Spytma v. Howes

• Decision Date: 04 December 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-1216.,01-1216.
• Citation: 313 F.3d 363
• Parties: Timothy Jon SPYTMA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Carol HOWES, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 363

313 F.3d 363

Timothy Jon SPYTMA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Carol HOWES, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 01-1216.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued August 8, 2002.

Decided and Filed December 4, 2002.

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James Sterling Lawrence (argued and briefed), Detroit, MI, for Appellant.

Janet A. Van Cleve (argued and briefed), Office of the Attorney General, Habeas Corpus Division, Lansing, MI, for Appellee.

Before MERRITT and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges; WEBER,^* District Judge.

OPINION

MERRITT, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal from denial of a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Four issues are raised on appeal. The first issue is a procedural question raised by the State with jurisdictional ramifications because the state contends that petitioner's petition is barred by the statute of limitations. The remaining three issues on the merits are raised by petitioner: (1) whether his transfer to adult court was lawful; (2) whether his jury waiver was knowing and intelligent; and (3) whether he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Petitioner Timothy Spytma was 15 years old in December 1974 when he was charged with the murder of a neighbor. He and a friend, 15-year old Michael Saxton, entered the neighbor's home when she was not there with the intention of burglarizing it. Both juveniles were under the influence of barbiturates at the time. When the neighbor came home and found the young men in her home, they tied her up, beat her with a baseball bat, sexually assaulted her, wrote on her body with ink and eventually slit her wrists. The specific cause of death was determined to be caused by blows to her head inflicted by Michael Saxton.

Petitioner and Saxton were charged with first degree murder. The probate court, which had jurisdiction over juveniles in Michigan at the time, held a joint hearing and decided that both juveniles should be transferred to adult court for trial. Following separate bench trials, they were both convicted and sentenced to life without parole. Petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the Michigan Court of Appeals without explanation. People v. Spytma, No. 31487 (Mich.Ct.App. Feb. 15, 1978). Petitioner was resentenced in 1986 after the Michigan Court of Appeals determined that the breaking and entering of the victim's home was not an enumerated felony for purposes of Michigan's felony-murder statute because it occurred during the day instead of at night. Petitioner was resentenced for second-degree murder and, after the Court of Appeals ordered new psychiatric evaluations of petitioner, he again received a life sentence without parole. See People v. Spytma, No. 93377 (Mich. Ct.App. Aug. 28, 1987).

In July 1995, petitioner filed a motion for relief from judgment with the Muskegon County Circuit Court raising three constitutional issues: (1) whether his jury waiver was knowing and intelligent; (2) whether the waiver of probate (juvenile) court jurisdiction was valid and (3) whether he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court at first summarily denied the motion, but the Michigan Court of Appeals directed the circuit court to hold an evidentiary hearing to collect further evidence on all three issues. An evidentiary hearing was held in April 1996. The circuit court heard testimony on all the issues and again denied relief. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed. People v. Spytma, No. 188253, 1997 WL 33350487 (Mich.Ct.App. May 9, 1997). The Michigan Supreme Court denied the application for leave to file an appeal. 457 Mich. 858, 581 N.W.2d 731 (1998).

Petitioner filed a habeas petition with the federal court and it was referred to a Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judge held a hearing and heard from the attorneys but did not take any new evidence. The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation that recommended granting conditional habeas relief because petitioner's jury waiver was not knowingly and intelligently given. He did not recommend relief on the other issues. Both parties objected to the Report and Recommendation. The district court adopted the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation as to the transfer to adult court and the ineffective assistance of counsel issues. The district court did not adopt the Magistrate Judge's recommendation on the jury waiver issue, instead finding that the waiver was knowingly and intelligently given. Spytma v. Howes, No. 1:99-CV-286 (W.D.Mich. Jan. 9, 2001). This appeal followed.

Statute of Limitations

The State claims that petitioner's habeas petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).¹ The State arrives at this position by arguing that the time during which petitioner's post-conviction claims were pending in state court counts against the one-year time limitation for bringing a habeas petition. In other words, the State contends that there is no tolling of the one-year period during the time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court on collateral review of a petitioner's claims.

The State acknowledges that the statute of limitations is tolled when a "properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review ... is pending." § 2244(d)(2). However, the State goes on to argue that the moment a state court rules on an application for collateral review, it is no longer "pending" and the statute of limitations is not tolled during the intervals between state court proceedings. Specifically, the State maintains in this case that the statute was not tolled from May 9, 1997, when the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision to deny petitioner's motion for relief from judgment, to June 23, 1997, the date on which petitioner properly and timely filed a delayed application for leave to file with the Michigan Supreme Court. The State argues that when that 45-day period is combined with the period between April 28, 1998, the date on which the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, and April 15, 1999, the date on which petitioner filed his petition for habeas corpus, the petitioner's petition violates the one-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

The statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 is ambiguous as to whether the one-year limitations period should be tolled during the time between a lower state court's decision and the filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court on collateral review of a petitioner's claims. The Supreme Court, however, recently clarified this issue, holding, as had every circuit court that had addressed the issue, that a petitioner's claim is "pending" for the entire term of state court review, including those intervals between one state court's judgment and the filing of an appeal with a higher state court. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 2138, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002). Accord Abela v. Martin, 309 F.3d 338, 345-46 (6th Cir. 2002). Because petitioner timely filed his application and appeals on collateral review in the state courts, he falls within the one-year statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(1).

Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction

In December 1974, Michigan law required that the probate court, which served as the juvenile court in Michigan at the time, hold a hearing to decide whether a juvenile defendant should be tried as an adult. M.C.L. § 712A.2; M.S.A. § 27.3178.² Petitioner claims that the waiver of jurisdiction by the probate court violated his constitutional due process rights because the probate court neglected to make sufficient factual findings as required by state law.

In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), the Supreme Court recognized that a hearing to determine whether a juvenile should be tried as an adult was a "critically important" stage and therefore the proceedings "must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment." Id. at 562, 86 S.Ct. 1045. The Court went on to state, however, that it did not mean by this "to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing ...." and the Court has never tried "to prescribe criteria for, or the nature and quantum of, evidence that must support" a decision to transfer a juvenile to adult court. Id. So while the Court made it clear that juveniles are entitled to some minimal level of procedural safeguards, such as legal representation and development of a reviewable record, the Court did not specify the exact nature of the constitutional requirements of due process at a juvenile transfer hearing. Oviedo v. Jago, 809 F.2d 326, 327 (6th Cir.1987).

At the time of petitioner's arrest, Michigan had procedures in place to follow when conducting a juvenile transfer hearing. See Juvenile Court Rules of 1969, Rules 11.1 & 11.6; People v. White, 51 Mich.App. 1, 4, 214 N.W.2d 326 (1973); Jackson v. People, 46 Mich.App. 764, 769, 208 N.W.2d 526, 530 (1973). Rule 11.1 set out a two-step process whereby the court first determined whether there was probable cause to believe that the child committed a felony offense, and then went on

to determine whether or not the interests of the child and the public would be best served by granting a waiver of jurisdiction to the criminal [adult] court. In making the determination, the court shall consider the following criteria:

(a) The prior record and character of the child, his physical and mental maturity and his pattern of living;

(b) The seriousness of the offense;

(c) Whether the offense, even if less serious, is part of a repetitive pattern of offenses which would lead to a determination that the child may be beyond rehabilitation under existing juvenile programs and statutory procedures;

(d) The relative suitability of programs and facilities available to the juvenile and criminal courts for the child; and

(e...