St. Clair Mineral Springs Co. v. City of St. Clair

• Citation: 56 N.W. 18,96 Mich. 463
• Court: Supreme Court of Michigan
• Decision Date: 25 July 1893
• Parties: ST. CLAIR MINERAL SPRINGS CO., Limited, v. CITY OF ST. CLAIR.

56 N.W. 18

96 Mich. 463

ST. CLAIR MINERAL SPRINGS CO., Limited, v. CITY OF ST. CLAIR.

Supreme Court of Michigan

July 25, 1893

Error to circuit court, St. Clair county; Arthur L. Canfield Judge.

Action by the St. Clair Mineral Springs Company against the city of St. Clair for injuries resulting from a defective bridge. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Avery Bros. & Walsh, for appellant.

Atkinson Vance & Wolcott, for appellee.

GRANT J., (after stating the facts.)

Only two of the errors assigned are relied upon:

1. It is insisted that the court erred in refusing to give the following request: "And if you find that after the horse was overcome with the load, and the wagon ran back, its progress would have been arrested by a rail of reasonable strength, and the accident prevented, and find as a fact that the rail on the scow was not reasonably strong and on that account the wagon went over the brink, and the horse got drowned, the plaintiff would be entitled to a verdict." This request was correctly refused. It entirely left out of consideration the proximate cause of the accident, and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff's servant. The law was correctly stated in the following portion of the court's instructions: "If you find that the backing of the horse was not occasioned by the defective condition of the bridge or apron, then it would make no difference whether the railing was sufficiently strong or not, because in that case the defendant's negligence would not be the proximate cause of the injury." Beall v. Township of Athens, 81 Mich. 536, 45 N.W. 1014.

2. Plaintiff's counsel presented a request giving the general definition of negligence, which the court did not give. It was unnecessary to give to the jury this general definition of negligence. In that portion of the instruction above given, the learned circuit judge concisely drew the attention of the jury to the issues they were to determine and told them what facts, if found, would constitute negligence, and render the defendant liable. His instructions as to contributory negligence were equally clear and explicit. We think that this is a much better practice than it is to give to the jury general definitions. In instructing the jury as to contributory negligence, the judge said that the driver was required to exercise such care as a reasonably prudent man would be expected to exercise under the...