Squires v. Bonser

• Decision Date: 22 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-7035,94-7035
• Parties: Joseph SQUIRES, Sr., Appellant v. Thomas BONSER; Jay E. Huffman; Middle Smithfield Township, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 168

54 F.3d 168

Joseph SQUIRES, Sr., Appellant v. Thomas BONSER; Jay E. Huffman; Middle Smithfield Township Appellees.

No. 94-7035.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued Sept. 20, 1994.

Decided May 8, 1995.

As Amended on Grant of Rehearing June 22, 1995.

Cletus P. Lyman (argued), Lyman & Ash, Philadelphia, PA, for appellant.

Angela L. Dumm (argued), Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Philadelphia, PA, for appellees.

Before: BECKER and COWEN, Circuit Judges, and POLLAK, District Judge. ^*

OPINION OF THE COURT

LOUIS H. POLLAK, District Judge.

This appeal addresses the district court's denial of reinstatement in a case arising under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. The jury sustained appellant's constitutional claim, finding that appellees' decision not to reappoint appellant to a further annual term as township working roadmaster was predicated on appellant's exercise of his First Amendment rights; accordingly, the jury awarded damages to appellant. But the district court, in the exercise of its equitable discretion, declined to direct that appellant be reinstated as working roadmaster. On review of the reasons assigned by the district court for not ordering reinstatement, we conclude that those reasons do not adequately support the district court's decision not to provide make-whole relief. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for entry of an order of reinstatement and for a new trial on compensatory damages.

I

Appellant Squires, appellee Bonser, and appellee Huffman constitute ¹ the membership of Middle Smithfield Township's board of township supervisors (hereinafter "the Board"). The three-member Board is responsible for "[t]he general supervision of the affairs of the township." 53 Pa.Stat.Ann. Sec. 65510. ² Squires, a Republican, has served on the Board since January 1, 1984. Bonser and Huffman, both Democrats, have served on the Board since, respectively, January 1, 1976, and January 1, 1986.

Included among the Board's powers is that of appointing superintendents or roadmasters to work on and maintain the roads. Pennsylvania law expressly allows for a member of the Board to serve as a superintendent or roadmaster. See 53 Pa.Stat.Ann. Sec. 65514. ³

From 1984 through 1989, Squires held the position of part-time roadmaster. In January, 1990, Squires was appointed by the Board at its annual reorganizational meeting to the full-time position of working roadmaster, a position in which Squires had responsibility for supervising the construction, maintenance, and repair of the Township's roads. Squires' appointment as working roadmaster had the support of both Bonser and Huffman. Squires was reappointed to the position in January 1991, again with the support of Bonser and Huffman. In January 1992, Squires was not reappointed and Bonser became the working roadmaster.

On July 2, 1992, Squires instituted this Sec. 1983 action against Bonser, Huffman, and the Middle Smithfield Township, contending that his non-reappointment to the position of working roadmaster constituted a violation of his First Amendment rights. Specifically, Squires undertook to show at trial that the non-reappointment occurred in retaliation for: (1) comments made by Squires to Huffman in 1991 in which Squires defended his son's candidacy for a position on the Board; ⁴ and (2) criticism by Squires in 1988, 1989, and 1991 of Huffman's participation in certain township matters--in particular, Squires' allegations that Huffman, an electrical contractor, had a conflict of interest in performing contracting work for several developers who had matters pending before the Board.

On April 27, 1993, the jury returned a verdict for Squires, awarding him $37,100 in compensatory damages and $1,500 in punitive damages. On May 7, 1993, Squires filed a motion with the district court for reinstatement to the position of working roadmaster. The motion for reinstatement was denied on December 14, 1993. Squires has appealed.

II

A

Reinstatement is an equitable remedy available in unconstitutional discharge cases arising under Sec. 1983. Versarge v. Township of Clinton, New Jersey, 984 F.2d 1359, 1368 (3d Cir.1993). ⁵ The decision whether to award reinstatement thus lies within the discretion of the district court.

In reviewing an order denying reinstatement, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the district court. We do, however, have an obligation to examine whether the equitable factors considered by the district court and the weight given to those factors are appropriate in light of the purposes underlying the statutory cause of action. As we stated in Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 626 F.2d 1115 (3d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923, 101 S.Ct. 1375, 67 L.Ed.2d 352 (1981):

Meaningful appellate review of the exercise of discretion requires consideration of the basis on which the trial court acted. If the factors considered do not accord with those required by the policy underlying the substantive right or if the weight given to those factors is not consistent with that necessary to effectuate that policy, then the reviewing tribunal has an obligation to require the exercise of discretion in accordance with "what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law."

Id. at 1119-20 (quoting Langnes v. Green, 282 U.S. 531, 541, 51 S.Ct. 243, 75 L.Ed. 520 (1931)). See also Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2371, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975) ("[W]hen Congress invokes the Chancellor's conscience to further transcendent legislative purposes, what is required is the principled application of standards consistent with those purposes....").

In the context of discriminatory discharge actions arising under Title VII, it is well established that the district court's consideration of equitable remedies is to be guided by the statute's central goals of make-whole relief and deterrence. Id. at 417-22, 95 S.Ct. at 2371-73. Thus, the denial of a make-whole remedy must be supported by "reasons which, if applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination." Id. at 421, 95 S.Ct. at 2373 (addressing denial of backpay). See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 771, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1267, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976) (addressing denial of seniority relief) (quoting Albemarle Paper ). ⁶ This court has previously recognized, for example, that denial of reinstatement may be appropriate in a Title VII action where "animosity between the parties makes such a remedy impracticable." Ellis v. Ringgold School Dist., 832 F.2d 27, 30 (3d Cir.1987).

This action arises under Sec. 1983, whose "purpose ... is to deter state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails." Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 1830, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992). In 1871, in fashioning Sec. 1983--as, in 1991, it was to do in revising (with a view to strengthening) Title VII--Congress authorized courts to deploy both legal and equitable remedies. Under Title VII, the statute's make-whole purpose "is shown by the very fact that Congress took care to arm the courts with full equitable powers." Albemarle Paper, 422 U.S. at 418, 95 S.Ct. at 2372. The same is true under Sec. 1983: the make-whole goal "[does] not differ when the basis of the underlying right is the Constitution rather than a statute such as Title VII." Gurmankin, 626 F.2d at 1121. ⁷ Because of this consonance of the underlying policy considerations, the framework of analysis governing reinstatement in Title VII actions also governs in Sec. 1983 actions implicating First Amendment concerns; that is, a denial of reinstatement is unwarranted unless grounded in a rationale which is harmonious with the legislative goals of providing plaintiffs make-whole relief and deterring employers from unconstitutional conduct. Cf. Gurmankin, 626 F.2d at 1121 (section 1983 cases involving "discrimination in employment based on stereotyped notions of ability ... require[ ] equitable remedies comparable to those deemed appropriate in Title VII employment discrimination cases").

We appreciate that there may not be absolute congruence between the equitable remedies long accepted under Title VII and those conventional under Sec. 1983, for the reason that, prior to the revision of Title VII in 1991, the remedies available under Title VII were entirely equitable, whereas Sec. 1983 has always provided both legal and equitable relief. Given the pre-1991 disparity between the two statutes' remedial arsenals, it has been argued that the presumption in favor of reinstatement developed under pre-1991 Title VII case law should not be directly transferred to actions arising under Sec. 1983. See Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314, 321-22 (1st Cir.1989) (en banc ) ("The fewer the available methods of redress, the more likely that 'sound legal principles' will counsel in favor of reinstatement as the relief of choice.").

We do not find it fruitful to explore how the "presumption" or "preference" in favor of reinstatement in the Title VII context compares in kind or degree with that applicable to reinstatement under Sec. 1983. Suffice it to say that, while the availability of legal relief under Sec. 1983--and now under Title VII--may influence the use of equitable remedies under these provisions, the central goals of make-whole relief and deterrence must guide a district court's consideration of reinstatement under both. Reinstatement advances the policy goals of make-whole relief and deterrence in a way which money damages cannot. As stated by the Eleventh Circuit in Allen v. Autauga County Board of Education, 685 F.2d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir.1982):

When a person loses his job, it is at best...