Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: SCOTLAND; BLEASE, Acting P.J., and NICHOLSON
• Citation: Squaw Valley Ski Corp. v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 897, 2 Cal.App.4th 1499 (Cal. App. 1992)
• Decision Date: 28 January 1992
• Docket Number: No. C010279,C010279
• Parties: SQUAW VALLEY SKI CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of Placer County, Respondent, Patricia George BOWLES, Real Party In Interest.

Page 897

3 Cal.Rptr.2d 897

2 Cal.App.4th 1499

SQUAW VALLEY SKI CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of Placer County, Respondent Patricia George BOWLES, Real Party In Interest.

No. C010279.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Jan. 28, 1992.

As Modified Feb. 25, 1992.

Review Denied April 16, 1992.

Hancock, Rothert & Bunshoft, Paul S. Rosenlund and Mark D. Tokunaga, San Francisco, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

D.G. Menchetti, Ltd., Bradley P. Elley, Incline Village, Nev., and Harrington & Trent, Sheila M. Harrington, Pleasanton, for real party in interest.

SCOTLAND, Associate Justice.

In this writ proceeding, we address two issues of first impression in California: whether a ski resort chair lift facility is a "common carrier" as defined in Civil Code section 2168; and whether Public Utilities Code section 212, subdivision (c), which explicitly excludes ski lift facilitiesfrom a separate definition of "common carrier" used for the purpose of Public Utilities Commission regulation and supervision (Pub.Util.Code, §§ 211, 216), also exempts a chair lift operator from Civil Code section 2168 common carrier status for the purpose of tort liability.

The questions are significant because, if a chair lift operator is a common carrier for tort liability, it is held to a standard of care higher than that of ordinary, reasonable care. (Civ.Code, § 2100.)

As we shall explain, the trial court properly held that, in operating its chair lift facilities, Squaw Valley is a common carrier within the meaning of Civil Code section 2168 for the purpose of tort liability and that Public Utilities Code section 212, subdivision (c), does not exempt Squaw Valley from this status.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In April 1986, Patricia Bowles (plaintiff), an experienced recreational skier, went to Squaw Valley to ski. After paying the fee Squaw Valley required for use of the skiing facilities it manages and controls, she proceeded to the Shirley Lake chair lift. Squaw Valley operates this lift solely during the ski season, and only skiers with valid lift passes, boots, skis and bindings are allowed to board the chair lift. Plaintiff complied with these criteria. As she was in the loading area attempting to board the lift, plaintiff was struck in the head by the bail of one of the chairs affixed to the lift.

Plaintiff filed this action to recover damages for injuries she allegedly sustained during this incident. Her complaint alleges there were no Squaw Valley employees to assist in loading her onto the chair lift, and asserts causes of action for negligence and negligent management, supervision and hiring of personnel. The complaint names as defendants Squaw Valley and the employees who were assigned to the Shirley Lake loading station at the time of the accident.

Plaintiff moved for summary adjudication of issues (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)), seeking to establish that Squaw Valley is a common carrier based on its operation of the Shirley Lake chair lift facility. Squaw Valley opposed the motion on the grounds that (1) chair lift facilities do not come within the Civil Code section 2168 definition of common carriers, and (2) even if they do, Public Utilities Code section 212, subdivision (c), excludes chair lift facilities from common carrier status with respect to tort liability.

The trial court held that Squaw Valley is a common carrier within the meaning of Civil Code section 2168, and that Public Utilities Code section 212, subdivision (c), exempts ski lift facilities only from regulatory jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission, and not from common carrier status for tort actions. Accordingly, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for summary adjudication to conclusively establish Squaw Valley as a common carrier in this personal injury action.

Upon Squaw Valley's timely petition for a peremptory writ commanding the trial court to vacate its decision (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c, subd. (l )), we issued an alternative writ of mandate to review the trial court's decision.

DISCUSSION

I

The trial court may grant summary adjudication of issues as to matters where there exists no material, triable controversy. (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c, subd. (f); Monte Vista Development Corp. v. Superior Court (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1681, 1685, 277 Cal.Rptr. 608.) In reviewing an order granting summary adjudication of issues, "we are governed by the rules generally applicable to review of summary judgments." (Heredia v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1345, 1353, 279 Cal.Rptr. 511.) We independently review the trial court's order, ruling de novo on questions of law. (Lough v. Coal Oil, Inc. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1518, 1525, 266 Cal.Rptr. 611.)

Whether a party is a common carrier within the meaning of Civil Code section 2168 is a matter of law where, as in this case, the material facts are not in dispute. (Orr v. Pacific Southwest Airlines (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1467, 1472-1473, 257 Cal.Rptr. 18; 2 The American Law of Torts (1985) § 9.29, p. 1182.) Similarly, the question whether Public Utilities Code section 212, subdivision (c), exempts ski lift operators from common carrier status in tort actions presents solely a question of law because it involves the application of this statute to undisputed facts. (Dean W. Knight & Sons, Inc. v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 300, 305, 202 Cal.Rptr. 44.) Accordingly, we review de novo the trial court's decision on these matters.

II

The significance of whether Squaw Valley is a common carrier is the standard of care imposed on it. In ordinary negligence cases, the duty is that of ordinary care which a reasonable, prudent person would use considering all the circumstances. (Rest.2d Torts, § 283; 6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 750, pp. 87-89; BAJI No. 3.10.) As to common carriers, Civil Code section 2100 provides: "A carrier of persons for reward must use the utmost care and diligence for their safe carriage, must provide everything necessary for that purpose, and must exercise to that end a reasonable degree of skill." (See also 6 Witkin, op. cit. supra, § 767, pp. 105-107; BAJI No. 6.51.) This standard of care requires common carriers "to do all that human care, vigilance, and foresight reasonably can do under the circumstances." (Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 785, 710 P.2d 907.) "Common carriers are not, however, insurers of their passengers' safety. Rather, the degree of care and diligence which they must exercise is only such as can reasonably be exercised consistent with the character and mode of conveyance adopted and the practical operation of business of the carrier." (Ibid.)

This elevated standard of care for common carriers has its origin in English common law. It is based on a recognition that the privilege of serving the public as a common carrier necessarily entails great responsibility, requiring common carriers to exercise a high duty of care towards their customers. (Convey-All Corp. v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co. (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d 116, 120-121, 174 Cal.Rptr. 443; 2 The American Law of Torts, supra, § 9.29, p. 1181.)

III

Civil Code section 2168 sets forth the definition of common carrier applied in tort actions. (E.g., McIntyre v. Smoke Tree Ranch Stables (1962) 205 Cal.App.2d 489, 491-492, 23 Cal.Rptr. 339.) The statute provides: "Everyone who offers to the public to carry persons, property, or messages, excepting only telegraphic messages, is a common carrier of whatever he thus offers to carry."

Whether a ski resort chair lift facility is a common carrier under this definition has not been decided by an appellate court in California. ¹ However, courts have determined that common carriers include a variety of similar operations which hold themselves out to the public to transport persons from one location to another. For example, a cable car company which, for a fee, shuttles sightseers up the snowless slopes of San Francisco is a common carrier. (Finley v. City & County of S.F. (1952) 115 Cal.App.2d 116, 120, 251 P.2d 687.) Even stores which operate elevators and escalators to propel patrons to the peaks of purchasing paradise have been deemed to be common carriers. (Champagne v. A. Hamburger & Sons (1915) 169 Cal. 683, 690, 147 P. 954; Treadwell v. Whittier (1889) 80 Cal. 574, 585-592, 22 P. 266; Hendershott v. Macy's (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 324, 327-328, 322 P.2d 596, disapproved on other grounds in Di Mare v. Cresci (1962) 58 Cal.2d 292, 299, 23 Cal.Rptr. 772, 373 P.2d 860.) Although a store does not charge for use of its elevators or escalators, it profits from the utilization of these devices to assist customers in shopping at the store. (Treadwell, supra, 80 Cal. at p. 592, 22 P. 266.) Hence, a common carrier within the meaning of Civil Code section 2168 is any entity which holds itself out to the public generally and indifferently to transport goods or persons from place to place for profit. (Samuelson v. Public Utilities Com. (1951) 36 Cal.2d 722, 728-730, 227 P.2d 256; see also Hutchinson, The Law of Carriers (3d ed. 1906) §§ 47-49, pp. 41-44.)

Given the fact Squaw Valley indiscriminately offers its Shirley Lake chair lift to the public to carry skiers at a fixed rate from the bottom to the top of the Shirley Lake run, it logically comes within the Civil Code section 2168 definition of a common carrier. (See Samuelson, supra, 36 Cal.2d at pp. 728-730, 227 P.2d 256; Hutchinson, op cit. supra, §§ 47-49, pp. 41-44.)

This conclusion is consistent with decisions of other jurisdictions which have considered whether chair lift operators are charged with the duty of care imposed on common carriers. ² Those jurisdictions uniformly have held that operators of chair lift facilities are common carriers absent a statutory mandate exempting them from this status. ³ (Bolduc v. Herbert Schneider Corp. (1977) 117...