Sridharan v. U.S. Army Corps. of Eng'rs
| Decision Date | 28 December 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:11-CV-00024 |
| Parties | VIJAYA RAGHAVAN SRIDHARAN and KANCHANA S. SRIDHARAN, Plaintiffs, v. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PACIFIC DRILLING, LTD., RAMA MEDABALMI, and MAHESH BALAKRISHNAN, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern Mariana Islands |
This dispute regards Plaintiffs Vijaya Sridharan and his wife's tort and statutory claims against United States government agencies and others. These claims arise out of his employment with Defendant Pacific Drilling, Ltd. ("Pacific Drilling"). Before the Court is Pacific Drilling's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 22.) It seeks dismissal of three tort claims, and only as those claims relate to Pacific Drilling. (ECF No. 23 at 3 (hereinafter "Motion").)
The Court has considered the written and oral arguments of both parties. The Court finds that the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands' ("Commonwealth") workers' compensation statute both requires that a plaintiff affirmatively plead the non-availability of a workers' compensation remedy and bars non-intentional tort claims against an employer. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Pacific Drilling's motion to dismiss the second and third causes ofaction (gross negligence and strict liability) in their entirety and the sixth cause of action (loss of consortium) with respect to Pacific Drilling.
Plaintiffs Vijaya and Kanchana Sridharan (collectively "Sridharan") allege the following facts in their complaint. Vijaya Sridharan was an employee of Pacific Drilling, working as a heavy equipment operator, from 1997 to 2010. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 15 (hereinafter "Complaint").) At some point no later than 2008, Pacific Drilling assigned him to work at the Marpi Landfill. (Id. at ¶ 16.) In 2008, Defendant U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, under Defendant Environmental Protection Agency's supervision, improperly disposed of lead and other toxins at this landfill. (Id. at ¶¶ 20-23.)
In the past, Pacific Drilling undertook adequate safety procedures in its operations. (Id. at ¶ 24.) That changed when Defendant Mahesh Balakrishnan ("Balakrishnan") became a supervisor. (Id.) The complaint does not allege when this occurred. With Balakrishnan supervising the Marpi Landfill project, Pacific Drilling failed to comply with numerous safety procedures. (Id. at ¶¶ 25-35.) This failure exposed Sridharan to the improperly disposed of toxins, which harmed his health. (Id. at ¶¶ 16-17, 59-60.)
Sridharan's health problems began in late 2008, after he was exposed to the toxins. (See id. at ¶¶ 16, 20-21.) In April 2010, his health problems progressed to the point where he could no longer work. (Id. at ¶ 16.) A few months later he was diagnosed with progressive muscular atrophy, a degenerative condition that will likely result in his death. (Id. at ¶ 17.)
The complaint pleads six causes of action. Only three are relevant to this motion: the gross negligence tort claim against Pacific Drilling (second cause of action); the strict liability tort claimagainst Pacific Drilling (third cause of action); and the loss of consortium claim against Pacific Drilling and Defendants Army Corps of Engineers and Environmental Protection Agency (sixth cause of action). (See id. at ¶¶ 53, 64, 94.)
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions against the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Additionally, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the Fair Labor Standards Act claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (). Finally, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims against Pacific Drilling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction). See Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 381 (1959).
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court must assume "that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (citations omitted). Legal conclusions, however, need not be accepted as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . ." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (). "To survive a motion to dismiss," these allegations must make the complaint's "claim to relief . . . plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Pacific Drilling argues that the Commonwealth's workers' compensation statute bars Sridharan's three tort claims. (Motion at 5-10.) This statute declares that workers' compensation is the "exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against the employer" where (1) "the conditions of compensation exist" and (2) the employer did not "fail[] to secure payment of compensation as required by this chapter . . . ."1 4 C.M.C. § 9305 (2010).
Interpreting this statute raises four issues: (1) Does the statute place the burden of pleading the non-availability of a workers' compensation remedy on a plaintiff; (2) does the statute bar gross negligence tort claims; (3) does it bar intentional tort claims; and (4) does it bar strict liability tort claims or claims for loss of consortium? Unrelated to these statutory issues, Pacific Drilling's motion raises a fifth issue: Do the complaint's allegations make it plausible that exposure to the toxins caused Sridharan's injuries?
Some of these issues turn on areas of Commonwealth law where the Commonwealth Supreme Court has not yet ruled. In these areas, the Court "must make a reasonable determination of the result the highest state court would reach if it were deciding the case." Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 306 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). This determination is guided by "intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions fromother jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and restatements as guidance." In re Kirkland, 915 F.2d 1236, 1239 (9th Cir. 1990); see also 7 C.M.C. § 3401 (2010).
The Court finds a reasonable determination to be that the Commonwealth Supreme Court would conclude both that a plaintiff bears the burden of pleading the non-availability of a workers' compensation remedy and that the statute bars all non-intentional tort claims against an employer. Sridharan has not pled the non-availability of a workers' compensation remedy, and he has not plausibly pled that Pacific Drilling committed an intentional tort. Both serve as independent reasons for dismissing the three causes of action. Thus, the Court does not address the issue of causation.
Commonwealth law has not established whether a plaintiff bears the burden of pleading the non-availability of a workers' compensation remedy. Examining its workers' compensation statute reveals that the Commonwealth legislature both generally followed Guam's workers' compensation statute and specifically followed California's in drafting the exclusive remedy provision. Standing Comm. Rep. No. 6-43, Re: House Bill No. 6-60, H.D. 1, at 2, 7 (N. Mar. I. 1988), available at ECF No. 23-1 (). The Commonwealth's reliance on California's exclusive remedy provision is evident from a comparison.2
Both California and Guam require that a plaintiff employee plead the non-availability of a workers' compensation remedy. California requires this only "where the complaint affirmatively alleges facts indicating coverage by the [workers' compensation statute]."3 Doney v. Tambouratgis, 587 P.2d 1160, 1163-64 (Cal. 1979). If the complaint does not plead the inapplicability of the statute, "no civil action will lie and the complaint is subject to a general demurrer." Id.
Guam courts have not yet determined whether a plaintiff bears this pleading burden under its statute. Cruz Reyes v. United States, Civ. No.08-00005, 2010 WL 5207583, at *4 (D. Guam Dec. 15, 2010). However, its supreme court has declared that, in interpreting its workers' compensation statute, New York law is persuasive. Gibbs v. Holmes, 2001 Guam 11, ¶ 15 (2001); see also Cruz Reyes, 2010 WL 5207583, at *4. Under New York law, a plaintiff bears this burden. O'Rourke v. Long, 359 N.E.2d 1347, 1352-53 (N.Y. 1976). In a similar situation, the District Court of Guam reasonably determined that Guam courts would follow New York law and, accordingly, held that a plaintiff bears the burden of pleading that the workers' compensation statute is not the exclusive remedy. Cruz Reyes, 2010 WL 5207583, at *4.
In short, the provenance of the Commonwealth's exclusive remedy provision indicates that, at minimum, a plaintiff must plead non-availability of a workers' compensation remedy when the complaint alleges facts indicating workers' compensation coverage. Accordingly, a reasonable determination of how the Commonwealth Supreme Court would conclude is that it would find this provenance persuasive and place the pleading burden on a plaintiff.
In this case, the complaint alleges facts indicating that these injuries arose out of and in the course of employment, thus suggesting that the Commonwealth's workers' compensation statute applies. (See Complaint at ¶¶ 15-19, 24-36, 54-57.) The complaint did not, however, affirmatively plead the...
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