Spurbeck v. Statton

Citation252 Iowa 279,106 N.W.2d 660
Decision Date13 December 1960
Docket NumberNo. 50136,50136
PartiesWalter J. SPURBECK, Appellant, v. D. M. STATTON, Commissioner of Public Safety of the State of Iowa, and Iowa Department of Public Safety, Appellees.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Members of Bremer County Bar Association, and Laird & Laird, Waverly, for appellant.

Norman A. Erbe, Atty. Gen., of Iowa, and Carl H. Pesch, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.

THOMPSON, Justice.

The sole question in the case before us is the constitutionality of Section 321.210, subd. 1 of the Code of Iowa of 1958, I.C.A. The plaintiff having brought his action in certiorari, and an order granting the writ having issued, the case was tried upon a stipulation which we set out herewith.

'STIPULATION OF FACTS.

'It is hereby stipulated by and between the parties hereto that on the 2nd day of November, 1959, the defendant served the plaintiff with a notice of suspension of said plaintiff's license to operate a motor vehicle and did thereby properly suspend the said license under authority of Section 321.210(1), Code of Iowa, 1958 [I.C.A.]. That said suspension was affected by an alleged administrative proceeding without prior notice of hearing or other judicial hearing or proceedings.

'It is further stipulated by and between the parties hereto that the following shall be and constitute the sole issues involved in this case.

'(1). Is Section 321.210(1), Code of Iowa, 1958 [I.C.A.], unconstitutional.

'(2). Did the defendants act illegally and without authority thereunder in suspending the plaintiff's license to operate a motor vehicle.

'(3). Does the aforesaid Act, to-wit: Section 321.210(1) Code of Iowa, 1958 [I.C.A.], constitute an illegal and unconstitutional delegation of legislative and judicial authority.

'(4). Is the procedure authorized by Section 321.210(1). Code of Iowa, 1958 [I.C.A.], unconstitutional and does it constitute a deprivation of a right without due process of law.'

It will be noted that the stipulation states the defendant, (by which we assume is meant the Commissioner of the Department of Public Safety), 'did properly suspend' plaintiff's driver's license. (Italics supplied.) We take this to mean that the suspension was proper if the statute under which the commissioner acted is constitutional. It also appears that the first two specifications of issues in the stipulation are general, while (3) and (4) state the particular respects in which the challenged act is thought by the plaintiff to be unconstitutional: because it is an illegal and unconstitutional delegation of legislative and judicial authority; and because it takes away a right without due process of law. While the arguments cover a wide range, we shall take the issues as stipulated before the trial court. In his petition, the plaintiff specifies the parts of the Iowa constitution which he thinks are violated as Article V, Section 1, I.C.A. which vests the judicial power in the Supreme and District Courts and such other courts as the legislature may establish; and, relating to the same issue, Article III, Section 1, which we quote: 'Departments of government. Section 1. The powers of the government of Iowa shall be divided into three separate departments--the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial: and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any function appertaining to either of the others, except in cases hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.' These sections of the constitution pertain to the issue of illegal delegation of authority.

Plaintiff in his petition also complains that Section 321.210, subd. 1, supra, is unconstitutional because it deprives him of a right without due process of law, thereby violating Article I, Section 9, of the Iowa constitution. So far as material this section provides: 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.' These are the only sections of the Iowa constitution which the petition charges are violated; and while reference is made to the equal rights and due process clauses of the Constitution of the United States, they are not argued or discussed in plaintiff's brief and in any event depend substantially upon the same considerations as our own similar provisions so far as the instant case is concerned. We shall make no further reference to the United States constitution.

Section 321.210, subd. 1, here under attack, is set out:

'Authority to suspend. The department is hereby authorized to suspend the license of an operator or chauffeur without preliminary hearing upon a showing by its records or other sufficient evidence that the licensee:

'1. Has committed an offense for which mandatory revocation of license is required upon conviction.'

Section 321.209, subd. 2, immediately preceding, makes it mandatory upon the department (the Department of Public Safety) to forthwith revoke the license of any operator upon receiving a record of the conviction of such operator of the offense of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. It is evident, therefor, that if Section 321.210, subd. 1 is valid, the department, upon a showing by its own records or other sufficient evidence that the holder of a license has committed the offense of driving while intoxicated, may suspend the license. Exhibits attached to plaintiff's petition show that shortly before the suspension of his driver's license by the department, the plaintiff had been arrested in Waverly, Bremer County, on a charge of driving while intoxicated. Affidavits of the arresting officer and another witness were submitted to the department and the notice of suspension issued to the plaintiff. Since it is stipulated the suspension was proper under the authority of Section 321.210, subd 1 we shall not give the facts further consideration.

I. The first contention of the plaintiff is that the section under attack is an improper delegation of power to an administrative department, to which, it is said, the act commits a judicial or legislative function. At the outset we state some well established general principles pertinent in all considerations of constitutional questions. Thus, all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; he who attacks the constitutionality must prove invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; the fact that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; if any reasonable basis which supports the statute may be conceived it will be upheld; the courts have no concern with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency of a statute, and are not responsible for the presence or absence of those elements in an act of the legislature. These rules have been stated over and over again in many cases, some of them quite recently. Diamond Auto Sales v. Erbe, Iowa, 105 N.W.2d 650; State ex rel. Cairy v. Iowa Co-Operative Association, 250 Iowa 839, 95 N.W.2d 441; Faber v. Loveless, 249 Iowa 593, 88 N.W.2d 112; Steinberg-Baum & Co. v. Countryman, 247 Iowa 923, 77 N.W.2d 15; Knorr v. Beardsley, 240 Iowa 828, 38 N.W.2d 236; Dickinson v. Porter, 240 Iowa 393, 35 N.W.2d 66; Miller v. Schuster, 227 Iowa 1005, 289 N.W.702. In the latter case, at page 1015 of 227 Iowa, at page 707 of 289 N.W., is announced another rule applicable in the case before us: '* * * this court, in harmony with the decisions of the federal courts and the courts of the several states, has adopted a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation.'

We turn then to a consideration of the challenge to the act here, that it is an illegal and unconstitutional delegation of powers. It is contended that there is an improper delegation of judicial authority to make a determination of guilt of the offense of driving while intoxicated, an illegal delegation of the police power; and further that the statute gives the department the right to make rules without fixing any proper standard which it must follow in so doing, an illegal delegation of law making power.

Considering first the claim of illegal delegation of the police power, it will be notes that the statute says the department is 'authorized' to suspend the license. This the plaintiff thinks gives the department, or the commissioner acting for it and in its name, authority to act or not to act in each case as its or his discretion may determine. In Central States Theater Corporation v. Sar, 245 Iowa 1254, 66 N.W.2d 450, cited and relied upon by the plaintiff, we struck down a statute which gave township trustees power to grant licenses for theaters and other businesses in locations outside incorporated cities or towns. But there the statute, Section 361.3, expressly said 'The granting of a license shall be discretionary with the trustees; * * *'. We held it was an illegal delegation of power and likewise discriminatory. We do not so interpret the act before us here. To 'authorize', according to Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, means 'To clothe with authority or legal power; to give a right to act; to commission.' So the department, through the commissioner, is empowered to act. The difficult question is whether this means a discretion to act or not to act in each case. We think that the statute is not to be so interpreted. It is our duty to construe acts of the legislature, where it can reasonably be done, so that their constitutionality will be upheld. The governing rule here is thus stated in 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 98, pp. 371, 372: 'statutes will, or should, be liberally or reasonably construed so as to sustain their constitutionality or validity'. We have ourselves said: 'It is a well-established principle, often applied by this court, that courts must construe a statute so as to avoid, if possible, holding it void for unconstitutionality.' Knorr v. Beardsley, supra page 840 of 240 Iowa, page 243 of 38 N.W.2d.

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