Spudich v. Smarr
| Citation | 931 F.2d 1278 |
| Decision Date | 29 April 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-2280WM,90-2280WM |
| Parties | Robert Philip SPUDICH, Appellant, v. Charles E. SMARR, Supervisor, Division of Liquor Control for the State of Missouri, Appellee. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit) |
Harry D. Boul, Columbia, Mo., for appellant.
Deborah Ground Buckner, Jefferson City, Mo., for appellee.
Before FAGG, SNEED *, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.
This case involves whether Missouri Revised Statutes Section 311.098 violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Appellant, Robert Spudich, is the owner and operator of a business establishment in Springfield, Missouri, known as Billiards of Springfield. He applied for a Sunday liquor license under Missouri Revised Statutes Section 311.098, which provides in pertinent part:
[A]ny person who possesses the qualifications required by this chapter, and who now or hereafter meets the requirements of and complies with the provisions of this chapter, may apply for, and the supervisor of liquor control may issue, a license to sell intoxicating liquor, as in this chapter defined, between the hours of 1:00 p.m. and midnight on Sunday by the drink at retail for consumption on the premises of any amusement place as described in the application. As used in this section the term "amusement place" means any establishment whose business building contains a square footage of at least ten thousand square feet, and where games of skill commonly known as bowling or soccer are usually played, and which has annual gross receipts of at least two hundred thousand dollars of which no more than fifty percent may be derived from the sale of alcoholic beverages.
Mo.Ann.Stat. Sec. 311.098 (Vernon Supp.1991) (emphasis added).
Appellant's business establishment meets all of the requirements of an "amusement place" except that neither bowling nor soccer are played there. Accordingly, his request for a liquor license was denied by the Missouri Division for Liquor Control.
On June 30, 1989, Spudich filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983 and 1988 against Charles Smarr, the Supervisor of Liquor Control of the State of Missouri, to enjoin enforcement of section 311.098 by Smarr. Spudich asserted that the statute under which Smarr purports to act violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In his complaint, Spudich claims that there are bowling alleys which compete with his business that have obtained Sunday liquor licenses. Spudich also claims that some of these bowling alleys offer games of billiards. Lastly, Spudich contends that these bowling alleys are attracting his customers on Sundays because they are able to sell liquor.
On July 16, 1990 the district court granted Smarr's motion for summary judgment. The district court held that Missouri Revised Statute Sections 311.098 does not violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Spudich appeals the decision of the district court. This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 (1988).
When reviewing the district court's entry of summary judgment, we apply the same standard the district court used in granting the motion for summary judgment. See Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 408 (8th Cir.1982). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the motion for summary judgment should be sustained "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In performing the analysis under Rule 56(c), we are required to view all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and that party must receive the benefit of all reasonable inferences drawn from the facts. See Robinson v. Monaghan, 864 F.2d 622, 624 (8th Cir.1989).
Section 311.098 is an economic regulation that is concerned with control of the liquor business in the state of Missouri. The statutory classification does not interfere with fundamental rights and is not based on a suspect class. As such, the classification is presumed constitutional, and it need only be rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 2516, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); Carolan v. City of Kansas City, Missouri, 813 F.2d 178, 181-82 (8th Cir.1987).
There is an added presumption in favor of the validity of state regulation in the area of liquor control. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118-19, 93 S.Ct. 390, 397, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972). A state has broad power to regulate the times, places, and circumstances under which it will permit the sale of liquor. See New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 715, 101 S.Ct. 2599, 2600, 69 L.Ed.2d 357 (1981) (per curiam). Although this power is not absolute, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210, 97 S.Ct. 451, 463, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976) (), a state's power to regulate the liquor industry "allows the widest discretion and is subject to minimal demands of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection requirements." Parks v. Allen, 426 F.2d 610, 613 (5th Cir.1970).
The Missouri legislature's interest in enacting a scheme of liquor control laws is to protect the health and safety of Missouri citizens while also providing for appropriate recreational enjoyment. Based upon Missouri's broad power to regulate when and where liquor is sold, this is clearly a legitimate interest. See e.g. U.S. Const. amend. XXI, Sec. 2; New York State Liquor Auth., 452 U.S. at 715, 101 S.Ct. at 2600; Craig, 429 U.S. at 205-06, 97 S.Ct. at 461. Consequently, the only question that this court must answer is whether the classification created by section 311.098 is rationally related to this purpose.
A statutory classification does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment unless it rests on grounds "wholly irrelevant" to the achievement...
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