Spruell v. Allied Meadows Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 February 1990
• Docket Number: No. 17541,17541
• Parties: James A. SPRUELL, SSA 566 60 7493, Claimant-Appellant, v. ALLIED MEADOWS CORPORATION, dba Mountaintop Quick Lube, Employer-Respondent, and State of Idaho, Department of Employment, Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 263

787 P.2d 263

117 Idaho 277

James A. SPRUELL, SSA 566 60 7493, Claimant-Appellant, v. ALLIED MEADOWS CORPORATION, dba Mountaintop Quick Lube, Employer-Respondent, and State of Idaho, Department of Employment, Respondent.

No. 17541.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Feb. 15, 1990.

William H. Foster, Grangeville, for appellant.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., John C. Hummell (argued), Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for respondent Dept. of Employment.

James W. Given, Lewiston, for respondent Allied Meadows.

BOYLE, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission. The Idaho Department of Employment determined that appellant James Spruell was eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The Industrial Commission heard the matter de novo and issued its own findings and conclusions denying benefits. We affirm the decision of the Industrial Commission.

Spruell was employed by Allied Meadows Corporation to manage a combination convenience store and self-service gas station owned by Allied. Spruell was discharged from that employment and filed for unemployment compensation benefits. Allied alleged in opposing the claim for benefits that Spruell was discharged for cause because he disobeyed direct orders to maintain sufficient fuel levels in the service station storage tanks and had failed to keep signed business checks in a secure place in violation of the employer's instructions.

The Department of Employment hearing officer determined that Spruell's behavior did not constitute employment-related misconduct and awarded unemployment compensation benefits. The Industrial Commission, after de novo review, concluded that Allied prevailed by the weight of the evidence, and found that Spruell's behavior and conduct constituted sufficient employment-related misconduct to justify his discharge, and therefore he was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits.

This Court's review of unemployment compensation cases is limited by the Idaho Constitution and prior decisions of this Court to reviewing only questions of law. Idaho Constitution, art. 5 § 9; Puckett v. Idaho Dept. of Corrections, 107 Idaho 1022, 695 P.2d 407 (1985); Parker v. St. Maries Plywood, 101 Idaho 415, 614 P.2d 955 (1980); Harris v. Green Tree, Inc., 100 Idaho 227, 596 P.2d 99 (1979); Simmons v. Dept. of Employment, 99 Idaho 290, 581 P.2d 336 (1978); Booth v. City of Burley, 99 Idaho 229, 580 P.2d 75 (1978); Hutchinson v. J.R. Simplot Co., 98 Idaho 346, 563 P.2d 404 (1977). Further, our review in cases involving factual disputes is restricted to determining whether findings of fact by the Industrial Commission are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Burnside v. Gate City Steel Corp., 112 Idaho 1040, 739 P.2d 339 (1987); Ullrich v. Thorpe Elec., 109 Idaho 820, 712 P.2d 521 (1985); Booth v. City of Burley, 99 Idaho 229, 580 P.2d 75 (1978). As stated in Booth, we declined to "independently adopt findings of fact at variance with those of the Industrial Commission where such findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Prior decisions suggesting a contrary result are, to this extent, hereby expressly overruled." 99 Idaho at 232, 580 P.2d at 78. Where the factual findings of the Industrial Commission are sustained by substantial and competent, though conflicting evidence, they will not be reversed on appeal. Kyle v. Beco Corp., 109 Idaho 267, 707 P.2d 378 (1985); Wood v. Quali-Dent Dental Clinics, 107 Idaho 1020, 695 P.2d 405 (1985); Cornwell v. Kootenai County Sheriff, 106 Idaho 823, 683 P.2d 859 (1984). The Supreme Court is compelled to defer to the findings of the Industrial Commission when those findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Idaho Constitution, art. 5, § 9; Guillard v. Dept. of Employment, 100 Idaho 647, 603 P.2d 981 (1979).

The Industrial Commission's responsibility and scope of review in employment compensation claims is clearly set forth in I.C. § 72-1368(g) which provides in pertinent part:

(g) The Commission shall decide all claims for review filed by any interested party in accordance with its own rules of procedure not in conflict herewith. The record before the Commission shall consist of the record of proceedings before the appeals examiner, unless it appears to the Commission that the interests of justice require that the interested parties be permitted to present additional evidence. In that event, the Commission may, in its sole discretion, conduct a hearing to receive additional evidence or may refer the matter back to the appeals examiner for an additional hearing and decision. On the basis of the record of proceedings before the appeals examiner as well as any additional evidence, if allowed, the Commission shall affirm, reverse, modify, set aside or revise the decision of the appeals examiner or may refer the matter back to the appeals examiner for further proceedings. (Emphasis added.)

In I.C. § 72-1368(g), the legislature provided for a de novo review before the Industrial Commission based upon the record of the proceedings before the appeals examiner. In reviewing the instant case the Industrial Commission complied with the direction of the legislature by reviewing the record consisting of the proceedings before the hearing examiner and making its findings.

The Industrial Commission properly applied Idaho law in determining whether Spruell was eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. I.C. § 72-1366(e) provides that a claimant is ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits if unemployment is due to discharge for misconduct in connection with employment. The term "misconduct," as used in I.C. § 72-1366(e), has been interpreted by this Court as meaning "willful, intentional disregard of the employer's interest; a deliberate violation of the employer's rules; or a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employees." Johns v. S.H. Kress & Co., 78 Idaho 544, 548, 307 P.2d 217, 219 (1957); see also Matthews v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 101 Idaho 657, 619 P.2d 1110 (1980), wherein we held:

There is no requirement in the Johns definition of misconduct that the claimant's disregard of standards of behavior must be found to have been subjectively willful, intentional or deliberate. Rather the test for misconduct in standard-of-behavior cases is (1) whether the employee's conduct fell below the standard of behavior expected by the employer; and (2) whether the employer's expectation was objectively reasonable in the particular case. The employee's subjective state of mind is irrelevant.

101 Idaho at 659, 619 P.2d at 112.

The Industrial Commission concluded that at least two of the reasons advanced for terminating Spruell constituted employment-related misconduct which rendered him ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. The Industrial Commission found that Spruell's leaving the business checkbook with signed blank checks unattended was in direct contravention of the directions of the employer and allowing the service station gas tanks to become empty on several occasions was behavior constituting employment-related misconduct warranting his discharge thus precluding him from receiving unemployment compensation benefits.

Although this Court may have reached a different conclusion from the conflicting evidence, the findings reached by the Industrial Commission are supported by substantial, competent evidence and must be sustained. Burnside v. Gate City Steel Corp., 112 Idaho 1040, 739 P.2d 339 (1987); Ullrich v. Thorpe Elec., 109 Idaho 820, 712 P.2d 521 (1985); Booth v. City of Burley, 99 Idaho 229, 580 P.2d 75 (1978).

The decision of the Industrial Commission is affirmed. Costs to respondent.

BAKES, C.J., JOHNSON, J. and TOWLES, District Judge Pro Tem., concur.

BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting.

The majority opinion purports in one paragraph to rather facilely resolve an issue which has troubled this Court for several decades: The question of whether an employee's misconduct must be intentional in order to justify the denial of unemployment compensation. This Court has wrangled with this issue throughout the course of numerous opinions, many of which will be discussed in due course. To my mind the mere recitation of an isolated statement drawn from only one of this myriad of cases is an especially inadequate resolution of that issue in this particular case and the posture in which it arrives here.

THE DEFINITION OF "MISCONDUCT"

Construction of our employment security law is guided by the declaration of state public policy contained in I.C. § 72-1302 (1973) which provides in pertinent part:

The legislature, therefore, declares that, in its considered judgment, the public good, and the general welfare of the citizens of this state require the enactment of this measure, under the police powers of the state, and for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of persons unemployed through no fault of their own.

The requirement that persons must be unemployed through no fault of their own in order to be entitled to unemployment compensation benefits surfaces in a succeeding statute which states the personal eligibility conditions for unemployment compensation. I.C. § 72-1366 (Supp.1988) provides in relevant part:

The personal eligibility conditions of a benefit claimant are that--(f) His unemployment is not due to the fact that he left his employment voluntarily without good cause, or that he was discharged for misconduct in connection with his employment.

(Emphasis added.)

As stated at the outset, the definition of "misconduct" has troubled this Court for several decades. The legislature has to date left it to this Court to provide guidance as to what constitutes the "misconduct" which will suffice to preclude eligibility for benefits. Over the years two lines of cases have advanced competing definitions of "misconduct" in...