Spruell v. Blythe

• Decision Date: 18 December 1957
• Docket Number: No. 56,56
• Citation: 215 Md. 117,137 A.2d 183
• Parties: Mayolla SPRUELL v. Charles W. BLYTHE et ux.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 117

215 Md. 117

137 A.2d 183

Mayolla SPRUELL v. Charles W. BLYTHE et ux.

No. 56.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 18, 1957.

Eugene Hettleman, Baltimore, for appellant.

J. Mayer Willen, Baltimore, for appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J., and COLLINS, ^* HENDERSON, HAMMOND and PRESCOTT, JJ.

PRESCOTT, Judge.

Mayolla Spruell, the appellant, filed suit in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City. She had purchased from the appellees a house and lot situated in Baltimore under what may be considered as an oral contract. The terms thereof were such as to bring the agreement within the provisions of the Land Instalment Contract Act. She prayed a return of all money paid by her for the purchase of said property, and that said property be impressed with a lien for all sums due her. The chancellor dismissed her bill of complaint, and she has appealed.

The contract was entered into on October 26, 1954, and provided for the purchase by the appellant from the appellees of the property known as 2235 W. Fayette Street for the sum of $6,500, subject to a ground rent of $90, to be created. The contract was oral, except for 'just a little piece of paper that was written' which was not introduced into evidence. She paid a deposit of $50 on that day, for which she received a written receipt, and an additional deposit of $50 on November 3, 1954. She occupied the property from November 5, 1954, until April 27, 1956, and paid unto the sellers a total of $1,504.25, weekly instalments according to the contract. There was never any written contract such as required by Art. 21, sec. 119 of the Code (1951). She testified she was supposed to get a deed when she had paid '$500 in.' When she had done that, the sellers demanded $250, more; and, when she had paid that sum they demanded $250 more, and 'on and on like that.' She also testified that on March 16, 1956, when she came into the office of the attorney for the appellees, he stated he wanted an additional $650 to put through a settlement and give her a deed.

The appellant consulted two attorneys during the time of her occupancy of the property, and negotiations between the parties continued during the time of her occupancy, until broken off by the final demand for an additional $650. She then vacated the property, consulted her present attorney, and promptly filed the present suit. It is admitted that the reasonable rental value of the property during the period of her occupancy would equal the amount she has paid the sellers; nevertheless, the appellant claims the return of all money paid by her, without any deduction for occupancy, based upon the provisions of the Land Instalment Contract Act.

The pertinent section of said Act, Art. 21, Secs. 118 to 124, Code (1951), reads as follows:

'119. (Form and Delivery of Land Instalment Contracts.) (1) Every land instalment contract shall be evidenced by an instrument in writing signed by all of the parties thereto containing all of the terms to which they have agreed.

'(2) At or before the time the vendee signs the instruments, the vendor shall deliver to him an exact copy of it and the vendee shall give the vendor a receipt showing that he has received the copy of the instrument. If such copy was not executed by the vendor, then unless the vendor within fifteen (15) days after notice that the vendee has signed, delivers to him a copy of the instrument signed by the vendor, the agreement and the instruments signed by the vendee shall be voidable at the option of the vendee and the vendor shall immediately upon demand refund to the vendee all payments and deposits theretofore made.

* * *

* * *

'(3) Until the vendee signs a land instalment contract and receives a copy of it, signed by the vendor the vendee has an unconditional right to cancel the contract and to receive immediate refund of all payments and deposits made on account of or in contemplation of the contract. A request for such refund shall operate to cancel the contract; or

'(4) When any such payment or deposit is accepted by the vendor from a vendee, the vendor shall immediately deliver to him a receipt therefor, which clearly states in 12-point type or larger, in typewriting or in legible handwriting his rights under paragraph (3) above.' (Emphasis supplied.)

The appellees concede, and the evidence discloses, that there was no compliance with section 119. The chancellor, however, concluded that the appellant had waived the provisions of subsection (3), thereof, the subsection that is determinative of this appeal, and by her conduct had become estopped to avail herself of the advantages reserved in said subsection for vendees. Ordinarily a party to a contract may waive any of its provisions that are for his benefit. But, when a statute contains provisions that are founded upon public policy, those to whom it applies are not permitted to waive such provisions. Stewart v. Gorter, 70 Md. 242, 245, 16 A. 644, 2 L.R.A. 711; Heim v. American Alliance Ins. Co., 147 Minn. 283, 180 N.W 225, 226, 1022; 6 Corbin, Contracts, sec. 1515; Pope Mfg. Company v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234, 235, 12 S.Ct. 632, 36 L.Ed. 414. In Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704, 65 S.Ct. 895, 901, 89 L.Ed. 1296, the Supreme Court, in recognizing this principle again, said:

'Where a private right is granted in the public interest to effectuate a legislative policy, waiver of a right so charged or colored with the public interest will not be allowed where it would thwart the legislative policy which it was designed to effectuate.'

It therefore becomes necessary that we determine whether the provisions of subsection (3) were made solely for the benefit of vendees, or were they based upon the public policy of this State. 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction (3rd Ed.) sec. 5901 says:

'In its strict sense public policy reflects the trends and commands of the federal and state constitution, statutes and judicial decisions. In its broad sense public policy may be traced to the current public sentiment towards public morals, public health, public welfare, and the requirements of modern economic, social and political conditions.'

See also, Maryland Trust Co. v. National Mechanics' Bank, 102 Md. 608, 632, 63 A. 70; Public Policy in the English Common Law, 42 Harv.L.Rev. 76. In 6 Corbin, Contracts, at page 458 the author states that 'In determining what public policy requires, there is no limit whatever to the 'sources' to which the court is permitted to go; * * *.'

It is a matter of common knowledge that at the time of the enactment of the Land Instalment Contract Law in 1951 there were certain governmental controls with reference to landlords, when they leased their properties as dwellings. Not infrequently, instalment purchase contracts were entered into, which required nothing, or a very small amount, as the down-payment, but called for rather substantial weekly or monthly payments, when the individual properties were considered. Many times, these contracts effectuated an evasion of one or more of the governmental controls relative to landlords; and the 'purchaser' under the contract, after making many weekly or monthly payments, arrived at the conclusion, because of the amount of the purchase price, interest being paid, or other charges that he would be in a better position if the treated himself as a 'lessee' and terminated the contract. This, in effect, made the purchasers lessees, and the sellers landlords who were not subject to the governmental controls. As was stated by Chief Judge Brune, in Hudson v. Maryland State...