St. Ann v. Rapelje

• Decision Date: 12 August 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. 13-11720
• Citation: St. Ann v. Rapelje, Case No. 13-11720 (E.D. Mich. Aug 12, 2014)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
• Parties: DAVID ST. ANN, Petitioner, v. LLOYD RAPELJE, Respondent.

DAVID ST. ANN, Petitioner, v. LLOYD RAPELJE, Respondent.

Case No. 13-11720

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

August 12, 2014

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

Magistrate Judge Paul J. Komives

OPINION AND ORDER (1) ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION IN PART, (2) DENYING PETITIONER'S WRIT FOR HABEAS CORPUS, AND (3) DENYING IN PART AND GRANTING IN PART A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Petitioner David St. Ann, a Michigan Department of Corrections prisoner confined at the Saginaw Correctional Facility in Freeland, Michigan, filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on April 16, 2013. In 2009, a Wayne County jury convicted Petitioner of first-degree premeditated murder, in violation of Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.316(1)(a), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony ("felony firearm"), in violation of Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.227b(1), four counts of uttering and publishing, in contravention to Michigan Compiled Laws § 750.249, and making a false application for state identification, thereby violating Michigan Compiled Laws § 28.293. Petitioner contends that he is being held in violation of his constitutionalrights and challenges his convictions on grounds implicating the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution. After Respondent filed its answer to the petition and the corresponding Rule 5 materials, the lawsuit was referred to Magistrate Judge Paul J. Komives for all pretrial matters, proceedings, including a hearing and determination of all non-dispositive matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and/or a report and recommendation on all dispositive matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).

This action is presently before the Court on Magistrate Judge Komives's Report and Recommendation ("R&R"), issued on May 6, 2014, and Petitioner's timely objections thereto. The R&R exhaustively analyzes the various claims raised in Petitioner's habeas application, concluding that each claim lacks merit. Consistent with this conclusion, the R&R recommends denial of the petition and a certificate of appealability on each of the issues raised therein.

For the reasons stated herein, the Court adopts the R&R - which it has supplemented where necessary - except with respect to its recommendation that the Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability. Thus, the Court denies Petitioner's habeas application and grants a certificate of appealability on the sole issue of whether there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial to support the homicide and felony firearm charges.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Review of the R&R and Petitioner's Objections

The Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107, "creates two different standards of review for district courts when a magistrate court's finding [or recommendation] is challenged in district court [by way of a party's objection]." United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)-(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72. When objections are filed to a report and recommendation on a dispositive matter, such as the instant habeas petition, courts are directed to "make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 8(b), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. In completing this de novo review, courts reexamine the issues and relevant evidence to determine whether the recommendation should be "accept[ed], reject[ed], or modif[ied], in whole or in part[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 8(b), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. The de novo standard does not require a court "to articulate all of the reasons it rejects a party's objections." Thomas v. Halter, 131 F. Supp. 2d 942, 944 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (citations omitted).

B. Review of Habeas Petitions

In assessing the viability of Petitioner's claims, this Court is mindful that review of this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death PenaltyAct of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. In order to grant relief, this Court must conclude that the state court's decision "with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings" was (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[]" or (2) "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The Supreme Court has expounded upon the meanings of the two clauses contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1519 (2000) ("[T]he 'contrary to' and 'unreasonable application' clauses [have] independent meaning."). "A state-court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases or if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent." Murphy v. Ohio, 551 F.3d 485, 493-94 (6th Cir. 2009) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405, 120 S. Ct. at 1519). Alternatively, "[i]f the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle . . . , habeas relief is available under the unreasonable application clause if the state court unreasonably applies that principle to the factsof the prisoner's case or unreasonably extends or unreasonably refuses to extend a legal principle from the Supreme Court precedent to a new context." Akins v. Easterling, 648 F.3d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). A federal court may not find a state court's application of Supreme Court precedent unreasonable if it is merely "incorrect or erroneous. [Rather, t]he state court's application must have been 'objectively unreasonable.'" See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2003) (citations omitted).

Factual determinations made by state court judges in the adjudication of claims cognizable on habeas review are accorded a presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A habeas petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. Id. Moreover, habeas review of claims adjudicated on the merits in state courts is "limited to the record that was before the state court." Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).

II. ANALYSIS OF PETITIONER'S OBJECTIONS

Objection to Factual Background:

Petitioner first objects to the R&R's recitation of the pertinent factual background, claiming that it was error to rely exclusively on the "seriously flawed" statement of facts set forth in the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision. Despite Petitioner's suggestion that Magistrate Judge Komives was required to review thefacts of Petitioner's case de novo, the law does not mandate such scrupulous review of a state court criminal judgment. Rather, as indicated above, a state court's factual determinations are presumed correct on habeas review unless a petitioner presents clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 547, 101 S. Ct. 764, 769 (1981) ("This interest in federalism recognized by Congress in enacting § 2254(d) requires deference by federal courts to factual determinations of all state courts."); Tucker v. Palmer, 541 F.3d 652, 661 (6th Cir. 2008) ("[U]nder the strict standards applied to habeas petitions, we cannot ignore the principles of federalism that undergird deference to the state court's findings[.]") (emphasis in original).

Objection to Procedural Default Determination:

Petitioner next objects to the R&R's conclusion that Petitioner procedurally defaulted his third, fourth, and fifth claims. The Court finds no error with this conclusion. Even if Magistrate Judge Komives's analysis was incorrect, which it is not, Magistrate Judge Komives determined that Petitioner's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims might provide the necessary cause to excuse the default and therefore analyzed the merits of the procedurally-defaulted claims. (R&R 10 (recognizing that "the cause and prejudice inquiry" of Petitioner's defaulted claims "merges with an analysis of the merits of" those defaulted claims).) This course of action was entirely proper. See, e.g., Hudson v. Jones,351 F.3d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 2003) ("[F]ederal courts are not required to address a procedural-default issue before deciding against the petitioner on the merits.") (citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525, 117 S. Ct. 1517, 1523 (1997)). Because Magistrate Judge Komives addressed the merits of the otherwise-defaulted claims - reviewing them de novo because the state trial court did not address them - Petitioner's second objection is overruled. (R&R 13 n.1.)

Objection Regarding Claim I (Probable Cause and Jurisdictional Defect):

In his habeas application, Petitioner argues an entitlement to the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the state court lacked jurisdiction to try him on the murder and the felony firearm charges because the magistrate never found probable cause to support either charge and because he was never arraigned on either charge.¹ In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Komives concludes thatPetitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. Petitioner objects to this conclusion, reiterating the arguments previously presented. This Court concurs with the conclusion reached in the R&R for the reasons that follow.

To the extent Petitioner argues that his conviction must be voided because there was no probable...