Squier v. Hydliff

• Decision Date: 30 October 1861
• Citation: 9 Mich. 274
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Alanson H. Squier v. Frederick Hydliff

9 Mich. 274

Alanson H. Squier v. Frederick Hydliff

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 30, 1861

Heard October 15, 1861; October 16, 1861 [Syllabus Material]

Error to Washtenaw circuit.

Hydliff an infant, brought suit by his next friend against Squier and declared for work and labor. Squier pleaded the general issue, and gave notice of set-off, that said Hydliff was an orphan, destitute of the means of support, and he, Squier, furnished him board, clothing, washing, mending, schooling, medical attendance, and nursed him in sickness, and supported him during four years and three months, all of which was suitable to his condition--and that said Squier also furnished said Hydliff divers goods, wares and merchandise at his request, etc.

On the trial in the court below, the plaintiff had judgment for $ 115. The errors complained of on the trial sufficiently appear from the opinion.

Judgement reversed, with cost, and a new trial ordered.

Seaman & Root, for plaintiff in error, argued that a contract clearly for the benefit of the infant, as this was (2 Kent 242), was binding upon him: 2 H. Black, 571; 2 T. R., 160; 3 M. and S., 497; 3 B. and C., 478. It is in fact a contract for the purchase of necessaries--that is, for all the necessaries included in his support for several years--payable in his labor and services; and the contract being fair, for his benefit, and fully executed on both sides, he could not avoid it, and recover for his work and labor on a quantum meruit. Protection to the infant requires that, where he has not been overreached in the contract, and it was not so unreasonable in itself as to raise a suspicion of fraud, and has been fully executed, he should not be permitted to repudiate it: 13 Pick. 1; 1 Gray 455.

H. J. Beakes, for defendant in error:

An infant may recover a reasonable compensation for his services, though rendered under a special agreement as to price: 19 Pick. 572; 2 Pick. 332; 3 Green 343; 12 Pick. 110; 7 Hill 110; 14 Vt. 405; 18 Conn. 337; 23 Vt. 268; 1 Vt. 273; 17 Me. 38; 9 Met. 57. He can not contract to pay even for necessaries so as to bar inquiry into their price and value: 1 Pars. on Cont., 260, 268; 4 Vt. 149; 3 Ind. 537. Upon principle it can make no difference as to the infant's right to disaffirm a contract, whether it be executed or executory. Not being competent to contract, he is of course not competent to ratify or carry out the contract so as to conclude him during his minority. See 6 Mass. 78; 26 Ala. 446; 9 Ind. 398; 15 Ohio 156, 193. If an infant could be precluded from availing himself of the right to disaffirm an executed contract, his privilege and protection under the law would be of little value.

The execution of the contract on the part of the adult, and the enjoyment of its fruits by the infant, confessedly does not affect the right of the infant to disaffirm when the contract is executory on his part. No act of the adult, therefore, can affect the question. And it is equally clear that the infant will not be bound by his contract, though completely executed on his part, when it remains executory on the part of the adult. No ratification or performance on the part of the minor, therefore, can affect the minor's right.

The true question, where the contract has been executed on both sides, is, has the minor received adequate compensation? If he has, then, unless he has returned the consideration received, he can not of course maintain his action. In such a case it may be said, in not very precise or accurate language, that the contract is allowed to stand. It is allowed to stand, however, not because of any validity in the contract, but because the remedy under the quantum meruit, and under the contract, is precisely the same thing, and therefore there is no object in disturbing the contract. But if the consideration is inadequate and can not be returned, then the measure of his redress is the difference between the value of his services and the consideration received.

Manning, J. Martin, Ch. J. and Campbell, J. concurred. Christiancy, J.

OPINION

Manning J.:

It has we believe, always been held that a minor might bind himself by contract for necessaries, and that such contract when executed, if reasonable under all the circumstances, or not...