St. Clair v. Hiatt, 2376.
Decision Date | 12 April 1949 |
Docket Number | No. 2376.,2376. |
Citation | 83 F. Supp. 585 |
Parties | ST. CLAIR v. HIATT, Warden. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia |
Andrews & Nall and Walter G. Cooper, both of Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner.
J. Ellis Mundy, U. S. Atty, and Harvey H. Tisinger, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Atlanta, Ga., for respondent.
On January 21, 1938, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, petitioner, upon his plea of guilty, was sentenced on ten counts of an indictment charging violations of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2421-2424, to ten consecutive prison terms of two and one-half years each, aggregating twenty-five years. He was represented by counsel.
The first count of the indictment charged the unlawful interstate transportation of a single female. The tenth count charged the unlawful interstate transportation of three females, but the transportation of all was at the same time and in the same automobile. Each of counts two to nine, inclusive, charged the unlawful transportation of a single female, but the transportation of the females named in counts two and three was by the same automobile and at the same time. Likewise, the women named singly in counts four and five, six and seven, and eight and nine, were transported respectively, two at a time in the same vehicle and at the same time, so that, though ten offenses were charged, there were only five acts of transportation.
Petitioner alleges as grounds for writ of habeas corpus that his sentences in excess of an aggregate of twelve and one-half years are invalid because he was guilty of only five offenses and not ten, since there were only five acts of transportation; and that he has completely served the five valid sentences.
Respondent challenges his petition on two grounds, first, as prematurely brought because he has not complied with Section 2255 of Title 28 United States Code Annotated, and, second, upon the merits, because the ten sentences were for ten separate offenses and lawfully imposed.
Petitioner replies by averring that Section 2255 of Title 28 United States Code Annotated is unconstitutional and also that, if valid and applicable, it has been complied with.
Section 2255 is in the following language:
"An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention."
Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the Constitution provides that: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."
Unless the provisions of Section 2255 amount to a suspension of the writ, it is constitutional.
This historic writ was the offspring of the common law, but its benefits and securities have been safeguarded and enlarged through the centuries, from times of momentous struggles for freedom to the present, by the great charters of liberty and freedom, Magna Charta, 1215; Petition of Right, 1628, 3 Car. I ci; Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. II c2; Bill of Rights, 1689, 1 William & Mary c2; and our own Constitutions, laws and decisions, both Federal and State.
It has been the greatest bulwark of freedom against tyranny, oppression and injustice. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 269, 283, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1052.
Any statute which might tend to weaken its efficiency or delay its availability or makes its use more difficult should be carefully considered and construed liberally in the light of its history and its benign purposes.
Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 283, 284, 68 S.Ct. 1059.
The question here is, does Code Section 2255 place such restrictions upon the use of the writ as to amount to an unconstitutional suspension of it, or, are such restrictions merely permissible requirements of procedure which do not suspend but only temporarily delay its use for a reasonable time for a justified purpose?
When properly construed, I think the latter alternative statement is the proper construction.
It is true that there may be instances where compliance with the requirement to file a motion in the trial court before proceeding by habeas corpus would be so difficult as to amount virtually to a denial of the writ, as where an illiterate, friendless and indigent prisoner should be required to prosecute his motion in a far distant court unaided by counsel and unable to appear personally and adequately present his case, or where his motion, after presentation, has remained unacted upon for an unreasonable time. However, provision is made in the section itself for such a contingency. Under such provision, the habeas corpus court must determine for itself whether the remedy by motion is "inadequate or ineffective" and will undoubtedly examine the application and all the facts and circumstances pertinent to its presentation to satisfy itself on this question.
When so construed, the provision of the section in...
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