Spruell v. Barkley
| Decision Date | 14 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2: 17-cv-0809 |
| Parties | LASHAWN SPRUELL a/k/a SHAWN SPRUELL Plaintiff, v. KIMBERLY BARKLEY, individually in her former capacity as Board Secretary for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Chief United States Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy
Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 46). For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary judgment will be granted.
On June 26, 2017, Plaintiff, LaShawn Spruell a/k/a Shawn Spruell ("Plaintiff" or "Spruell"), a former state prisoner, initiated this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the filing of a counseled Complaint against thirteen named individual defendants, some of whom are employed by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and others of whom are employed by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (the "Board"), and John Does 1-10. Plaintiff alleges he was wrongfully incarcerated past his maximum parole release date. On September 19, 2017, Defendants filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that ten of the nameddefendants lacked personal involvement as required by § 1983. (ECF No. 11). Plaintiff apparently agreed and on October 2, 2017, filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice dismissing those ten defendants. (ECF No. 15). On May 18, 2018, with the approval of the Court, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in which he dismissed the remaining three original defendants, and substituted Kimberly Barkley, Board Secretary, for the John Doe Defendants.2 An additional thirty (30) day period for discovery was also allowed. The Amended Complaint remains Plaintiff's operative pleading. (ECF No. 37).
Discovery has closed and Defendant Barkley filed the instant motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 46), with a brief in support (ECF No. 47), a concise statement of undisputed material facts (ECF No. 38), and an appendix of record evidence (ECF No. 49). Defendant argues, inter alia, that she had no personal involvement with Plaintiff's case and, in the alternative, that she is entitled to summary judgment on all claims against her on the merits. In response Plaintiff, through counsel, filed a brief in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, with attached Exhibits (ECF No. 52). Defendant then filed a response to Plaintiff's counter concise statement of undisputed material facts (ECF No. 53) and a reply brief (ECF No. 54). Plaintiff, in turn, filed a response in opposition to Defendant's concise statement of material facts. (ECF No. 57). For the reasons set forth below, the Court agrees with Defendant and will grant her motion for summary judgment.
The facts in this lawsuit are straightforward. The summary judgment record reflects that on November 5, 1998, Spruell pled guilty to two counts of robbery and was sentenced to concurrent periods of incarceration of 4 to 12 years and 5 to 12 years with maximum dates of March 27, 2010, and September 2, 2010. Spruell was committed to serve his incarceration in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC"). The Board granted Spruell parole by decision of May 16, 2006. Spruell was released from prison on June 23, 2006.
On October 16, 2008, while still on parole, Spruell was arrested on new criminal charges by the Philadelphia Police Department and charged with various state crimes related to firearm possession and aggravated assault. On December 4, 2008, the Board made a decision to detain Spruell in the Philadelphia County Prison pending disposition of the new state criminal charges.
On April 24, 2009, a Criminal Complaint was filed in federal court against Spruell relating to his pending state criminal charges. Thereafter the state charges were nolle prossed. Following a guilty plea to a charge of felon in possession of a firearm, Spruell was sentenced in federal court on October 26, 2011, to a federal sentence of 84 months with credit for 36 months time served. There is nothing in the summary judgment record that indicates that Spruell was to be returned to state prison or to the Board to serve his state sentence before continuing to serve his federal sentence. On November 16, 2011, the Board recommended that Spruell's parole be revoked and that he be recommitted to the DOC as a convicted parole violator ("CPV").
On December 7, 2011, the Board issued a detainer for Spruell's arrest due to his federal conviction.
Spruell remained in federal custody until July 20, 2015, when he completed his federal sentence. On that date, the federal Bureau of Prisons released Spruell to the Board pursuant tothe Board's detainer. On July 27, 2015, the Board issued an Administration Act returning Spruell to state custody as a CPV and for the scheduling of a revocation hearing. Spruell arrived at SCI-Greene on August 2, 2015.
On October 28, 2015, Spruell, with counsel from the Greene County Public Defender's Office, attended a Revocation Hearing at SCI-Greene before Timothy Douglas, the hearing examiner, and Craig McKay, a Board member. Matthew Darr, Spruell's parole supervisor, was also in attendance. (ECF No. 49-1 at 82). In a Notice of Board Decision, recorded November 9, 2015, the Board recommitted Spruell to a state correctional institution as a CPV to serve 18 months back time for his federal conviction of felon in possession of a firearm. His new parole violation max date was determined to be March 9, 2019.
Spruell filed an administrative appeal of the Board Decision on December 17, 2015, alleging that the time he served for his federal sentence should also have counted towards his state sentence and, therefore, his maximum sentence date had passed. By Notice of Board Decision recorded April 13, 2016, Spruell was denied parole.
During the relevant time period, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court issued a line of cases involving sentence calculations. On April 23, 2016, the Board announced that a new policy was in effect for pre-sentence calculations in accordance with the Commonwealth Court decisions. On May 6, 2016, the Board began reviewing Spruell's sentence data sheet. Spruell's maximum date was recalculated to April 3, 2014.
On June 17, 2016, Spruell's parole supervisor was informed of the recalculation and instructed to process Spruell for release. A Notice of Board decision the same day formally changed Spruell's maximum release date to April 3, 2014. On June 23, 2016, Spruell was released from DOC custody.
The standard for assessing a Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is well-settled. A court should grant summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Furthermore, "summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is 'genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 250.
On a motion for summary judgment, the facts and the inferences to be drawn therefrom should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). The moving party has the initial burden of identifying evidence which demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. The party opposing the motion, however, cannot rely merely upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions to support its claim. The nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, and must produce more than a "mere scintilla" of evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. See Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).
In order to survive a motion for summary judgment on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must adduce evidence that the defendant acted under color of state law and that the plaintiff wasdeprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal law. See Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994).
"The general rule governing the allocation of credit for time served awaiting disposition of new criminal charges was established by [the Pennsylvania Supreme Court] in Gaito v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation [&] Parole, 488 Pa. 397, 412 A.2d 568 (1980)." Armbruster v. Pa. Bd of Prob. & Parole, 919 A.2d 348, 352 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Pursuant to Gaito, Pennsylvania courts "consistently held that once a parolee is sentenced on a new criminal offense, the period of time between arrest and sentencing, when bail is not satisfied [on the new criminal charge], must be applied to the new sentence, and not to the original sentence." Armbruster, 919 A.2d at 352. In the years following the Gaito decision, courts began to apply two exceptions to the general rule of Gaito. In Martin v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 840 A.2d 299 (Pa. 2003), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that a parolee should receive credit to the original sentence for periods of custody on a Board warrant and new criminal charges where the parolee is not convicted or does not receive a sentence of incarceration on the new conviction. Id. at 308-09. Similarly, the Commonwealth Court held that a parolee is entitled to credit against his original sentence even though he does not...
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