Spry v. Pruitt
| Decision Date | 18 October 1951 |
| Docket Number | 8 Div. 524 |
| Citation | 256 Ala. 341,54 So.2d 701 |
| Parties | SPRY v. PRUITT. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Bradshaw & Barnett, Florence, for appellant.
Orlan B. Hill and Mitchell & Poellnitz, all of Florence, for appellee.
This is a controversy over the amount of rent due by Tom Pruitt to S. L. Spry for farm land situate in Lauderdale County, which Spry leased to Pruitt for the crop year 1947 and which land was cultivated by Pruitt.
The following written contract was entered into by the parties:
'State of Alabama
'This contract made and entered into at Rogersville, Alabama this 28th day of October 1946. By and between S. L. Spry, party of the first part and Tom Pruitt, Party of the second part.
'Witnesseth:
'That for and in consideration of the mutual covenants of the parties hereto, they do contract as follows; The party of the first part does hereby lease to the party of the second party that track or lot of land situated in Lauderdale County, State of Alabama known and described as part of the P. H. Perry farm and the M. M. Striplin farm and farther described and known by the A.A.A. program as farm No. B.96.
'The party of the first party leases said track of land as above stated and a plott or drawing hereto attached and signed by both parties, said plott or drawing becomes a part of this contract. The party of the first part does hereby lease said plott of land to the party of the second party for the sum of Thirty-five (35) bales of cotton, ginned cotton bales averaging five hundred (500) pounds per bale and said cotton being the first cotton gathered or picked on said land also cotton seed out of 17 1/2 bales of cotton, seed to be left at gin by the party of the second party. Party of the second party to notify party of the first party when and where to take possession of cotton and seed as it is being gathered in the year 1947.
'Signed party of first party
S. L. Spry
S. L. Spry
'Signed party second party
Tom Pruitt
Tom Pruitt'
Attached to the contract is a plat or rough sketch wherein the leased land is enclosed within a red border, but there are no dimensions shown.
On April 14, 1948, Tom Pruitt filed this suit against S. L. Spry in the circuit court of Lauderdale County, in equity.
After alleging the execution of the contract above set out, complainant averred that respondent Spry represented the land rented to him to be 200 acres. Complainant then alleges that after the execution of said contract, it became apparent to the parties that said contract resulted from a misunderstanding and mutual mistake and the misrepresentation on the part of respondent as to the area of the tract of land, and that as a result of conplainant's 'denouncement of said contract on the basis of such mutual mistake and misrepresentation an oral contract was made between the parties which in substance was a modification of the terms of said signed paper writing.' As to this alleged oral contract, the bill alleges: 'By the terms of said new agreement it was understood between the parties that complainant would make a crop on the premises specified in said paper writing and would pay to defendant as rental an amount of cotton seed properly proportioned according to the actual area of the lands in possession of complainant for farming purposes which was so delivered by defendant; the rent to be proportioned against the actual area later to be determined as compared with the rent named in said writing for a tract of 200 acres.'
The bill further alleges, in substance, that complainant proceeded to cultivate the lands during the crop year 1947, and has had the land accurately surveyed by a competent surveyor and the number of acres in the plot was found to be a fraction less than 100.
It is alleged in the bill that there is a justiciable controversy between complainant and defendant with respect to the contract between the parties and the amount of rental due at that time, in that defendant denies there was any agreement other than the written contract.
The bill further alleges that on April 13, 1948, complainant tendered to respondent warehouse receipts for stored cotton and an order for cottonseed which was also stored, together with the sum of $30.97, all of which make up the amount of rental actually owing by complainant to respondent. Upon the filing of the bill of complaint, complainant tendered into court the said warehouse receipts and order for cottonseed and the money, to be taken and accepted by respondent in full settlement and satisfaction of any and all demands by respondent against complainant on account of rent of said lands.
The bill, as amended, prayed: (1) '* * * that the court will declare and determine that the true contract between the parties for the rental of lands for the year 1947 involves the payment by complainant to defendant of rent according to the area of the land actually rented and delivered by defendant to complainant and in proportion as the amount of such area shall bear to an area of 200 acres, the amount of rent to be related to the actual area as specified in this bill'; (2) 'that the court will ascertain and declare that the tenders heretofore made by complainant to defendant and now made with the Register of this Court are an actual and complete compliance with his duty and liability under his said rental contract with S. L. Spry'; (3) 'that the actual measurement of the lands so rented to complainant by defendant constitutes 99.7 acres'; (4) 'that the court will ascertain and declare by decree what rental is owed by complainant to defendant for the use in the year 1947 of the lands described in the bill.' The bill also prayed for general relief.
The complainant demanded a jury to try the issues of fact in the cause.
Demurrer to the bill as amended was overruled on August 28, 1948.
On September 1, 1948, the trial court entered the following order: 'Complainant having demanded a trial by jury of the facts in this cause, it is by the court ordered, adjudged, and decreed that this cause be, and the same is hereby, referred to a jury of the law court now sitting for a decision of the factual issues in the case; such decision to be made on issues to be submitted by the court to the jury.'
Thereafter, on September 7, 1949, the respondent filed his answer, in which he set out in extenso the written contract under date of October 28, 1946. The respondent averred in his answer that there was no contract between the parties other than the written contract set out, and also averred that the complainant made no effort to cultivate all the lands which he rented from respondent for the year 1947 and that complainant well understood the lands he had rented from respondent, inasmuch as he went over and observed the lands before he rented the same. Respondent averred that he was not advised as to the allegation in the complaint, 'A true measure of said land determines the amount of land so rented to complainant by defendant to be a fraction less than 100 acres,' and averred that if the survey was of only the land which complainant actually cultivated, then it was not a full and complete survey of the land actually rented. Respondent denies there was any mistake, mutual or unilateral, as to the lands which he rented to complainant and denied that he made any misrepresentation to complainant about said lands. In regard to the averments of the bill of complaint relative to a tender, the answer avers that papers were tendered to him in the office of one of the attorneys for complainant, but that he (respondent) refused the papers offered, since he was not advised as to their legal effect and since he had not had the opportunity to consult his attorney with reference to them. Respondent alleged in his said answer that there is no real controversy between the parties and that he, the respondent, is entitled to the rent as provided in the written contract of October 28, 1946.
After the attorneys for the respective parties had made their opening statements to the jury, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:
'Gentlemen of the Jury, this is an action under what the law calls the Declaratory Judgment Statute incorporated in our Code of Laws in Alabama; that law says any person or persons interested under a contract where there is a dispute as to what the contract rights are between them may come into Court and get a declaration of what their rights are or what their status is; that is what this case is about.
'It is the duty of the Court to state to you the issues of fact, that is, the question of fact for you to decide.
The jury returned the following verdict: ...
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