St. Clair v. General Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 06 January 1998
• Docket Number: No. 2:96CV871.,2:96CV871.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
• Parties: Brian ST. CLAIR, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant.

10 F.Supp.2d 523

Brian ST. CLAIR, Plaintiff, v. GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 2:96CV871.

United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina, Greensboro Division.

January 6, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Douglas S. Harris, Greensboro, NC, for plaintiff.

Jonathan B. Berkelhammer, Smith, Helms, Mullis & Moore, Greensboro, NC, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BEATY, District Judge.

This case comes before the Court initially on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Document # 11]. In response, Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice [Document # 14], a Motion for Extension of Time within which to name an expert witness [Document # 15], and a Motion for Extension of Time within which to amend the Complaint [Document # 16]. Given that this matter is approaching a scheduled trial date of January 12, 1998, Defendant has also filed a Motion to Dispense with Mediation [Document # 17]. The Court will discuss Plaintiff's Motions and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment in turn, however, in view of the closeness of a scheduled trial date and the Court's ruling on the parties' discovery and dispositive motions, court-ordered mediation will not serve any useful purpose. Therefore, without further discussion, Defendant's Motion to Dispense with Mediation is allowed.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.

This action resulted from an automobile accident on August 27, 1993, at the intersection of Fisher Park Circle and North Elm Street in Greensboro, North Carolina. Plaintiff, Brian St. Clair, was driving a 1991 Cadillac DeVille along North Elm Street when a 1980 Volkswagen crossed immediately in front of him in an attempt to execute a left turn onto North Elm Street from Fisher Park Circle. Plaintiff's vehicle struck the driver's side of the Volkswagen, resulting in substantial damage to the Volkswagen and to the front of Plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff alleged that he was driving at approximately thirty-five miles per hour prior to the collision and attempted to apply his brakes as soon as he observed the Volkswagen enter his path. According to the police officer's accident report, Plaintiff's vehicle left twenty-nine feet of tire marks leading up to the collision. The police report also estimated that Plaintiff's vehicle sustained approximately $3,000 in damages.

Plaintiff's 1991 Cadillac DeVille was equipped with seat belts and a supplemental inflatable restraint system, more commonly known as an air bag system. Plaintiff states that his seat belt was fastened and engaged during the accident. However, the gravamen of Plaintiff's cause of action is that the vehicle's air bag did not deploy. Plaintiff alleges that he sustained injuries to his right wrist and his right knee as a result of the accident. Plaintiff attributes his wrist injury to his having to grip and press down on the steering wheel to such an extent that the steering wheel bent during the accident. Plaintiff further alleges that the failure of the air bag to deploy caused his knee injury to the extent that his knee hit the lower part of the dashboard in the vehicle. Plaintiff did not report or complain of any injuries at the accident scene, but he subsequently received medical treatment consisting of surgery to his wrist and knee.

Plaintiff's vehicle after the accident was towed to Black Cadillac-Olds, a dealership in Greensboro, North Carolina. Plaintiff alleges that the shop manager and mechanics who repaired Plaintiff's vehicle suggested to him that the air bag in his vehicle should have deployed during the accident. As a part of the repairs to the vehicle, the mechanics replaced both the bent steering wheel and the air bag system components in the vehicle. Although Plaintiff requested that the items removed from his vehicle as a part of the repair be preserved, the dealership failed to keep the items for inspection by either party for the purpose of this lawsuit.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

On August 27, 1996, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the North Carolina General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, in Greensboro, North Carolina, alleging product liability claims against Defendant General Motors Corporation. Plaintiff's first cause of action asserted a claim for negligence in the design and manufacture of the air bag system in Plaintiff's 1991 Cadillac DeVille. Plaintiff's second cause of action asserted a claim for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability. Plaintiff alleges that the collision involving his vehicle on August 27, 1993 occurred under such conditions that the air bag in his vehicle should have deployed. Plaintiff further contends that, because the air bag did not deploy, the system must have been defective and that Defendant should have detected the defect upon a reasonable inspection. Plaintiff bases his claim for damages upon the theory that Defendant's alleged negligence and breach of implied warranty caused an enhancement in Plaintiff's injuries to his wrist and knee. Specifically, it is Plaintiff's contention that, absent the alleged defect in the air bag system, his injuries either would not have occurred or would have been greatly diminished.

On October 18, 1996, Defendant removed this case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.¹ On January 23, 1997, Plaintiff and Defendant both received notice of an initial pretrial conference scheduled by the Court. Counsel for the parties subsequently met and agreed upon a Joint Rule 26(f) Report which was approved in an Order dated February 21, 1997. The Joint Rule 26(f) Report required all general and expert discovery in the case to be completed by August 25, 1997. With respect to expert witnesses and their opinions, the Report provided for "sequential disclosure and discovery of experts" to occur in the following manner:

Reports from retained experts under Rule 26(a)(2) are due during the discovery period:

From Plaintiff — within sixty (60) days of filing the Joint Rule 26(f) Report, with the deposition of Plaintiff's expert(s) to occur within thirty (30) days thereafter.

From Defendant — within thirty (30) days from completion of the deposition of Plaintiff's expert as referred to above, with the deposition of Defendant's experts(s) [sic] within thirty (30) days thereafter.

(Joint Rule 26(f) Report ¶ 2.) Thus, Plaintiff was to disclose the identity of his expert and provide Defendant with a report of the expert's opinions by April 23, 1997, with the deposition to occur no later than May 22, 1997. Plaintiff was also required to make any amendments to his pleadings within thirty days from the date the Report was filed which was until April 23, 1997. (Id. ¶ 5.) Defendant was thereafter required to disclose any information about the identity of its expert by July 21, 1997, and complete all depositions by August 20, 1997.

Plaintiff, however, failed to identify or disclose the opinion of any experts as required by the Joint Rule 26(f) Report. In addition, Plaintiff did not seek any amendments to his pleading by the April 23, 1997 deadline. Notwithstanding Plaintiff's failure to comply with the discovery deadlines, Defendant identified its expert as well as provided a report of the expert's opinions by the deadline of July 21, 1997, as set out in the Report. In addition, on July 22, 1997, Defendant served Plaintiff with a request for document production and a series of interrogatories both of which requested detailed information to substantiate Plaintiff's allegations that the air bag system of his vehicle was defective. Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant's discovery requests until well after the August 25, 1997 deadline for the completion of all discovery in this case.

Both Plaintiff and Defendant had been notified as early as March 27, 1997 that a jury trial in this case would be set for the January 12, 1998 term of this Court. After Plaintiff failed to comply with the discovery schedule which ended on August 25, 1997, Defendant on August 26, 1997, filed a notice of its intention to file a dispositive motion in this case. Thereafter, on September 24, 1997, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that, in the absence of expert testimony, Plaintiff could not establish his claims against Defendant. It was not until October 29, 1997 that Plaintiff responded to Defendant's motion by filing the following motions: a Motion for Extension of Time within which to name an expert accompanied by an affidavit from an individual Plaintiff identified for the first time as an expert witness, and a Motion for Extension of Time within which to amend the Complaint. As an alternative, Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice in the event the Court denied his motions to extend time. In addition, Plaintiff provided Defendant with responses to Defendant's written discovery requests which had been submitted on July 22, 1997. In the discussion that follows, the Court will first consider the three motions filed by Plaintiff because of their impact on the Court's resolution of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

III. PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR EXTENSION OF TIME.

The procedural history set out above details the untimeliness of Plaintiff's actions with respect to the discovery deadlines established in this case. Nevertheless, Plaintiff has moved, pursuant to Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for an extension of time with respect to the deadlines set forth in the Joint Rule 26(f) Report. Specifically, Plaintiff now seeks an extension of time both to amend his Complaint and to name an expert. However, Plaintiff's motions for extension of time in both instances were not filed until October 29, 1997, after Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. It is clear that Plaintiff's motions were filed well beyond the April 23, 1997 deadline for such actions to be taken. Under such circumstances, Rule 6(b) provides for extensions of time as...