Square Lake Hills Condominium Ass'n v. Bloomfield Tp.

• Decision Date: 11 June 1991
• Docket Number: No. 87631,87631
• Parties: SQUARE LAKE HILLS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, a Michigan non-profit corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BLOOMFIELD TOWNSHIP, a Michigan municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 321

471 N.W.2d 321

437 Mich. 310

SQUARE LAKE HILLS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, a Michigan

non-profit corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BLOOMFIELD TOWNSHIP, a Michigan municipal corporation,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 87631.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Dec. 6, 1990.

Decided June 11, 1991.

[437 Mich. 312] Bodman, Longley & Dahling by James J. Walsh, Martha B. Goodloe, Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.

Kohl, Secrest, Wardle, Lynch, Clark & Hampton, [437 Mich. 313] William P. Hampton, Gerald A. Fisher, Farmington Hills, for defendant-appellant.

John H. Bauckham, Lynda E. Thomsen, Kalamazoo, for amicus curiae.

Peterson, Hay and Comsa, P.C. by Mark S. Mackley, Mount Clemens, for amicus curiae, Charter Tp. of Harrison.

OPINION

RILEY, Justice.

The question before the Court is whether townships have the authority to regulate by ordinance boat docking and launching under the township ordinance act, M.C.L. Sec. 41.181 et seq.; M.S.A. Sec. 5.45(1) et seq. We hold that townships have the authority to regulate boat docking and launching for the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of persons and property within their communities under the township ordinance act. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to Oakland Circuit Court to enter an order pursuant to this opinion.

I

In the early 1960s, Milton and Barbara Sloban owned land adjacent to Square Lake in Bloomfield Township zoned as single-family residential use. The Slobans, who requested and were denied a variance to build apartments on their property, challenged the township's zoning classification. Following trial, Judge Arthur E. Moore, Oakland Circuit Court, entered a judgment invalidating the township's single-family zoning classification as applied to the Square Lake property and authorized multiple-family residential use.

The Slobans split the property in two, conveying the back-lot portion and an easement of 160 feet of beach frontage to Square Lake Apartments, Inc. (Phase One), and retained the front-lot portion adjacent to Square Lake. A few years later, the Slobans developed the lake-front property (Phase Two) into seventy-eight multifamily rental units. ¹ With the two apartment complexes in place, approximately forty homes and 152 multifamily units had access to Square Lake.

Square Lake Apartments, Inc., conveyed the Phase One development back to the Slobans early in 1973. As a result, the easement created for the Phase One residents was extinguished by merger of title. Later that year, the Slobans sold the Phase Two development to Lake Front Apartments and created another easement to allow Phase One residents access to the lake. ²

Square Lake Hills Associates bought Phase One seven years later. They converted the apartments into condominiums, erected a small boat dock off of its easement, and advertised the units as affording lake-access rights for year-round recreation.

Meanwhile, Bloomfield Township responded to a call for inland lake regulation in 1974 by adopting ordinance no. 278. This ordinance restricted the use of inland lakes to owners or occupants of riparian parcels. ³ In 1981, the township repealed ordinance no. 278. ⁴ In its place, it adopted ordinance no. 340 which required nonriparian owners who used the township's inland lakes to obtain prior approval from the Township Zoning Board of Appeals.

In 1984, Bloomfield Township sued the current and former owners of the Phase Two development directing them to comply with ordinance no. 340 and prohibiting Phase One residents access to the beach-front easement area. ⁵ While the lawsuit was pending, the Bloomfield Township Board of Supervisors proposed ordinance no. 397. ⁶ This ordinance limited township riparian property owners, with a minimum of 150 feet of lake frontage, to launching and docking one motor boat. Plaintiff's representative and the riparian property owners of Square Lake appeared at the township board meeting on April 13, 1987, to discuss the proposal. ⁷ After a lengthy hearing, the township board unanimously voted to approve the ordinance.

Soon thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit challenging ordinance nos. 340 and 397. Bloomfield Township, questioning the substantive grounds of plaintiff's complaint, responded with a motion for summary disposition. Plaintiff cross motioned for partial summary disposition on the basis of Fox & Associates, Inc. v. Hayes Twp., 162 Mich.App. 647, 413 N.W.2d 465 (1987), which held that townships do not have authority under the Township Rural Zoning Act to enact ordinances restricting boat docking or funnel development.

Judge Norman L. Lippitt heard both motions and concluded that Fox & Associates prohibited Bloomfield Township from regulating Square Lake under both the Township Rural Zoning Act and the township ordinance act.

In appealing Judge Lippitt's decision, Bloomfield Township additionally sought an order from this Court to consolidate with Fox & Associates. ⁸ We denied Bloomfield Township's motion to consolidate because we were not persuaded the questions presented by the township should be reviewed by this Court before consideration by the Court of Appeals. ⁹

The Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the trial court, premising its decision on Fox & Associates. After its motion for reconsideration was denied, Bloomfield Township applied for leave to appeal in this Court. We granted the township's motion, limiting review to the following issues: ¹⁰

(1) Whether the delegation of powers in the township ordinance act allows Bloomfield Township to regulate by ordinance boat launching and boat docking; and

(2) Whether the Township Rural Zoning Act allows Bloomfield Township to regulate by ordinance boat launching and boat docking. ¹¹

II

Under the separation of powers doctrine, ¹² township regulations enacted under the township ordinance act are not subject to judicial intervention absent abuse of discretion, excessive use of power, or error of law. Tireman-Joy-Chicago Improvement Ass'n v. Chernick, 361 Mich. 211, 105 N.W.2d 57 (1960); Sheffield Development Co. v. City of Troy, 99 Mich.App. 527, 530, 298 N.W.2d 23 (1980). When asked to review a township ordinance, we will not substitute our judgment for that of a township official. Rather, we heed the advice of Justice Talbot Smith in Brae Burn, Inc. v. Bloomfield Hills, 350 Mich. 425, 431, 86 N.W.2d 166 (1957):

"The people of the community, through their appropriate legislative body, and not the courts, govern its growth and life. Let us state the proposition as clearly as may be: It is not our function to approve the ordinance before us as to wisdom or desirability. For alleged abuses involving such factors the remedy is the ballot box, not the courts. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the legislative body charged with the duty and the responsibility in the premises." (Emphasis added.)

As the majority in Brae Burn held, our function is to determine whether a township ordinance is within the range of conferred discretionary powers and then determine if it is reasonable. Id. at 437, 86 N.W.2d 166. See also People v. Gibbs, 186 Mich. 127, 133, 152 N.W. 1053 (1915); 1426 Woodward Ave Corp v. Wolff, 312 Mich. 352, 371, 20 N.W.2d 217 (1945); State, Co. & Municipal Employees Local 339 v. Highland Park, 363 Mich. 79, 86, 108 N.W.2d 898 (1961). The reasonableness of an ordinance, while a question of law, depends upon the particular facts of each case. Id. The test for determining whether an ordinance is reasonable requires us to assess the existence of a rational relationship between the exercise of police power ¹³ and the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare in a particular manner in a given case. People v. Armstrong, 73 Mich. 288, 292, 41 N.W. 275 (1889); People v. Gibbs, supra; Alderton v. City of Saginaw, 367 Mich. 28, 33, 116 N.W.2d 53 (1962); Delta Charter Twp. v. Dinolfo, 419 Mich. 253, 271, 351 N.W.2d 831 (1984). ¹⁴

At common law, we narrowly construed township ordinances enacted pursuant to the delegated police power in the township ordinance act. Harding v. Bader, 75 Mich. 316, 319, 42 N.W. 942 (1889); Clements v. McCabe, 210 Mich. 207, 219, 177 N.W. 722 (1920). The delegates to the 1961 Michigan Constitutional Convention replaced the common-law rule of strict construction by constitutionally requiring courts to liberally construe all legislative and constitutional powers conferred upon townships. Const 1963, art. 7, Sec. 34; see also, 1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp 1048-1058. While this constitutional directive does not provide an independent grant of authority for townships to act in a particular area, its mandate of liberal construction does provide a framework for analysis of Bloomfield Township's arguments. ¹⁵ See Arrowhead Development Co. v. Livingston Co. Road Comm., 413 Mich. 505, 511, 322 N.W.2d 702 (1982); Eyde Construction Co. v. Meridian Twp., 149 Mich.App. 802, 807, 386 N.W.2d 687 (1986).

A

Plaintiff first ¹⁶ argues that Bloomfield Township acted beyond the delegated police powers in the township ordinance act when it limited the use of its easement by controlling the number of boats docked and launched on Square Lake.

Central to plaintiff's analysis is the 1989 amendment of the township ordinance act which now provides in part:

"The township board of a township may, at a regular or special meeting by a majority of the members elect of the township board, adopt ordinances regulating the public health, safety, and general welfare of persons and property, including, but not limited to fire protection, licensing or use of bicycles, traffic and parking of vehicles...." M.C.L. Sec. 41.181; M.S.A. Sec. 5.45(1). (Emphasis added.)

Thus, plaintiff maintains the Legislature did not intend for townships to have an unlimited amount of regulatory power under the township ordinance act. Moreover, plaintiff maintains the Legislature intended to...