St. Aubin v. Quarterman

• Decision Date: 21 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-40277.,05-40277.
• Citation: 470 F.3d 1096
• Parties: Keith Michael ST. AUBIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Nathaniel QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

470 F.3d 1096

Keith Michael ST. AUBIN, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Nathaniel QUARTERMAN, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 05-40277.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

November 21, 2006.

George McCall Secrest, Jr., Jani J. Maselli (argued), Bennett & Secrest, Houston, TX, for St. Aubin.

Marta Rew McLaughlin (argued), Austin, TX, for Quarterman.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before BARKSDALE, BENAVIDES and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:

Keith Michael St. Aubin contests the denial of habeas relief for his Texas-state-court conviction of, inter alia, murder, for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. Pursuant to our highly deferential standard of review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (AEDPA), at issue is whether the following state-habeas decision is unreasonable: St. Aubin's lead trial counsel was not ineffective at the trial's punishment phase, for either his investigation of, or decision not to present, mitigating evidence concerning St. Aubin's mental-health history. AFFIRMED.

I.

In February 1998, St. Aubin, then 19 years old and armed with a loaded semi-automatic handgun, attended a street festival in Galveston, Texas. Juan Garcia, who was attending the festival with friends, felt someone push him and turned around to see St. Aubin. A heated verbal argument and scuffle ensued between St. Aubin and Garcia and his friends, ending with St. Aubin shooting the handgun into the crowd, killing one person and injuring four. Witnesses testified they did not observe Garcia or anyone with him possessing or reaching for a weapon.

After the shooting, St. Aubin offered to pay two men to give him a ride. St. Aubin told them he had just shot several people, never mentioning that he feared for his life or that Garcia and his friends had weapons. For safety reasons, the driver took the clip from St. Aubin's handgun while they were in the vehicle. On the way to the destination, the vehicle became stuck; the driver sought the assistance of police officers in the area. When the police found the clip in the driver's pocket, St. Aubin assaulted one of the Officers.

At the trial's guilt/innocence phase, St. Aubin claimed he shot the victims in self-defense, after they surrounded him to attack him. Although St. Aubin had an extensive history of mental-health problems, his lead trial counsel (LTC) did not include them as part of the defense. A jury convicted St. Aubin of one count of murder, four counts of attempted capital murder, and two counts of assault on a public servant.

At the trial's punishment phase, the State presented evidence of St. Aubin's bad reputation and character, including: deputies testified about threats St. Aubin made in jail toward them and his alleged suicide attempts; a fellow inmate testified St. Aubin offered him money to help him execute an escape plan; and St. Aubin's high school coach testified St. Aubin did not have a reputation as a peaceful, law-abiding citizen. St. Aubin's LTC did not call any witnesses. He maintained the shootings were not premeditated but rather the panicked, impulsive reaction of a frightened 19-year-old. In closing, the State argued St. Aubin's failure to present rebuttal witnesses confirmed his malicious character. St. Aubin was sentenced to life for the murder and attempted-murder convictions and ten years confinement for the assault-on-a-public-servant conviction.

On appeal, St. Aubin claimed his LTC had been ineffective at the trial's guilt and punishment phases, by failing to develop and present evidence of St. Aubin's psychiatric conditions, which would have both been relevant to his defense and mitigated his punishment. In rejecting these claims and affirming St. Aubin's conviction and sentence, the intermediate court of appeals held: "Nothing in the record shows counsel's reasons for not offering the [medical] records, which also exposed multiple serious extraneous bad acts. We will not speculate on those reasons". St. Aubin v. State, No. 01-98-01318-CR, 2000 WL 675705, at *1 (Tex.App.25 May 2000). St. Aubin did not file a petition for discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (TCCA).

St. Aubin filed numerous state-habeas applications. Attached to those applications were St. Aubin's medical records from the Galveston County Jail, West Oaks Psychiatric Hospital, and Dr. Ronald Garb, his treating psychiatrist, and affidavits by the following: Dr. Garb; Dr. Seth Silverman, a forensic psychiatrist who examined and evaluated St. Aubin; Richard Burr, a lawyer and claimed expert in penalty-phase representation; and St. Aubin's mother. The medical records showed hospitalization on two occasions for psychiatric reasons and prescriptions for a number of anti-psychotic medications. Evidence of St. Aubin's mental illness, aggression, isolated acts of violence, and other incidences of anti-social behavior also were discussed in the records, many of which St. Aubin's mother had provided his LTC prior to trial. The state-habeas trial court, without an evidentiary hearing, recommended denial of relief.

The TCCA, however, concluded additional fact finding was required to resolve the claimed ineffective-assistance-of-counsel (IAC). Therefore, it remanded the proceeding to the state-habeas trial court in order to have LTC explain why St. Aubin's mental health, and its impact on his reaction to stress, had not been presented at the trial's punishment phase.

On remand, the state-habeas trial court ordered St. Aubin's LTC to address the IAC claim, including explaining why he did not introduce evidence at the punishment phase showing St. Aubin had prior mental problems that caused him to react in certain ways to stress. In response, St. Aubin's LTC submitted an affidavit in which he: described his "extensive meetings" with St. Aubin and his parents, discussing "all aspects of Mr. St. Aubin's life, background, and family history"; stated he was unaware of any prior mental problems that would cause St. Aubin to react to stress in ways that might explain the shootings; noted the double-edged nature of mental-health evidence, in that it might diminish St. Aubin's blameworthiness but also indicate future dangerousness; described his "strategic decision not to call any witnesses" at the punishment phase; and stated that decision was made in consultation with St. Aubin and his family.

The state-habeas trial court again recommended the denial of habeas relief and made the following factual findings: (1) LTC made a strategic decision not to call any witnesses at the punishment phase to avoid opening the door to prior bad acts and unadjudicated extraneous offenses; (2) although witnesses were available to testify, after consultation with St. Aubin and his family, LTC made a strategic decision not to call witnesses; (3) LTC was unaware "of any evidence `of prior mental problems causing [St. Aubin] to react in certain ways to stress'" and such evidence was not made known to counsel after extensive consultation with St. Aubin and his family; and (4) if credible, meaningful mental-health evidence had existed, LTC would nevertheless have struggled with the strategic decision whether to present the evidence in mitigation of punishment, for fear it would have been outweighed by the danger of the State's introducing evidence of bad acts and extraneous offenses not previously introduced.

St. Aubin objected to the state-habeas trial court's findings and attached affidavits refuting LTC's. Pursuant to the state-habeas trial court's findings, the TCCA denied St. Aubin's habeas application without written order.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, St. Aubin sought federal habeas relief, with two of his claims being for IAC. The magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing to determine the extent to which LTC investigated St. Aubin's mental-health history and reasons for not introducing mental-health evidence at the punishment phase, including testimony by LTC clarifying his state-habeas affidavit. LTC testified that affidavit was intended to convey that, while he was aware of St. Aubin's mental-health issues, he did not view any of it as mitigating, instead viewing it all as aggravating. Other evidence introduced at the hearing included an audiotaped portion of LTC's conversation with Dr. Garb during the trial-preparation period that contradicted Dr. Garb's state-habeas affidavit that he never discussed St. Aubin's psychiatric history with LTC. Dr. Garb had advised LTC that St. Aubin's psychiatric problems were insufficient to raise an insanity defense because St. Aubin understood the difference between right and wrong.

The magistrate judge's extremely comprehensive report and recommendation stated, inter alia: St. Aubin had not made the necessary showing for habeas relief on his failure-to-investigate claim—what a proper investigation would have revealed—because he pointed only to information with which LTC was already familiar; and, similarly, LTC's decision not to call witnesses at the punishment phase was not unreasonable, and, even if it were, St. Aubin had failed to show the requisite prejudice.

In the light of St. Aubin's objections to that report and recommendation, the district court conducted a de novo review. Pursuant to a detailed analysis of the record, it overruled the objections, accepted the report and recommendation, and denied habeas relief. St. Aubin v. Dretke, No. G-02-397 (S.D. Tex. 16 Feb. 2005). Shortly thereafter, by separate order and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), it granted a certificate of appealability on the issues of whether St. Aubin received IAC based on LTC's: (1) investigation of his mental-health history; and (2) decision not to present evidence of that history at the trial's punishment phase.

II....