Sprung v. Morton

• Decision Date: 31 December 1909
• Citation: 182 F. 330
• Parties: SPRUNG v. MORTON, Immigrant Inspector. BLOOM v. SAME (two cases).
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

182 F. 330

SPRUNG v. MORTON, Immigrant Inspector.

BLOOM v. SAME (two cases).

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia.

December 31, 1909

D Lawrence Groner, for petitioners.

L. L Lewis, U.S. Atty.

WADDILL District Judge.

These three cases will be considered together for the purpose of this opinion; the first case having been heard prior to and on the 14th and 15th days of June, 1909, the second on the 15th day of June, 1909, when both cases were decided and finally disposed of on said last-named date, and the third case was heard, decided, and finally disposed of on the 16th day of June, 1909. Briefly they are as follows:

A. In the Sprung Case, the petitioner alleges that she is unlawfully restrained of her liberty by the respondent, an immigrant inspector of the United States, in default of $5,000 bail imposed by him, for an alleged violation of the immigration laws; the government's contention being that she should be deported because she is an alien who came into the United States some 15 years ago for the purpose of prostitution, and led the life of a prostitute; that she has since twice returned to Europe, the last trip being in May 1909, and having since her return resumed her unlawful practices. The petitioner, on the other hand, says that she was lawfully admitted into this country and has long resided herein; that she is the lawful wife of an American citizen, and since her marriage has lived with him, leading in all respects a proper and moral life; that when she left this country in May, 1908, as set forth in the return to the writ of habeas corpus, she did so as the wife of an American citizen, she and her husband having duly secured passports for that purpose; that she returned to her native land for the purpose of medical treatment, and to see her parents; that she and her husband regularly returned to this country as such husband and wife, and since their return have resided here; that she has in all respects properly conducted herself since her return, and is in no way subject to deportation from this country, or to the provisions of the immigration acts.

B. In the Rebecca Bloom Case, the petitioner alleges that she is illegally restrained of her liberty by an immigrant inspector of the United States, in default of $5,000 bail imposed by him, for an alleged violation of the immigration laws; the government's contention being that she should be deported because she is an alien who entered this country on or about September 22, 1906, in violation of law, for the purpose of prostitution, and other immoral purposes, and which since her arrival she has continued to practice. The petitioner's case is that she, along with her husband and two children, aged, respectively, six and eight years, were lawfully admitted to this country at and about the time mentioned by the respondent; that she was and is the lawful wife of Abraham Bloom, and has been since the year 1900, during which time said two children were born unto them; that she and her husband first lived in London, England, then Capetown and Johannesburg, South Africa, and upon coming to this country, for a short while resided in New York, then in St. Louis, and then Norfolk; that she has continuously lived with her husband, except for a short period between the time of her leaving St. Louis and his coming to Norfolk; that at the time of filing the petition, and for some time prior thereto, she and her husband and children had been lawfully and properly living together in the city of Norfolk; and that neither she nor her husband or children are in any respect liable to deportation, or in any manner subject to the provisions of the immigration laws of the United States, they having been properly admitted to this country nearly three years ago, not in contravention of said laws, are now bona fide inhabitants of the city of Norfolk, Va., and are no more deportable than any other person lawfully resident in the country.

C. In the Abraham Bloom Case, the petitioner alleges that he is illegally restrained of his liberty by an immigrant inspector of the United States, in default of $5,000 bail imposed by him, for an alleged violation of the immigration laws; the government's contention being that he is liable to deportation, and has been ordered deported by such inspector, because it is alleged that he imported into the United States a prostitute (referring to his wife, Rebecca Bloom), and that their two children were likely to become a public charge. Petitioner's case is that he has committed no act in violation of the immigration law; that Rebecca Bloom has been his lawful wife since the year 1900; that they were properly and regularly admitted with their children into this country, and are now lawfully and happily living together in the city of Norfolk; that neither he nor his children are liable to deportation, or in any manner subject to the provisions of the immigration laws; that he is at this time, as he has been since his marriage to his wife, supporting his family properly and decently; that they are not living, and have not lived, in violation of any law, nor are his children in any way likely to become a charge upon the public.

These are the contentions substantially set forth in the pleadings, and as shown by the evidence. The cases were heard upon the petitions, returns, and traverses to the returns, the motions to quash the returns, and the motions to dismiss on the part of the government, and the testimony adduced, which consisted of documentary evidence and oral examinations of witnesses by the petitioners and respondent in each case, and upon an agreement that the testimony had, and the oral examinations of witnesses taken in the Rebecca Bloom Case, should be treated and considered as having also been taken in the case of Abraham Bloom and his children.

The jurisdiction of the court is raised by the respondent, the immigrant inspector, in all three cases; his position being briefly, that the petitioners severally are in custody for alleged violations of the immigration laws, and are alone subject to the orders of the Department of Commerce and Labor, of which he is an official, that the legality of their detention cannot be inquired into or determined by the courts of the country, and that his action, and that of the executive department of which he is a member, is final and conclusive in the premises. This question will be considered in connection with the merits of the several cases, respectively; and at the threshold it may be said that the court is inclined to think that the trend of authority is that the Congress can confer upon executive officials of the government the exclusive right of determining questions pertaining to the admission of aliens into this country, and the deportation of those improperly admitted in violation of the provisions of the act, and that this power as to such immigrants is vested in the Secretary of Commerce and Labor upon his conforming to the provisions of the act of February 20, 1907, entitled 'An act to regulate the immigration of aliens into the United States. ' Act Feb. 20, 1907, c. 1134, 34 Stat. 898 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 447). While this is true, however, it cannot be possible that the courts are deprived of jurisdiction and authority to inquire into the cause of detention of persons in the position of petitioners here, who claim not to be in any way amenable to the provisions of the immigration laws, one who had been in the country 15 years, and is the wife of an American citizen, and the other, the husband, wife, and children who were lawfully admitted into the country nearly three years ago, the husband and wife having lived together long before coming to this country, and have since, except for a short interval, so lived as they were living at the time of their arrest.

The courts must have the right to determine when persons have once been admitted into the country, apparently lawfully and properly, whether they belong to the inhibited class or not. The Secretary of Commerce and Labor may have the right to say who shall be admitted and as to them doubtless his determination is final; but, when persons have once become residents and citizens of this country, surely as to them he cannot have such authority and power, and the courts be deprived of all jurisdiction in matters affecting their liberty and right to remain in the country; and this would seem to be particularly true where the alleged cause for deportation arose from misbehavior long after admission into the country. If that is not so, then every resident of this country, whether a naturalized citizen or not, who happens to have at one time been admitted to this country from abroad, certainly during the period of three years after admission to the country, will be liable to arrest and summary deportation; and it goes a little further. If persons who lawfully enter into the country can be deported for misconduct at any time within three years after arrival, it places the United States in the position of undertaking a system of surveillance of all persons who live in the country during the three years after their arrival, with the right to deport them for misconduct committed after they come here, although they may have been admitted in all respects legally and properly, and in every way conducted themselves properly for virtually the entire time of the three years' residence. And the contention would go even further, if the ruling of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor is final and conclusive upon the question of who and who are not American citizens. It would enable him to exclude all persons, including native-born Americans, from the United States, without day or opportunity to be heard, as his adjudication on the...