Sprunk v. First Bank System, 91-274

• Citation: 830 P.2d 103, 252 Mont. 463
• Case Date: April 27, 1992
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

Page 103

830 P.2d 103 252 Mont. 463 Wes SPRUNK, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
FIRST BANK SYSTEM, a registered bank holding company,
Defendant and Respondent. No. 91-274. Supreme Court of Montana. Submitted March 5, 1992.
Decided April 27, 1992.

Page 104

[252 Mont. 464] William A. Rossbach, argued, Rossbach & Whiston, Missoula, for plaintiff and appellant.

James A. Robischon, argued, Murphy, Robinson & Heckathorn, Kalispell, George D. Goodrich, Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, Missoula, for defendant and respondent.

HARRISON, Justice.

Wes Sprunk (Sprunk) appeals from an order of the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, Montana, which granted summary judgment in favor of First Bank System. This appeal stems from the same set of facts and circumstances stated in our opinion Sprunk v. First Bank Western Montana Missoula & First Bank System (1987), 228 Mont. 168, 741 P.2d 766 (Sprunk I ). We affirm.

[252 Mont. 465] The main issue is whether the District Court erred in granting respondent FBS's motion for summary judgment. This main issue is divided into three sub-issues as follows:

1. Whether the District Court erred in deciding that Sprunk had no cause of action against FBS when determining that First Bank Western Montana Missoula was not the agent, alter-ego or instrumentality of FBS?

2. Whether the District Court erred in determining that there was no fiduciary relationship or duty between Sprunk and FBS?

3. Whether the District Court erred in determining that Sprunk's claims are precluded by the doctrine of res judicata?

Sprunk owned an automobile dealership in Missoula that was backed financially by First Bank Western Montana Missoula (Bank), a subsidiary of First Bank System (FBS). During a downturn in the automobile industry in the early 1980's, Sprunk refinanced his debt with the Bank via a $500,000 guaranteed loan from the Small Business Administration (SBA). Later, Sprunk attempted to restructure the dealership by relocating to a smaller location and deeding over his prime real estate to the Bank. On May 27, 1982, Sprunk, the Bank and the SBA entered into an agreement to accept deeds in lieu of foreclosure on Sprunk's Missoula and Lake County real properties in order to discharge Sprunk's indebtedness to the Bank.

In Sprunk I, Sprunk alleged he entered into the agreement as a result of the Bank's fraudulent misrepresentations. He argued that the Bank pressured him into signing the agreement by overstating his debt and the losses it suffered due to liquidation. Sprunk's complaint alleged bad faith breach of a fiduciary duty, actual fraud and constructive fraud. The District Court granted the Bank's motion for summary judgment. Sprunk appealed and we affirmed. Subsequently, FBS filed a motion for summary judgment which was also granted by the District Court based on separate and independent grounds as well as the doctrine of res judicata. Sprunk now appeals that decision to this Court.

Summary judgment is proper when no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P.; also see Cecil v. Cardinal Drilling Co. (1990), 244 Mont. 405, 409, 797 P.2d 232, 234. The initial burden of proof is on the moving party to establish that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Westmont Tractor Co. v. Continental I, [252 Mont. 466] Inc. (1986), 224 Mont. 516, 521, 731 P.2d 327, 330. Once the moving party meets that burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish the existence of genuine issues of material fact. Simmons v. Jenkins...