St. Ann v. McLean

• Decision Date: 08 November 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 15-11770
• Parties: David St. Ann, Plaintiff, v. Todd McLean, Dean Polita, Sam Morgan, Thomas Haynes, and Kelly Buczek, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

David St. Ann, Plaintiff, v. Todd McLean, Dean Polita, Sam Morgan, Thomas Haynes, and Kelly Buczek, Defendants.

Case No. 15-11770

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

November 8, 2019

Judith E. Levy United States District Judge

Mag. Judge Anthony P. Patti

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO PRECLUDE TESTIMONY OF CHRISTIN HARRIS [98]

On September 5, 2019, pursuant to the Court's order (ECF No. 97, PageID.2149-50), Defendants submitted a supplemental summary judgment brief on whether Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim ("IIED") should be permitted to go to trial, and whether Plaintiff's witness Christin Harris should be permitted to testify as a fact witness. (ECF No. 99.) Plaintiff responded. (ECF No. 97, PageID.2150.) The Court has carefully considered the issues and orders as follows.

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff alleges that on January 27, 2014, during his period of imprisonment in the Saginaw Correctional Facility ("SRF"), he received a misconduct ticket for disobeying a direct order to return to his cell. (ECF No. 99, PageID.2165, 2787.) On January 28, 2014, Warden Obell Winn approved Plaintiff to be placed under a "W05-Investigation," which increased Plaintiff's security level and housing unit to Level IV—a maximum security and disciplinary unit. (Id. at PageID.2192.) Plaintiff alleges that he did not receive notice of the nature of the W05-investigation and also alleges that the W05-investigation and security classification change were pretexts to punish Plaintiff for filing grievances against prison staff. (Id.)

Plaintiff argues that he was wrongfully held in Level IV for a total of eighteen months, during which time he alleges he was verbally harassed and psychologically abused by prison staff Defendants Todd McLean, Dean Potila, Samuel Morgan, and Thomas Haynes. (Id.) He alleges that Defendants told other inmates that Plaintiff was a "baby raper, child molester, rat, and was writing snitch-kites¹ on inmates." (Id.at PageID.2177.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' scheme to spread these rumors to other inmates resulted in Plaintiff being "extorted, harmed, and/or even sexually assaulted by STG² gang members" while in Level IV. (Id.) He alleges that Defendants' position as prison staff gave them "the power of life and death" over Plaintiff and that their "evil motive and intent and recklessness" was to retaliate against Plaintiff for filing grievances and to intentionally inflict emotional distress. (Id. at 2177-2188.)

Plaintiff alleges that in June 2016, he suffered from a "panic attack, chest pains, difficulty breathing, numbness and loss of feeling on left side of his body" as a result of Defendants' harassment, other inmates' extortion, and the STG members' sexual assault. (Id. at PageID.2174.) Plaintiff alleges that he continues to receive counseling and psychiatric treatment for PTSD, nightmares, anxiety, and depression and has been prescribed psychotropic medication. (Id. at PageID.2175.) Finally, heargues that if the Court were to dismiss his IIED claim, this would allow "criminal, inhumane, sadistic behavior to flourish in prisons." (Id. at PageID.2180.)

B. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court may not grant summary judgment if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court "views the evidence, all facts, and any inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Pure Tech Sys., Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 95 F. App'x 132, 135 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Skousen v. Brighton High Sch., 305 F.3d 520, 526 (6th Cir. 2002)).

C. Applicable Law

To prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under Michigan law, Plaintiff must demonstrate the following elements: "'(1) extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) intent or recklessness; (3) causation; and (4) severe emotional distress.'" Roberts v. Auto-OwnersInc., Co., 422 Mich. 594, 602 (1985). "The outrageous conduct requirement is satisfied only by conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Liability arises, moreover, only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it." Andrews v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 160 F.3d 304, 309 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Tortious, intentional, and even criminal conduct is not sufficient to meet this standard; instead, the test has been described as whether "the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!' " Roberts 422 Mich. at 603.

D. Analysis

1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants deny that they intentionally caused Plaintiff emotional distress. (ECF No.98, PageID.2158.) In support of their position, they rely on affidavits of Defendants Buczek, Potila, Morgan, McLean, and Haynes filed in support of their original motion for summary judgment, whichsets forth that each individual "always acted in good faith without harassing Plaintiff in any way." (ECF Nos. 48-7, 48-5, 48-4, 48-3, and 48-2.) They also argue that there is no evidence that Plaintiff suffered "severe emotional distress," and that any symptoms Plaintiff suffered or suffers could be caused by being imprisoned for over a decade. (ECF No. 98, PageID.2159.)

For his part, Plaintiff appears to set forth two arguments regarding IIED. First, he argues that Defendants actions directly caused him emotional distress. Second, he argues that Defendants acted in a manner that they knew would lead other inmates to harass and injure him, which caused Plaintiff emotional distress.

With regard to the first argument—that Defendants' actions directly caused Plaintiff emotional distress through their harassment—Plaintiff argues that Defendants' outrageous conduct included the following:

(1) Moving Plaintiff to a new cell in the middle of the night, allegedly unnecessarily, for the purpose of harassing him. Plaintiff submitted a declaration dated March 14, 2014 from another inmate, Antwan Officer, who witnessed the incident and stated he believed officers gave a false reason for moving Plaintiff. (ECF No.99, PageID.2215-17.)

(2) Barring Plaintiff from using the law library. As evidence of this, Plaintiff submitted two April 24, 2014 letters from inmates Antwan Officer and Donaven Hollingsworth, indicating that an unnamed officer told them he was not permitting Plaintiff to use the prison law library due to Plaintiff's "top-lock" classification. (ECF No.99, PageID.2221, 2224.)

(3) Issuing an April 2014 weapons misconduct ticket, which Plaintiff appears to argue was a false pretense to keep him in Level IV and subject to Defendants' continued harassment. In support of this, he submitted a copy of the misconduct report and an unclear photograph of the weapon he was accused of possessing, which he argues was not a weapon and was not his. (ECF No. 99, PageID.2226-2228, 2234.)

(4) Subjecting Plaintiff to more officer scrutiny than other inmates. In support of this argument, Plaintiff submitted three affidavits from inmate Roscoe Gallmore, dated July 13, 2015, May 21, 2015, and April 10, 2015, which indicate in sum that Plaintiff's cell was frequently searched, that Plaintiff was frequently taken away for strip searches of his body cavities, that on one occasion staff refused to give Plaintiff Band-Aids when he injured his finger, and that Plaintiff asked Gallmore to hold Plaintiff's legal documents because he was fearful they would "mysteriously disappear." (Id. at PageID.2240-41; 2243-44; and 2246-47.) Plaintiff also submitted a letter from inmate Dion Armstead dated August 7, 2015, indicating that he witnessed Officer Glynn using obscenities and other offensive language. Armstead also indicates that he witnessed Plaintiff crying with his head in his lap and considering committing suicide because he could not "handle the pressure of officers and staff retaliating against him." (Id. at 2249-51.)

(5) Questioning Plaintiff regarding an ombudsman inquiry. As evidence of this argument, Plaintiff submits his own August 12, 2015 declaration indicating that he was called to Defendant Haynes' office and questioned about an ombudsman investigation regarding St. Ann's Level IVplacement. According to this affidavit, Haynes stated, "if I get in trouble behind this shit-you think your ass is feeling the heat right now-you haven't seen anything!" (ECF No. 99-1, PageID.2263.) Plaintiff declared that this statement made him feel shocked, degraded, and afraid for his safety and life. (Id.)

Although these allegations are appalling, the evidence set forth above, either on its own or in combination, does not give rise to a colorable claim for IIED under Michigan law. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff's factual arguments do not establish the level of "extreme and outrageous" conduct that went "beyond all possible bounds of decency such that they could be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." See Sperle v. Mich. Dept. of Corr., 297 F.3d 483, 496 (6th Cir. 2002).

As to item one above, Mr. Officer's letter—asserting that he believed staff gave a false reason for moving Plaintiff to a new cell in the middle of the night—is not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact that could rise to the level of atrocious behavior, and the ill-intent he assigns to unnamed officers is speculative. As to item two above, Mr. Officer's...