Squeo v. Norwalk Hosp. Ass'n

Decision Date28 April 2015
Docket NumberNo. 19283.,19283.
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesAgnes SQUEO, Fiduciary (Estate of Stephen J. Squeo), et al. v. The NORWALK HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION et al.

316 Conn. 558
113 A.3d 932

Agnes SQUEO, Fiduciary (Estate of Stephen J. Squeo), et al.
v.
The NORWALK HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION et al.

No. 19283.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 21, 2014.
Decided April 28, 2015.


113 A.3d 934

Brenden P. Leydon, Stamford, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Michael R. McPherson, with whom, on the brief, were Joyce A. Lagnese and Jonathan A. Kocienda, Hartford, for the appellees (defendants).

Cynthia C. Bott and Karen K. Clark filed a brief for the Connecticut Trial Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

113 A.3d 935

Jennifer L. Cox and Jennifer A. Osowiecki filed a brief for the Connecticut Hospital Association as amicus curiae.

ROGERS, C.J., and PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH, McDONALD, ESPINOSA and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.

Opinion

PALMER, J.

316 Conn. 560

In Clohessy v. Bachelor, 237 Conn. 31, 46, 56, 675 A.2d 852 (1996), this court first recognized that, under certain limited circumstances, a bystander to an accident may bring a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against the person whose negligence caused that accident, separate and apart from any claims that the primary victim of the accident might have. The present appeal requires us to resolve two issues that Clohessy left open: (1) whether, and under what circumstances, a bystander emotional distress claim may be brought in connection with an injury arising from alleged medical malpractice; and (2) what degree of emotional distress a bystander must suffer before he or she may assert a bystander claim for emotional distress. With regard to the first issue, we conclude that a bystander to medical malpractice may bring a claim for the resulting emotional distress only when the injuries result from gross negligence such that it would be readily apparent to a lay observer. This additional element reflects our determination that bystander claims should be available in the medical malpractice context only under extremely limited circumstances. With regard to the second issue, we conclude that a bystander must suffer injuries that are severe and debilitating, such that they warrant a psychiatric diagnosis1

316 Conn. 561

or otherwise substantially impair the bystander's ability to cope with life's daily routines and demands.

In the present case, the plaintiffs, Agnes Squeo, fiduciary of the estate of Stephen J. Squeo (Stephen), and Joseph Squeo, brought this action, alleging that the defendants, The Norwalk Hospital Association and Deborah M. Shahid, an advanced practice registered nurse, negligently discharged Stephen, the plaintiffs' suicidal son, at approximately 10:30 a.m. on August 15, 2007, after conducting an emergency psychiatric examination at Norwalk Hospital (hospital). The plaintiffs further claimed that they suffered severe emotional distress when, approximately thirty-five minutes after his discharge, they discovered that Stephen had hung himself from a tree in their front yard.2 The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' bystander emotional distress claim, contending that such a claim may not be brought in the medical malpractice context and, in the alternative, that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs had suffered severe and debilitating emotional distress. The trial court, Hon. Kevin Tierney, judge trial referee,3 agreed with the latter contention and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to the bystander claim. Because we agree that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs suffered severe

113 A.3d 936

and debilitating emotional distress as a result of the defendants' alleged negligence, we uphold the trial court's decision to grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' bystander emotional distress claim.

316 Conn. 562

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. The plaintiffs brought this action, alleging one count of professional negligence4 and one count of bystander emotional distress.5 The trial court summarized the allegations in the operative complaint as follows: “On the evening of August 14, 2007, Agnes Squeo [called] the Norwalk Police Department because her son, [Stephen], was depressed and expressed a desire to harm himself with an electrical cord. Later that evening, [Stephen] was detained by the police and admitted to the hospital for an emergency psychiatric examination. During his stay at the hospital, [Stephen] was evaluated by Shahid. The following morning, Shahid left a telephone message for the plaintiffs indicating that [Stephen] would soon be released from the hospital because he was no longer a danger to himself or others. [Stephen] was allowed to leave the hospital soon after Shahid left the ... message for the plaintiffs. After walking home alone, [Stephen] obtained [an electrical] cord and immediately [hanged] himself from a tree in the [plaintiffs'] front yard. Soon thereafter, Joseph Squeo saw [Stephen] hanging from [the] tree, and the plaintiffs ran to assist [Stephen]. In an attempt to revive him, the plaintiffs cut the [electrical cord] ... and administered [cardiopulmonary resuscitation ]. Despite the plaintiffs' best efforts, [Stephen] had

316 Conn. 563

already suffered [a] substantial brain injur[y], and he ultimately died after being taken off life support on August 23, 2007.”

The defendants initially moved to strike the second count of the plaintiffs' complaint, contending that Connecticut law does not recognize a cause of action for bystander emotional distress in a medical malpractice case. The court, Hon. Edward R. Karazin, judge trial referee, denied the motion. Recognizing a split of authority in the Superior Court, Judge Karazin concluded that, under certain circumstances, a bystander claim may be brought in the context of a medical malpractice action.6

The defendants subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, in which they (1) renewed their argument that claims of bystander emotional distress cannot be brought in the medical malpractice context, and (2) also contended that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiffs' emotional distress

113 A.3d 937

was severe and debilitating. In support of their motion, the defendants submitted excerpts from the plaintiffs' deposition transcripts and interrogatory responses, in which the plaintiffs admitted that they had required neither medication nor prolonged mental health care as a result of witnessing Stephen's hanging, and also that they had remained steadily employed following the incident. The plaintiffs did not submit affidavits or any other documentary evidence in support of their opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to the second count

316 Conn. 564

of the complaint, finding that the plaintiffs “failed to demonstrate that there is a material issue of fact [as to whether] the injuries and damages [they] suffered ... were severe and debilitating.” The plaintiffs appealed to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51–199(c) and Practice Book § 65–1. On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that (1) Connecticut does recognize a cause of action for bystander emotional distress arising out of medical malpractice, and (2) the trial court incorrectly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the emotional distress that they suffered as a result of witnessing the incident that ultimately led to Stephen's death. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

Before we analyze the plaintiffs' claims, we briefly review the development and recognition of bystander emotional distress as a distinct cause of action in the United States and Connecticut. Bystander emotional distress is a derivative claim, pursuant to which a bystander who witnesses another person (the primary victim) suffer injury or death as a result of the negligence of a third party seeks to recover from that third party for the emotional distress that the bystander suffers as a result. Courts historically have been reluctant to recognize this cause of action. Beyond the concerns that once counseled against affording a remedy for any purely emotional injury—the potential for trivial, frivolous or fraudulent claims, and the difficulties involved in tracing the etiology of psychological harms—recognition of bystander emotional distress has been hindered by concerns unique to the bystander context. Specifically, there have been fears that, if anyone who witnesses a serious accident or injury is permitted to bring his or her own independent claim, courts will be flooded with these derivative claims, and defendants will be subject to liability that is disproportionate to...

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