St. Amant v. Benoit

• Decision Date: 07 January 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-3107,86-3107
• Parties: Sherrial T. ST. AMANT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronald J. BENOIT and John H. Robichaux, Sr., Defendants-Appellees. Summary Calendar.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1294

806 F.2d 1294

Sherrial T. ST. AMANT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Ronald J. BENOIT and John H. Robichaux, Sr., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 86-3107

Summary Calendar.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 7, 1987.

Larry P. Boudreaux, Thibodaux, La., for plaintiff-appellant.

Thomas P. Anzelmo, McGlinchey, Stafford, Mintz, Cellini & Lang, New Orleans, La., Delbert G. Talley, Gretna, La., for Benoit.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before CLARK, Chief Judge, GARWOOD and HILL, Circuit Judges.

ROBERT MADDEN HILL, Circuit Judge:

Sherrial T. St. Amant appeals from the ruling of the district court granting summary judgment to the defendants in his section 1983 action. We affirm.

I.

Since our prior opinion in this case was unpublished, we restate the facts from that opinion. St. Amant filed suit against the Acting Chief of Police of the City of Thibodaux, Louisiana, Ronald J. Benoit, and the Mayor, John H. Robichaux, Sr., under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 706 et seq. St. Amant was employed as a police officer by the City of Thibodaux until May 5, 1982, when he terminated his employment. He alleged that in February 1980 in the course of his employment he sustained a gunshot wound to his left shoulder. This injury prevented him from working until the spring of 1981. Upon returning to work, while assigned to duties as an Internal Affairs officer, he conducted an investigation that resulted in state and federal charges being brought against the Chief of Police, A.J. Rodrigue. Subsequently, St. Amant was assigned to work as a radio dispatcher. He alleges that this work aggravated the injury to his left shoulder, and that therefore he twice requested a transfer on January 18 and March 25, 1982, to another position from Acting Chief of Police Benoit from whom he received no response. St. Amant also sent copies of his requests for transfer to Mayor Robichaux. In a letter dated September 2, 1982, Mayor Robichaux informed St. Amant that he was no longer employed by the city primarily because he ceased work without notification or explanation on May 5, 1982. The letter also noted that since the available medical reports showed that St. Amant could not perform his work as a patrolman and that there was no guarantee that he ever would be able to do so, the city could not hold his job open indefinitely.

St. Amant alleged that Chief Rodrigue had a close personal and political relationship with Mayor Robichaux and had been selected for the police chief position by the mayor. St. Amant also alleged that there was a close personal and political relationship between Acting Chief Benoit and Mayor Robichaux and that Benoit acted in concert with Robichaux in discriminating against him. St. Amant contends that the denial of the request for a transfer to a job that he could perform in view of his injury was politically discriminatory and violated other civil and constitutional rights. He pointed out that another officer who was injured at the same time and who was confined to a wheelchair was rehired as a desk sergeant.

The district court dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See infra note 1. The Rehabilitation Act claim was dismissed on the ground that the Thibodaux Police Department did not receive federal financial assistance and was therefore not covered by the Act. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794. The section 1983 claim was dismissed on the ground that the applicable statute of limitations had run when St. Amant filed suit on May 5, 1983, because he knew or should have known more than one year before he filed suit that his request for transfer had been denied. See La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 3536 (West 1953 & Supp.1985). ¹ The district court reasoned that St. Amant's cause of action accrued when his continued assignment either appraised him or should have appraised him that his requests for transfer in January and March 1982 had been denied and therefore his suit was time-barred. We affirmed the dismissal of the Rehabilitation Act claim and reversed the dismissal of the section 1983 claim, remanding for a factual determination of the date when the cause of action accrued. St. Amant v. Benoit, (Table) 765 F.2d 141 (5th Cir.1985) (unpublished).

On remand, the district court found that the action accrued prior to May 5, 1982, and therefore that it had prescribed by the time St. Amant filed his complaint on May 5, 1983. Accordingly, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. St. Amant appeals this ruling.

II.

The standard for summary judgments is set out in rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The mere existence of a factual dispute does not by itself preclude the granting of summary judgment. "[T]he requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. ----, ----, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202, 211 (1986) (emphasis in original).

We recently stated that:

An issue is genuine if the evidence supporting its resolution in favor of the party opposing summary judgment, together with any inferences in such party's favor that the evidence allows, would be sufficient to support a verdict in favor of that party. If, on the other hand, the evidence offered by both the moving and opposing parties would support only one conclusion and, even if all the evidence to the contrary is fully credited, a trial court would be obliged to direct a verdict in favor of the moving party, the issue is not genuine.

Professional Managers, Inc. v. Fawer, Brian, Hardy & Zatzkis, 799 F.2d 218, 222 (5th Cir.1986) (footnotes omitted). See generally Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules: Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D. 465 (1984).

As to materiality, the Supreme Court has stated that "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Liberty Lobby, --- U.S. at ----, 106 S.Ct. at 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d at 211. The substantive area of law involved is relevant in determining which facts are material. Id. Furthermore, the existence of a "scintilla of evidence" is not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Liberty Lobby, --- U.S. at ----, 106 S.Ct. at 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d at 214. In two cases last term, the Court noted that the standard for summary judgment "mirrors" the standard for a directed verdict under Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). See Liberty Lobby, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. at 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d at 213; Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265, 273-274 (1986). The primary difference in the two motions comes from when they are used; "in essence, though, the inquiry under each is the same." Liberty Lobby, --- U.S. at ----, 106 S.Ct. at 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d at 214. Consequently, in order to defeat a summary judgment motion, there must be evidence whose reasonable inferences support the nonmoving party's position. Professional Managers, 799 F.2d at 223.

In this case the burden of persuasion at trial is on the nonmoving party, St. Amant. In order to obtain summary judgment, therefore, the defendants must either submit affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of St. Amant's claim or, alternatively, demonstrate that St. Amant's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of his claim. See generally Celotex, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 106 S.Ct. at 2556-2559, 91 L.Ed.2d at 278-281 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

III.

The district court granted summary judgment on the basis of a letter that St. Amant received from Mayor Robichaux that was dated April 8, 1982. The court reasoned that this letter, combined with the lack of response from the city in regard to his earlier requests and his continued employment in the position from which he sought transfer, provided St. Amant with the knowledge that his transfer request had been denied. ²

We agree with the district court that the April 8 letter from Mayor Robichaux should have indicated to St. Amant that his transfer request was denied. Contrary to St. Amant's contention, we do not find the April 8 letter ambiguous or confusing. St. Amant...