SR v. Jefferson Parish Corr. Ctr., CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-1263-SS

• Decision Date: 27 April 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-1263-SS
• Parties: ERNEST BILLIZONE. SR. v. JEFFERSON PARISH CORRECTIONAL CENTER, ET AL.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

ERNEST BILLIZONE. SR. v. JEFFERSON PARISH CORRECTIONAL CENTER, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 14-1263-SS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

April 27, 2015

ORDER AND REASONS

Plaintiff, Ernest Billizone, Sr., a frequent litigant in this Court, filed the instant civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center and a number of individual jail officials asserting a variety of claims. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge.¹

On December 15, 2014, the Court dismissed plaintiff's claims against defendant Jean Llovet concerning the jail's medical care.² The remaining individual defendants, Sheriff Newell Normand, Edward Olsen, Howard Lavin, Martha Ennis, John Cotton, Carl Preyer, Gary Cook, and Sue Ellen Monfra, have now filed a motion seeking dismissal of the claims against them.³ Plaintiff was ordered to respond to that motion on or before April 22, 2015;⁴ however, no response has been filed.

I. Jefferson Parish Correctional Center

Before turning to the pending motion, the Court first notes that plaintiff has also named the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center as a defendant. However, it is clear that a correctional center may not be sued because it is merely a building, not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Jefferson Parish Correctional Center, Civ. Action No. 13-4963, 2013 WL 6002770, at *3 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 2013); Stamps v. Jefferson Parish Correctional Center, Civ. Action No. 12-1767, 2012 WL 3026808, at *2 (E.D. La. July 12, 2012), adopted, 2012 WL 3027945 (E.D. La. July 24, 2012). Accordingly, pursuant to its authority to act sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b),⁵ the Court hereby dismisses the claim against the Jefferson ParishCorrectional Center as frivolous and/or for failing to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See, e.g., Castellanos v. Jefferson Parish Correctional Center, Civ. Action No. 07-7796, 2008 WL 3975606, at *5 (E.D. La. Aug. 22, 2008).

II. Individual Defendants

The remaining individual defendants have filed a "Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) or, Alternatively, for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56."⁶ The standards to be used in analyzing such motions are clear.

"A motion under Rule 12(c) for failure to state a claim is subject to the same standards as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)." In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 209-10 (5th Cir. 2010). The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:

To avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. To be plausible, the complaint's factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. In deciding whether the complaint states a valid claim for relief, we accept all well-pleaded facts as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

Id. at 210 (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).

On the other hand, when reviewing a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, the Court may grant the motion when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). There is no "genuine issue" when the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmovant. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

"Procedurally, the party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Taita Chemical Co., Ltd. v. Westlake Styrene Corp., 246 F.3d 377, 385 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). The party opposing summary judgment must then "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56); see also Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001). The Court has no duty to search the record for evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment; rather, "[t]he party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which the evidence supports his or her claim." Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). Conclusory statements, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence and will not suffice to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Id.; Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996).

Applying the foregoing standards, the Court hereby grants the pending motion and dismisses the remaining claims against the individual defendants for the following reasons.

A. General Conditions of Confinement Claims

In this lawsuit, plaintiff challenges numerous conditions of his confinement at the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center. In his original complaint, he indicated that he is a pretrial detainee.⁷It is clear that "the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the imposition of conditions of confinement on pretrial detainees that constitute punishment." Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 540 (5th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, the jurisprudence recognizes that the judiciary is ill equipped to micro-manage a jail's day-to-day operations, and federal courts are therefore loath to intervene when detainees complain of mere inconveniences. Further, such judicial restraint is appropriate because the federal constitution simply is not concerned with a de minimis level of imposition on pretrial detainees. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.21 (1979); Ruiz v. El Paso Processing Center, 299 Fed. App'x 369, 371 (5th Cir. 2008). As explained below, it is apparent that plaintiff's complaints regarding the conditions of his confinement concern inconveniences which do not constitute "punishment" or otherwise rise to the level of constitutional violations.

In his rambling complaint, plaintiff provides a laundry list of grievances; however, the bulk of them center around his contention that the jail is "filthy," full of mold and rust, and infested with pests.

Concerning the generally unsanitary conditions, plaintiff's allegations fall far short of what is required to state a nonfrivolous claim. Obviously, there is a point beyond which a prison's conditions are so unsanitary as to render them unconstitutional. See, e.g., Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 338 (5th Cir. 2004) (confinement in "'extremely filthy' [cells] with crusted fecal matter, urine, dried ejaculate, peeling and chipping paint, and old food particles on the walls" was unconstitutional). That said, it must be remembered that, although prisons should be reasonably clean, "[t]he Constitution does not require that prisons be completely sanitized or as clean or freefrom potential hazards as one's home might be." McAllister v. Strain, Civ. Action No. 09-2823, 2009 WL 5178316, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 23, 2009); accord Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he Constitution does not mandate prisons with comfortable surroundings or commodious conditions."). While the conditions described by plaintiff be unpleasant, they are not so egregious as to be unconstitutional.

Plaintiff's claim concerning the presence of mold fares no better. The jurisprudence has repeatedly held that the mere fact that mold is present does not render an inmate's confinement unconstitutional. See, e.g., Eaton v. Magee, Civ. Action No. 2:10-cv-112, 2012 WL 2459398, at *5 (S.D. Miss. June 27, 2012) ("Plaintiff's claim that the bathroom and shower area are unsanitary and contain black mold fails to rise to the level of a constitutional violation."); Barnett v. Shaw, No. 3:11-CV-0399, 2011 WL 2200610, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 18, 2011) (allegation of "excessive amount of black mold in the showers and sinks" was insufficient to raise a claim for constitutional violation), adopted, 2011 WL 2214383 (N.D. Tex. June 7, 2011); Reynolds v. Newcomer, Civ. Action No. 09-1077, 2010 WL 234896, at *10 (W.D. La. Jan. 19, 2010) (plaintiff's complaints of "the presence of black mold in living areas, eating areas, and shower areas" were found to "rise to no more than a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not concerned" (quotation marks omitted)); McCarty v. McGee, No. 2:06cv113, 2008 WL 341643, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 5, 2008) ("Plaintiff's claim that the shower he was forced to share with other inmates is polluted and covered in mold and fungus, causing him to catch athlete's foot and ringworm, fails to rise to the level of a constitutional violation.").

Similarly, plaintiff's allegation that rust is present also fails. The presence of rust in a jail does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation or otherwise warrant relief in a federal civil rights action. See, e.g., Maddox v. Gusman, Civ. Action No. 14-2435, 2015 WL 1274081, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2015); Simmons v. Gusman, Civ. Action No. 14-1907, 2015 WL 151113, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2015); Penn v. Jones, Civ. Action No. 13-0830, 2014 WL 31351, at *2 (W.D. La. Jan. 2, 2014).

Likewise, the mere presence of pests, such as gnats, does not amount to a constitutional violation. See, e.g., Simmons, 2015 WL 151113, at *4; Clark v. Gusman, Civ. Action No. 11-2673, 2012 WL 1825306, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 29, 2012), adopted, 2012 WL 1825302 (E.D. La. May 18, 2012); Murray v. Edwards County Sheriff's Department, 453 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1292 (D. Kan. 2006), aff'd, ...