Spurgeon v. Julius Blum, Inc.

• Decision Date: 22 March 1993
• Docket Number: No. 89-1107.,89-1107.
• Citation: 816 F. Supp. 1317
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois
• Parties: Randall Howard SPURGEON, Plaintiff, v. JULIUS BLUM, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff, v. SUNNYLAND CABINET & MILL WORK, INC., an Illinois Corporation, Third Party Defendant.

816 F. Supp. 1317

Randall Howard SPURGEON, Plaintiff, v. JULIUS BLUM, INC., a foreign corporation, Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff, v. SUNNYLAND CABINET & MILL WORK, INC., an Illinois Corporation, Third Party Defendant.

No. 89-1107.

United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Peoria Division.

March 22, 1993.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jack C. Vieley, Peoria, for plaintiff.

Gary M. Peplow, John C. Mulgrew, Jr., & Matthew S. Hefflefinger, Heyl Royster Voelker & Allen, Peoria, for defendant/third party plaintiff.

Paul C. Estes, Peoria, for third party defendant.

ORDER

McDADE, District Judge.

The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the reasons which follow, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Doc. # 39-1. Plaintiff's Motion is DENIED.¹ Doc. # 501.

BACKGROUND

On April 24, 1989, Plaintiff filed a two count Complaint alleging that Defendant is liable to him under theories of strict liability and negligence for injury to his hand resulting from the defective design of a "door hinging machine," and for failure to warn him that the product, as designed, was unreasonably dangerous when used without a safety shield.² The Court has diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

A. Summary Judgment

Federal Rule 56(c) Summary Judgment is appropriate when there remains no genuine issue of material fact upon which a reasonable jury could find in favor of the non-moving party, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Although the moving party on a motion for summary judgment is responsible for demonstrating to the Court why there is no genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must go beyond the face of the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, to show that a rational jury could return a verdict in this party's favor. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-27, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-55, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-55, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-14, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The Court must view all inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. at 2509-10. Beraha v. Baxter Health Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1440 (7th Cir. 1992). Disputed facts are material when they might affect the outcome of the suit. First Ind. Bank v. Baker, 957 F.2d 506, 507-08 (7th Cir.1992). A metaphysical doubt will not suffice. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. at 1355.

B. Undisputed Facts

The following facts are undisputed.³ On or about August 31, 1988, Plaintiff, Randall Spurgeon, an employee of Sunnyland Cabinet & Mill Work, Incorporated Sunnyland, caught his left thumb in the drill of a door hinging machine "machine" when he reached "into" and "under" the machine's motor to adjust an air clamp which had come loose during drilling.

1. The Machine

The machine was designed and manufactured by Defendant, Julius Blum Incorporated, and shipped to Sunnyland on December 8, 1986. When shipped, the safety shield covering the drill was in place.

The machine performs two functions: it drills holes in a door and inserts a hinge or other mounting hardware. The machine is operated by a control panel which activates the drilling and insertion unit. An operator places the woodstock/door on a working table, which is built on top of the frame. A ruler runs perpendicular to the frame. Stops are positioned on the ruler so that the woodstock can be positioned uniformly for each task.

"The user must position the woodstock underneath the drilling unit and properly align it against the stops positioned on the ruler." Pneumatic hold-down clamps (air clamps) are located on both sides of the frame and are designed to secure the woodstock underneath the drilling unit. To the left of the machine is a "swing arm" and an "insertion ram," designed to mount the hinges into the woodstock.

A clear, plexiglass, safety shield "covers" the drilling unit's router blades. The shield is designed to keep the user's hands out of the drilling area and act as a deterrent to flying wood chips. At the time of the accident, the guard on the machine was longer than the drill bits, so that when an operator put his hand on the bottom of the shield, he would not be able to feel the drill points. The guard (and thus the drill unit) is not flush with the front of the machine, but rather is "recessed in" the machine "about ¼ inch." Although the guard is "clear," Plaintiff admits that it can be seen—although there is some inconsistency on this point.

To use the machine as it was designed, an operator turns the power on and presses a yellow button on the control panel to activate the drilling unit. The drill then moves down toward the woodstock to make holes for the hinge. Once the holes have been drilled into the woodstock, the user is ready to apply hinges. To apply hinges, the operator mounts the insertion ram onto the swing arm and then positions the swing arm horizontally over the drilled holes in the woodstock. To insert the hinge, the swing arm must be rotated down beneath the drill unit with the drill bits turning above until it stops. The operator then pushes the yellow button on the control panel which inserts the hinge (mounted on the insertion ram) into the woodstock.

There is no dispute that the safety shield was in place when the machine left the control of Defendant. There is also no dispute that the machine, as designed, was intended to be used with the safety shield in place and was reasonably safe when operated with the shield.

2. The Accident

On the day of the accident, Plaintiff dusted off the machine and ran scraps of wood to test the depth of the cut. Plaintiff "assumed" that the safety shield was in place, but never checked to make sure because, he stated, the machine should never be operated without the shield, he never took the shield off, and the only reason for the shield to ever come off the machine was to sharpen the drill bits—which never happened. Nevertheless, the shield was not on the machine. Plaintiff testified that even though he was the only person who used the machine that day, he did not remove the shield, nor did he see it missing. Consequently, when the air clamp swung underneath the drill unit, Plaintiff reached into the machine with his left hand to pull it back into position, and his left thumb was "sucked into" the drill unit, wherein he sustained injuries. The day of the accident was the first time Plaintiff had operated the machine since Dan Golasz quit six months earlier, and no one, to Plaintiff's knowledge, had used the machine during that period.

Plaintiff testified that the accident would not have happened if the shield had been in place, and/or if he had turned off the machine before he put his hand in the drill area. Plaintiff further acknowledged that he knew the danger associated with use of the machine without the safety shield in place. Plaintiff admits that there may have been one warning on the side of the machine when it arrived, but could not be sure.

DISCUSSION

Liability in this case is based on two theories: design defect and failure to warn. Plaintiff contends that Defendant is liable for his injury under theories of strict liability and negligence due to design defect because: (1) the safety shield covering the router blades could be easily removed; (2) there is no safety device within easy reach of the normal operating position of the operator to stop the machine in an emergency;⁴ and (3) there were no adequate safeguards or adequate safety shields to prevent the operator from getting his hand and fingers cut by the exposed router blades.⁵ Plaintiff contends that Defendant is liable for failure to warn because: (1) there are no written instructions or warnings of the danger from the exposed router blades; and (2) there are no warnings on the machine of the danger from the exposed router blades.

The Court finds that it must grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant on all Plaintiff's claims except the design defect claim regarding easy removability of the safety shield. There are disputed issues of fact regarding not only whether the shield was easily removable and who removed it, but also whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the shield would be removed because it "hindered" use of the machine, and whether the danger from the absent shield was unreasonable and/or "open and obvious."

A. Design Defect

In both strict liability⁶ and negligence⁷ actions, liability will be imposed for design defects when a manufacturer breaches a duty to a product's user.⁸Malone v. Bic Corp., 789 F.Supp. 939 (N.D.Ill.1992); Baltus v. Weaver Division of Kidde & Co., 199 Ill.App.3d 821, 829, 145 Ill.Dec. 810, 815, 557 N.E.2d 580, 585 (1990). Determination of a manufacturer's duty is a question of law. Cozzi v. North Palos Elementary School Dist., 232 Ill.App.3d 379, 383, 173 Ill.Dec. 709, 712, 597 N.E.2d 683, 686 (1st Dist.1992) citing Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62 Ill.2d 456, 466, 343 N.E.2d 465, 471 (1976) and McColgan v. Env. Control Syst., Inc., 212 Ill.App.3d 696, 699, 156 Ill.Dec. 835, 837, 571 N.E.2d 815, 817 (1st Dist.1991); Mason v. Ashland Exploration Inc., 965 F.2d 1421, 1425 n. 6 (7th Cir.1992); Malone v. Bic Corp., 789 F.Supp. 939, 942 (1992). Manufacturers have a duty to design reasonably safe products. Baltus, 199 Ill.App.3d at 829, 145 Ill.Dec. at 815, 557 N.E.2d at 585; Malone, 789 F.Supp. at 942. This duty is breached and liability is imposed under strict liability and negligence when a plaintiff proves that at the time the product left the manufacturer's control the design in question created an unreasonably dangerous condition which proximately caused plaintiff's injury, and this injury was reasonably foreseeable by...