Spruill v. Ballard
| Decision Date | 28 March 1932 |
| Docket Number | No. 5290.,5290. |
| Citation | 61 App. DC 112,58 F.2d 517 |
| Parties | SPRUILL v. BALLARD et al. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
O. H. Brinkman, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
George W. Offutt and Charles V. Imlay, both of Washington, D. C., for appellees.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB, VAN ORSDEL, HITZ, and GRONER, Associate Justices.
The court below dismissed plaintiff's bill on the ground that it was without equity. This, we think, was wrong.
The bill alleged that appellant, whom we shall call plaintiff, owned improved property in the city of Washington in which she lived, and which was assessed for taxation at $12,000 and valued at above $16,000. Being in need of funds, she applied to Ballard, one of the appellees, to help her obtain a loan of $9,000 to be secured by deed of trust on the property. Ballard arranged the loan, and plaintiff executed a deed of trust to Ballard and Serven, the other appellee, as trustees. Two years and a half later, plaintiff found herself without funds to pay the semiannual interest then due, and applied to Ballard to secure an extension of time from the holder of the indebtedness. Ballard refused to secure the extension of time and declined to give her the noteholder's name, as a result of which the property was advertised for sale. The day after, plaintiff tendered in cash the amount of the interest in default, the accrued taxes, and the one day's cost of the advertisement, but declined to pay in addition the sum of $225 as commissions to trustees for services in advertising the property. The tender was refused, and the property offered for sale as advertised.
At the sale plaintiff protested its validity, but, to avoid sale to another, made a bid through an agent, and a deposit of $300 (apparently there was no other bidder and no sale was had), and at a later date appellees agreed to apply the $300 deposit on account of accrued interest, provided plaintiff also would pay an advertising bill of $71 and an auctioneer's fee of $47 and trustees' fees of $125, but this plaintiff refused to do, and, upon appellees' renewed threat to sell the property and deprive her of title and possession, brought her bill to restrain appellees as trustees from carrying out their threat, but admitted her obligation to pay the indebtedness of $9,000 with interest, and her willingness and ability to do so, but alleged that appellees ought not to be permitted to make the sale because one or both of them held or owned the notes secured by the deed of trust, which fact was concealed from plaintiff at the time she executed the deed of trust, and that in the circumstances they were not legally or equitably entitled to act as trustees under the deed of trust and were seeking to deprive plaintiff of her property for their own benefit.
The prayer of the bill is that appellees be enjoined and restrained from selling the property, that the court determine what sum on account of interest, or otherwise, is due by plaintiff, and that, upon payment of same by plaintiff, the alleged default be revoked and annulled, and that the court appoint impartial and disinterested trustees to act in the place and stead of appellees.
It was stated in the argument that the property had been sold after the dismissal of the bill in the lower court, and title acquired in the name of Ballard, or for his account.
It will thus be seen that the bill charges unqualifiedly that the appellee Ballard, who agreed to procure the loan as the agent of appellant, concealed from her the fact that he was lending his own money, and, to effect this concealment more fully, had the note made payable to an office employee, and himself appointed one of the trustees.
If the allegations of the bill in these respects are true, and on the motion to dismiss they must be so regarded, we are of opinion that such facts disqualified Ballard to act that disinterested and impartial part his duty assigned to him; and that the ownership of the...
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National Life Insurance Company v. Silverman
...well recognized principle of equity * * *." (Emphasis added.) Anderson v. White, 2 App.D.C. 408, 417 (1894). In Spruill v. Ballard, 61 App.D.C. 112, 114, 58 F.2d 517, 519 (1932), an equity case, we said: "The ease and facility of foreclosure under a deed of trust commends it over the more c......
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S & G Inv. Inc. v. Home Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 72-1625
...56, 454 F.2d 899 (1971); Maynard v. Sutherland, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 169, 174 n.16, 313 F.2d 560, 565 n.16 (1962); Spruill v. Ballard, 61 App.D.C. 112, 58 F.2d 517 (1932).22 See note 18 supra.23 National Life Ins. Co. v. Silverman, 147 U.S.App.D.C. 56, 454 F.2d 899 (1971); Orlove v. National Sa......
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Bryant v. Jefferson Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 73--1968
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