St. Charles County Ambulance Dist. v. Town of Dardenne Prairie

• Decision Date: 06 March 2001
• Citation: 39 S.W.3d 67
• Parties: (Mo.App. E.D. 2001) St. Charles County Ambulance District, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Town of Dardenne Prairie, Defendant-Respondent. ED78284 0
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

39 S.W.3d 67 (Mo.App. E.D. 2001)

St. Charles County Ambulance District, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Town of Dardenne Prairie, Defendant-Respondent.

ED78284

Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District

03/06/2001

Appeal From: Circuit Court of St. Charles County, Hon. Nancy L. Schneider

Counsel for Appellant: Kevin T. McLaughlin and Michael E. Kaemmerer

Counsel for Respondent: Charles E. Callier, Jr., and Mary C. Bonacorsi

Opinion Summary: St. Charles County Ambulance District appeals from a decision of the Town of Dardenne Prairie granting a conditional use permit with restrictions that allows the District to build an ambulance base in Dardenne Prairie but prohibits the use of a siren in specific areas at certain times.

Division Four holds: The Missouri legislature has preempted the Town from regulating when and where an ambulance may sound its siren in section 304.022 RSMo. Supp. (2001). The conditional use permit restriction directly conflicts with the statute; therefore, the restriction is void.

Lawrence E. Mooney, Presiding Judge

St. Charles County Ambulance District appeals from a decision of the Town of Dardenne Prairie granting a conditional use permit with restrictions that allows the District to build an ambulance base in the town, but prohibits the use of a siren in specific areas at certain times. The District contends that Dardenne Prairie erred in restricting the permit because: (1) it is an abuse of discretion to impose restrictions that are not supported by competent and substantial evidence; (2) the Missouri legislature has preempted the Town from regulating when an ambulance may sound its siren; and (3) the Missouri Constitution prohibits such regulation relative to the District's stated purposes of providing for the public health, safety, and welfare. We reverse and remand.

Facts

The District purchased property in an area of Dardenne Prairie that was zoned primarily for single-family homes on large lots. The District notified the Planning and Zoning Commission of its intent to build an emergency medical personnel base station, or ambulance base, and applied for a conditional use permit with that body. Both the Planning and Zoning Commission and the Dardenne Prairie Board of Trustees held public hearings regarding the application at which the District presented evidence for approval and several Dardenne Prairie residents spoke against the permit. After its hearing, the Board of Trustees approved the permit application with restrictions and issued its final version of findings of fact and conclusions of law, including the restriction at issue in this case. The conditional use permit restriction at issue here prohibits an ambulance driver from sounding the vehicle's siren when responding to emergency calls between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. in specific areas around the base. The District filed its challenge to the siren restriction in the St. Charles County Circuit Court which ruled against the District. The District filed this timely appeal.

Analysis

In its second point on appeal, the District argues that the trial court erred in restricting the conditional use permit because Dardenne Prairie does not have the authority to regulate the hours when an ambulance may sound its siren. According to the District, Dardenne Prairie's action is preempted by Section 304.022 RSMo. Supp. (2001), which regulates when an ambulance may use its siren. We agree. Because the second point of error regarding preemption is dispositive, we do not address the other points.

We review Dardenne Prairie's regulatory action de novo under Section 536.140.3 RSMo. (1994). The issue of preemption may be divided into two questions: 1) Has the Missouri legislature expressly preempted the area?; and 2) Is the city's regulation in conflict with state law? Page Western, Inc. v. Community Fire Protection Dist. of St. Louis County, 636 S.W.2d 65, 66 (Mo. banc 1982). In construing statutes to determine whether the area of regulation has been expressly preempted, we look to the statute's plain and ordinary meaning. City of Dellwood v. Twyford, 912 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Mo. banc 1995). In addition, we note that a municipality may enact regulations that supplement or enlarge upon provisions of a state statute by requiring more than what is required in the statute. Id. at 67. However, when the expressed or implied provisions of the local regulation and the state statute are inconsistent and in irreconcilable conflict, then the local regulation is void. Id. A conflict exists if the local regulation "permits what the statute prohibits" or "prohibits what the statute permits." Id., quoting, City of St. Louis v. Klausmeier, 112 S.W. 516, 518-519 (Mo. banc 1908).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the language of Section 304.022.4, which regulates when an ambulance may sound its siren:

(1) The driver of any vehicle referred to in subsection 3 of this section shall not sound the siren thereon or have the front red lights or blue lights on except when such vehicle is responding to an emergency call or when in pursuit of an actual or suspected law violator, or when responding to, but not...