Squire-Dingee Co. v. Indus. Bd. of Illinois

• Decision Date: 19 December 1917
• Docket Number: No. 11609.,11609.
• Citation: 117 N.E. 1031,281 Ill. 359
• Parties: SQUIRE-DINGEE CO. v. INDUSTRIAL BOARD OF ILLINOIS et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

281 Ill. 359

117 N.E. 1031

SQUIRE-DINGEE CO.

v.INDUSTRIAL BOARD OF ILLINOIS et al.

No. 11609.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 19, 1917.

Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; Oscar M. Torrison, Judge.

Proceeding by Joseph Dombkowski under the Workmen's Compensation Act for increase of compensation, opposed by the Squire-Dingee Company, employer. Award by Industrial Board was confirmed by the circuit court, and the employer brings error. Affirmed.

Frank M. Cox and R. J. Fellingham, both of Chicago, for plaintiff in error.

Carl Strover, of Chicago, for defendant in error Dombkowski.

CARTER, C. J.

This is a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1913, brought by Joseph Dombkowski to recover compensation for injuries sustained by him on October 31, 1913, through the falling of a platform at plaintiff in error's factory, over which he was wheeling a truck loaded with boxes filled with goods, in the course of his employment. The arbitrator found in favor of Dombkowski. On petition before the Industrial Board for review, a finding more favorable to Dombkowski was made, granting him $5.25 per week for 8 weeks and for the further period of 18 weeks beginning March 14, 1914. In the original application Dombkowski described his injury as a double hernia, internal injuries, and bruises on right leg and left hip. In the fall of 1914 an operation was performed on him for hernia, which apparently resulted in a partial, if not a substantial, cure. In August, 1914, plaintiff in error paid Dombkowski $147, and afterwards, on March 15, 1915, $57.75. About 15 months after the award by the Industrial Board on review, Dombkowski filed his petition with said board under clause (h) of section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, in which he alleged that:

‘The disability of petitioner has subsequently increased in this: That it has been discovered that petitioner is suffering from a chronic inflammatory condition of some of the lumbar vertebrae, said condition having been diagnosed as a case of spondylitis deformans; also it has been found that petitioner is suffering from a slight fracture of the pelvic bone, and that there are other internal complications rendering petitioner unable to work, notwithstanding that the double hernia, on account of which the original award was made, has been, at least to a large extent, cured.’

This is the petitionout of which this proceeding grew. On March 6, 1917, the Industrial Board, having heard the evidence on the present petition, including a certified copy of the stenographic report of the evidence heard under the original petition, entered an award that petitioner recover from plaintiff in error the sum of $5.25 per week for a period of 8 weeks from November 7, 1913, and for a further period from March 16, 1914, to the 1st day of February, 1916, and ordered that petitioner recover from respondent the sum of $1.50 per week for a period of 299 1/2 weeks from February 1, 1916, and further ordered that plaintiff in error be given credit for the sums of money already paid to petitioner. The case was taken to the circuit court on a writ of certiorari, where the judgment of the Industrial Board was affirmed, and that court further certified that the cause was one proper to be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The plaintiff in error thereupon prosecuted this writ, asking that the judgment of the circuit court be reversed.

[1] Counsel for plaintiff in error insist that the controlling question on this hearing is whether Dombkowski's disability has recurred or increased, as those terms are used in clause (h) of section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, since the award granted by the Industrial Board on the first petition. It is argued by counsel that the evidence taken on this hearing, considered in connection with the stenographic report of the evidence on the first hearing, shows clearly that this is simply a continuation of the original injury and not a recurrence. In the state of the record on this point we think this was a question of fact, and that the finding of the Industrial Board on such question is conclusive on this court. The case of Simpson Construction Co. v. Industrial Board, 275 Ill. 366, 114 N. E. 138, strongly relied on by counsel for plaintiff in error, we do not deem in point here. In that case it had been held by the Industrial Board, under the original petition, that the injured person could not recover, and in view of the state of the record in that case it could well be argued that there could be no recurrence or increase of an injury for which no original recovery could be had. Furthermore, it is stated in that opinion that the proof showed that the injured person had always been in the same condition since the time of the injury, while there is much testimony in this case that Dombkowski's condition was not the same at all times since the injury. Neither do we think that anything that was said in Bloomington, Decatur & Champaign Railroad Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 120, 114 N. E. 511, or in Casparis Stone Co. v. Industrial Board, 278 Ill. 77, 115 N. E. 822, in any way conflicts with the holding in this case that there has been a recurrence of the injury. In this case the Industrial Board complied with the holding in those two cases that in order to pass on the question of recurrence of the injury that board should have before it a stenographic report of the original hearing to form a basis upon which to decide what the original injury was and then might take other evidence to show whether the injury had increased or recurred. The original stenographic report was introduced here, then additional evidence was taken as to whether the original injury, as shown by that stenographic report, had recurred or increased, and, as stated before, we think the evidence on that question is of such a nature that it is one of fact, and the finding of the Industrial Board on this point is binding on the courts.

As we understand...