negotiations and thereby facilitate more settlements and less litigation"). We therefore hold that under the plain language of rule 1.442(c)(3), an offer from multiple plaintiffs must apportion the offer among the plaintiffs. Accordingly, we approve the decision below, and disapprove Flight Express and Spruce Creek to the extent that those decisionsthe amount and terms of the offer that are attributable to each offeror in order to evaluate the offer as it pertains to that party."). The district court below then certified conflict with Flight Express, 736 So.2d at 797, and Spruce Creek, 746 So.2d at 1116, both of which held that the lack of apportionment in offerors' proposal for settlement did not render the proposal invalid. Willis Shaw Express, Inc., and Edward McAlpine now petition this Court to quash the district...
  • Matetzschk v. Lamb
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • Julio 18, 2003
    ...(section 768.79, Florida Statutes) on the basis that the lack of apportionment between the claimants was a matter of indifference to the defendant, who would be entitled to a release by both claimants upon his acceptance of their offer. Spruce Creek has now been expressly disapproved with respect to this point by the recent opinion of the Florida Supreme Court in Willis Shaw. Therein, the opinion of Justice Wells emphasized the language of Florida Rule of Civilagreement on a single "Proposal for Settlement," not an agreement as to all three proposals. There is case precedent in this district in regard to undifferentiated offers of judgment. In Spruce Creek Development Co. of Ocala, Inc. v. Drew, 746 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999),disapproved of by Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So.2d 276, 2003 WL 1089304 (Fla. 2003), we held that a single and undifferentiated offer of an injured driver and her husband, who...
  • D'ANGELO v. Fitzmaurice
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • Noviembre 26, 2003
    ...his or her individual claims, in violation of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3). The district court of appeal denied the motion for attorney's fees and certified conflict with Spruce Creek Development Co. v. Drew, 746 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), and Flight Express, Inc. v. Robinson, 736 So.2d 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). II. CERTIFIED QUESTION OF GREAT PUBLIC IMPORTANCE The district court failed to note in its opinion and certified question the distinction betweenthe injury where the settling tortfeasor was not included on the verdict form. However, there should be no setoff for noneconomic damages. We also review D'Angelo for certified conflict with Spruce Creek Development Co. v. Drew, 746 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), and Flight Express, Inc. v. Robinson, 736 So.2d 796 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), on an attorney's fees and cost question under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1997). We accept jurisdiction in this$98,096.22.12 III. CERTIFIED CONFLICT The certified conflict in this case was resolved by this Court in Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So.2d 276 (Fla.2003), which disapproved the holdings in Flight Express and Spruce Creek. This Court held in Willis Shaw that a joint proposal of settlement which did not specifically apportion damages between plaintiffs was invalid and that the plaintiffs were, therefore, not entitled to attorney's...
  • Meyer v. Hutchinson
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • Diciembre 05, 2003
    ...amounts attributable to the personal injury and consortium claims. The trial court awarded attorney's fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2002), based on this court's holding in Spruce Creek Development Co. of Ocala v. Drew, 746 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Spruce Creek held that the lack of apportionment in an offeror's proposal for settlement did not render the proposal invalid. Meyer contends that the joint proposals for settlement served inconsortium claims. The trial court awarded attorney's fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2002), based on this court's holding in Spruce Creek Development Co. of Ocala v. Drew, 746 So.2d 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Spruce Creek held that the lack of apportionment in an offeror's proposal for settlement did not render the proposal invalid. Meyer contends that the joint proposals for settlement served in this case are invalid for failing to apportiontrial court found the Hutchinsons' proposal to be valid based on Spruce Creek. This court in Matetzschk v. Lamb, 849 So.2d 1141 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), has previously acknowledged that the Florida Supreme Court expressly disapproved of Spruce Creek in Willis Shaw Express, Inc., finding unapportioned proposals of settlement void under rule 1.442(c)(3) and section 768.79, Florida Statutes. Complying with Willis Shaw Express, Inc., we...
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2 books & journal articles
  • Proposals for settlement: minding your p's and q's under rule 1.442.
    • United States
    • Florida Bar Journal Florida Bar Littky-Rubin, Julie H.
    • February 01, 2001
    ...of South Florida, Inc., 761 So. 2d 399 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 2000). (10) Id. (11) Id. (12) Id. (13) Liguori v. Daly, 756 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2000). (14) Spruce Creek Devel. Co. of Ocala, Inc. v. Drew, 746 So. 2d 1109, 1116 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. (15) Committee Notes to Rule 1.442 (1996 Amendment). (16) McFarland & Son v. Basel, 727 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1999), rev. denied, 743 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1999). (17) C&S Chemicals, Inc. v....
  • Proposals for settlement: more traps for the unwary.
    • United States
    • Florida Bar Journal Florida Bar Pappas, Gary M.
    • December 01, 2002
    ...for joint offerors, it may be harmless error for joint defendants to fail to apportion the offer if "the theory for the [offeror's] joint liability does not allow for apportionment." (38) In Spruce Creek Development Co. v. Drew, 746 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), the joint offer was made on behalf of the injured driver and her husband, who brought a loss of consortium claim. (39) Relying on the Third District's holding in Flight Express, Inc. v. Robinson, 736 So. 2d 796D.C.A. 2001); Ford Motor Co. v. Myers ex rel. Myers, 771 So. 2d 1202, 1204 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2000); McGarland & Son, Inc. v. Basel, 727 So. 2d 266, 270 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1999). (7) Spruce Creek Dev. Co. of Ocala, Inc. v. Drew, 746 So. 2d 1109, 1116 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1999); Flight Express, Inc. v. Robinson, 736 So. 2d 796, 797 n.1 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. (8) Eagleman v. Eagleman, 673 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1996). (9) Unicare Health Facilities,Id. at 972 n.1. (32) White, 27 FLA. L. WEEKLY S331. (33) Id. (34) Id. (35) See supra note 7. (36) See, e.g., Safelite Glass Corp. v. Samuel, 771 So. 2d 44, 45-46 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 2000); Spruce Creek Dev. Co. v. Drew, 746 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1999); Flight Express, Inc. v. Robinson, 736 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1999). (37) See, e.g., Hilyer Sod, Inc. v. Willis Shaw Express, Inc., 2002 WL 1223140 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. June 6, 2002); Clipper v. Bay...