Spruill v. Sch. Dist. of Phila.

Decision Date28 October 2021
Docket NumberCIVIL ACTION NO. 21-1174
Citation569 F.Supp.3d 253
Parties Linda SPRUILL, Individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Phillip Spruill, Deceased v. The SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA and WES Health Systems, Inc.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

Brian D. Kent, Laffey, Bucci & Kent, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, for Linda Spruill.

Hannah Girer-Rosenkrantz, School District of Phila, Philadelphia, PA, Justin D. Barbetta, Christina Gallagher, Wisler Pearlstine, LLP, Blue Bell, PA, for School District of Philadelphia.

Anne Schmidt Frankel, Marcy B. Tanker, Stuart Turville O'Neal, III, Burns White LLC, West Conshohocken, PA, for WES Health Systems.

MEMORANDUM

Juan R. Sanchez, Chief Judge

Linda Spruill brings this action in her individual capacity and that of Personal Representative of her deceased son's estate against the School District of Philadelphia and WES Health Systems, Inc. The School District has moved to dismiss Counts I, III, and V of the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Because Spruill has adequately pleaded Counts I and III and the School District is immune with respect to Count V, the Court shall grant the motion in part and deny it in part.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

This very tragic case arose out of the suicide of the plaintiff, Linda Spruill's 11-year-old son, Phillip on April 5, 2019. Prior to his death, Phillip Spruill had struggled with anxiety, depression, learning disabilities and behavioral issues and had been the victim of years of bullying while a student at two Philadelphia School District elementary schools – John F. Hartranft2 and Benjamin B. Comegys. Phillip attended Hartranft Elementary from the first to the third grades and Comegys from third through fifth grade. Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 13. At Comegys, Phillip's fellow students called him "gay," "faggot," "fat," "worthless," "ugly," and "other verbally abusive, demeaning, humiliating and derogatory terms every day." Id. , ¶ 16. He "was also tripped, pushed, and otherwise physically abused by his fellow students." Id.

Although Spruill repeatedly attempted to get an Individualized Education Plan (IEP) in place for Phillip when he was a student at Hartranft, she did not succeed until after he transferred to Comegys at the end of the 2016-2017 school year. As part of the evaluation process for the IEP, the "School District acknowledged that as a result of Phillip's disabilities, there was a significant risk that [he] would do himself harm." Id. , ¶ 15. The District's evaluative documents further acknowledged that "Phillip's violent and disruptive behavior was the direct result of provocation by his peers." Id. , ¶ 17. The IEP dictated that Phillip be placed in a small class setting and be considered for transfer to another school. It further provided he was to receive special, one-on-one instruction and special testing, one-on-one counseling services through WES Health Systems for thirty minutes per week, and a safety plan was to be put in place beginning in 2017. Id. , ¶¶22, 23. Phillip was also to receive "1500 minutes of emotional support" with the goal of teaching him "skills to manage his stress and negative feelings." Id. , ¶ 24. Despite the development of the IEP at the end of the 2016-2017 school year, it was not implemented until March, 2019, when Phillip was in the 5th grade, and then only in part. Id., ¶¶ 15, 22. In the meantime, Phillip continued to be bullied and abused by other students with no intervention or protection from school or WES personnel. When he tried to protect himself, "Defendants inexplicably and repeatedly suspended Phillip for conflict with other students ..." Id. , ¶¶ 18, 19. These policies had the effect of creating a "completely toxic, hostile and dangerous school environment for Phillip," as his "bullies felt secure in their abuse, knowing that it was Phillip that would be punished for it." Id., ¶ 21.

On April 5, 2019, a visibly upset and emotional Phillip approached the WES Health Services counselor at Comegys and told her that he needed to speak with her. Id. , ¶ 28. The counselor, however, turned Phillip away, saying "I am handling something," and/or "I am too busy." Id. Phillip left school early and was found later that same day by his minor brother hanging from a belt wrapped around his neck attached to his bunk bed. His brother couldn't untie him and ran for his mother who immediately untied him and called 911. Phillip was taken to the hospital but sadly, he could not be revived and he was pronounced dead a short time later. Id., ¶ 29.

Linda Spruill brings this action on her own behalf and in her capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of her late son. The Complaint has five counts. The first three are against the School District of Philadelphia only for violations of Title IX of the Americans with Disabilities Act, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and his right to equal protection of the laws and to an educational environment free from sexual harassment under the Fourteenth Amendment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I – III). Count IV is a common law negligence claim asserted against WES Health Services, Inc. only, and Count V asserts a wrongful death and survival claim under Pennsylvania state law against both defendants. The School District moves to dismiss Counts I, III and V in their entirety.

STANDARDS GOVERNING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

The general requirements for pleading a claim for relief in the federal courts are simple and straightforward. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), the following is required:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support;
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.

To withstand a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A claim is facially plausible when the facts pleaded "allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Pearson v. Sec'y. Dep't. of Corrections , 775 F.3d 598, 604 (3d Cir. 2015) ; Moore v. Angie's List , Inc. , 118 F. Supp. 3d 802, 807 (E.D. Pa. 2015). "A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,’ nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ " Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

DISCUSSION

Spruill has adequately pled her Title IX and § 1983 claims contained in Counts I and III, respectively. The School District has statutory immunity under Pennsylvania state law for purposes of Spruill's wrongful death claim in Count V. The Court will therefore deny the motion with respect to Counts I and III and grant the motion with respect to Count V.

Count I of Spruill's complaint purports to plead a cause of action for violation of Title IX of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12111, et. seq. As the School District correctly points out, however, there is no Title IX under the ADA. The Court therefore interprets the Complaint as pleading a cause of action in Count I under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et. seq. ,3 as she alleges that "Phillip was effectively barred access to educational opportunity and educational benefits in violation of Title IX" as a result of the School District's "deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment, bullying and abuse, so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive within its school." Compl., ¶ 32.

Title IX provides, with certain limited exceptions not applicable here:

No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ...

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).

"Congress enacted Title IX in 1972 with two principal objectives in mind: ‘to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices,’ and to ‘provide individual citizens effective protection against those practices.’ " Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist. , 524 U.S. 274, 286, 118 S.Ct. 1989, 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998) (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago , 441 U.S. 677, 704, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ). It "was modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... which is parallel to Title IX except that it prohibits race discrimination, and not sex discrimination, and applies in all programs receiving federal funds, not only in education programs." Id. (citations omitted).

Recognizing that the text of Title IX is broad, the Supreme Court has directed the courts to "accord" Title IX "a sweep as broad as its language." N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell , 456 U.S. 512, 521, 102 S.Ct. 1912, 72 L.Ed.2d 299 (1982). Title IX has been found to include within its reach employees of educational entities, students complaining of harassment by teachers and fellow students, and those asserting claims of retaliation for complaints of disparate treatment on the basis of sex. See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Educ. , 544 U.S. 167, 170, 125 S.Ct. 1497, 161 L.Ed.2d 361 (2005) (retaliation); Davis v. Monroe County Board of Educ. , 526 U.S. 629, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999) (student-on-student harassment); Gebser , 524 U.S. at 286, 118 S.Ct. 1989 (teacher-student harassment); Bell , 456 U.S. at 521, ...

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