Squires v. Textile Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 12 June 1959 |
| Docket Number | No. 609,609 |
| Citation | 108 S.E.2d 908,250 N.C. 580 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Nancy D. SQUIRES v. TEXTILE INSURANCE COMPANY. |
Sapp & Sapp, by Armistead W. Sapp, Greensboro, for defendant Textile Insurance Co., appellant.
Jordan, Wright & Henson, Greensboro, for plaintiff, appellee.
The appellee has moved in this Court to dismiss the appeal for failure of the defendant to comply with the Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court for defective assignments of error, and failure to discuss the assignments in the brief. After careful examination of the record and the brief, we conclude the assignments and their treatment in the brief are sufficient to present for review (1) the propriety of the nonsuit, (2) the admission in evidence of the release agreement procured from Mrs. Hearn by the defendant, (3) the court's refusal to permit the defendant to introduce a garage policy issued by Nationwide Mutual to Massengill, and (4) the failure to submit the issue of Sorahan's ownership of the Ford convertible involved in the accident.
The plaintiff introduced Policy No. 378. Admittedly it was in force on the date the plaintiff sustained her injury. She next introduced the judgment roll showing she had prosecuted successfully an action in the Superior Court and obtained a judgment against Sorahan, Southern Auto Parts, Inc., City Motors of Durham, Inc., and E. S. Massengill, T/A Durham Motor Sales. The issues and judgment in that case established that Louis W. Sorahan was the agent of the other defendants and was about their business at the time of the plaintiff's injury which resulted from Sorahan's negligence; and that the defendants were liable to this plaintiff for $17,500 damages. The plaintiff also introduced evidence that the judgment had not been paid.
Louis W. Sorahan testified for the plaintiff that at the time of the collision between his Ford convertible and the automobile this plaintiff was driving and in which Mrs. Hearn was riding as a guest passenger, he was acting as an employee of Southern Auto Parts, Inc., City Motors of Durham, Inc., and Massengill, T/A Durham Motor Sales, and was on a mission for them as their agent at the time of his collision with the plaintiff's automobile. This evidence was sufficient to make out a case for the jury and to repel the motion for nonsuit.
The first issue submitted to the jury might have been drawn with greater precision. However, in connection with the pleadings, the policy involved, the record evidence, and the charge of the court, enough appears to place the insured's agent Sorahan and the automobile he was using at the time of the injury within the coverage of the defendant's policy under the definition of 'Hazards--Division 2,' and under the general definition of 'Insured--Division III.' Under 'Division III,' the policy says: 'The unqualified word 'insured' includes the named insured (Southern Auto Parts, Inc.) and also includes (1) any * * * employee (Sorahan) while acting within the scope of his duties as such, and (2) any person while using an automobile covered by this policy * * * provided the actual use of the automobile is by the named insured or with its permission. ' Then follows: 'This policy does not apply * * * (b) to any partner, employee, dirctor, stockholder, or additional insured with respect to an automobile owned by him.'
Does (b) mean the insurer will not pay to a partner, employee, director, stockholder, or additional insured for injury if caused by his own automobile, or does it mean the insured will not indemnify third persons for injury if inflicted by an automobile owned by a partner, employee, etc.?
The defendant contends (b) withdraws from coverage altogether damages to third persons by an employee while using his own automobile. We are not certain what (b) means. If it means what the defendant says it does, it is in conflict with the coverage under ...
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Yale v. National Indem. Co.
...by the insured, as defenses to an action on the policy by a judgment creditor of the insured. See, e. g., Squires v. Textile Ins. Co., 250 N.C. 580, 108 S.E.2d 908 (1959). In any event, in view of our holding that the state judgment was not void for jurisdictional deficiencies, we can assum......
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Craige v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 1:19-cv-408
...tension with certain earlier decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court regarding this issue. See, e.g., Squires v. Textile Ins. Co., 250 N.C. 580, 108 S.E.2d 908, 912 (1959) ("The judgment is, therefore, conclusive as to the insurer on the question of agency and damage. The only defense......
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Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Seretta Constr. Mid-Atlantic, LLC
...of the constructions for which the parties contend." Wachovia Bank, 276 N.C. at 354, 172 S.E.2d 518 (citing Squires v. Textile Insurance Co., 250 N.C. 580, 108 S.E.2d 908 (1959) ). Here, although the word "injured" is not specifically defined by the policy, the meaning of the term can be co......
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Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 5
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