St. Clare Home v. Donnelly
| Decision Date | 17 January 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 74-313-A,74-313-A |
| Citation | 368 A.2d 1214,117 R.I. 464 |
| Parties | The ST. CLARE HOME v. Humphrey J. DONNELLY et al. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court denying injunctive relief against the collection of certain taxes by the City of Newport. Hereinafter we shall refer to the plaintiff as 'St. Clare's' or 'the home' and the defendant as 'the city.'
St. Clare's is a corporation operating a home for the aged in Newport. It had never been taxed by the city from its inception in 1927 until 1970. For the years 1970 through 1972, however, the home was assessed taxes totalling $27,155. St. Clare's neither paid the taxes nor brought a petition to contest the assessment within 3 months after payment was due as provided by G.L.1956 (1970 Reenactment) § 44-5-26. 1 In March 1974, after the city notified the home of its intention to sell the property for nonpayment of taxes, St. Clare's brought an action in the Superior Court to enjoin the sale, remove the lien, and purge the land and tax records on the ground that the property was exempt under § 44-3-3(12). 2 The trial justice assumed without deciding that the home was exempt under § 44- 3-3(12) but dismissed the action because St. Clare's had not pursued the remedy provided in § 44-5-26.
In dismissing the action, the trial justice relied upon § 44-5-27, which provides:
In its appeal St. Clare's argues that § 44-5-27 by its very terms applies only to owners of ratable property and since the home enjoys a tax-exempt status, the statutory 3-month limitation found in § 44-5-27 is inapplicable to the case at bar. The city contends that even if tax-exempt property is not ratable, § 44-5-27 limits St. Clare's remedy because an assessment of unratable property is a void and/or illegal assessment, and § 44-5-27 provides that challenges to validity and legality shall be limited to the procedures under § 44-5-26. We conclude that tax-exempt property is not ratable property and that § 44-5-27 does not apply to limit the remedies of a taxpayer who possesses no ratable estate at all because the property is tax-exempt.
Some time before the turn of the century this court defined 'ratable property' as property that is 'capable of being rated; that is appraised or assessed.' Coventry Co. v. Assessors of Taxes, 16 R.I. 240, 241, 14 A. 877, 878 (1888). There the court was concerned with a statute which made a legal challenge to any alleged overassessment subject to the condition that prior to the assessment the taxpayer had filed with the assessor an account of his 'ratable property.' The Coventry dispute involved a personal property tax, where the tax was to be imposed on that portion of the taxpayer's property which exceeded his indebtedness. The Coventry taxpayer filed a return in which he alleged: "No ratable personal estate over and above the actual indebtedness of the company." Id. at 240, 14 A. at 877. In faulting the sufficiency of the return, this court remarked that the taxpayer had apparently assumed that the Legislature was using the term 'ratable' as synonymous with 'taxable,' but such an assumption was not warranted. Ratable property '* * * does not relate to property actually taxed, but to that which is in its nature taxable, and which the assessors rate or value in discharging their duty.' Id. at 241, 14 A. at 878. While the distinction between 'ratable' and 'taxable' may seem to be a fine one, its presence can readily be seen after one examines the statutory scheme pursuant to which the assessors discharge their duty.
The General Assembly has directed local tax assessors to apportion the tax levy of the town upon the assessed valuation. Section 44-5-11. To this end, the tax assessor is required to assess all property 'liable to taxation' 3 by making a list of the value of the ratable estate of the town. Sections 44-5-12, 44-5-20. To apportion the tax, the assessor divides the tax levy, which is the total amount of approved expenditures, by the total amount of the town's assessed ratable property, also referred to as the assessment roll. Sections 44-5-13, 44-5-20, 44-5-22. Application of the tax levy to the assessment roll results in the tax roll from which tax bills are prepared. Section 44-5-22.
The responsibility for determining the value of the ratable property rests with the assessor and not the taxpayer. In the Coventry case the assessor had the job of assessing the taxpayer's personalty at its full and fair cash value, and it was only then that a determination could be made of whether there was actually a surplus of ratable property available for taxation, thus, the court's rationale for drawing a line between 'ratable' and 'taxable' property.
However, it is clear that property which is not capable of being assessed should not be included on the list of property to be valued by the assessor. In a tax scheme where the process of assessment, i.e., application of the tax levy to the valuation of the list of ratable property, leads directly to the imposition of the tax, ratable property must be property capable of being assessed. To put it another way, if property is ratable, it is assessable. In this context 'ratable' and 'assessable' are synonymous.
St. Clare's property, if tax-exempt, was not assessable. Tax-exempt property is not property capable of being appraised. It is not liable to taxation. Application of the tax levy to a valuation which included tax-exempt property would necessarily result in a malapportionment of taxes. An assessment is an integral part of the taxation process leading to the imposition of a tax. Exempt property is simply not assessed. 16 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 44-105 at 296 (3d ed. 1972). See also Grosvenor v. Supervisor of Assessments, 271 Md. 232, 315 A.2d 758 (1974). This court has pointed out that under a statute requiring the taxpayer to file an account of all his ratable property, there is no necessity of rendering such an account if the property is tax-exempt property which is not liable to assessment. Woonsocket Hosp. v. Quinn, 54 R.I. 424, 430, 173 A. 550, 552 (1934). Property which is wholly tax-exempt is not ratable.
The city asserts that even if the home is not ratable, its sole remedy is that prescribed in § 44-5-26 because of the language of § 44-5-27, which says that a taxpayer claiming to be victimized by an illegal or void assessment 'shall be confined' to the remedy delineated in § 44-5-26. We cannot agree. By its very terms the remedy is made exclusive if the taxpayer owned or possessed 'any ratable estate at all.' This is so whether the taxpayer who possesses ratable estate seeks to challenge the assessment on the grounds of overtaxation, or illegal and/or void taxation. See Murray v. Rockaway Blvd. Wrecking & Lumber Co., 108 R.I. 607, 277 A.2d 922 (1971). However, our examination of the statute leads us to conclude that this restriction is not applicable where the taxpayer possesses only tax-exempt property which is not ratable.
We note that when the petition remedy was originally enacted the statute specifically provided that this remedy would be cumulative in the case of a taxpayer challenging the legality or validity of an assessment. This version of the statute did not contain the limitation 'if the taxpayer owned or possessed any ratable estate at all.' Public Laws 1932, ch. 1945, § 15. It was only when the Legislature provided that § 44-5-26 would also constitute the only remedy for void and illegal assessments that the additional limiting condition 'if the taxpayer owned or possessed any ratable estate at all' became a part of the statute. Public Laws 1935, ch. 2260, § 15. Obviously such an exception would have been superfluous if the Legislature had intended to include the case of the taxpayer claiming no ratable estate in the class of taxpayers otherwise challenging the legality and validity of assessments. If we were to decide now that the taxpayer with no ratable estate is confined to § 44-5-26 we would render meaningless the express condition embodied in the phrase 'if the taxpayer owned or possessed any ratable estate at all.' This we cannot do. In giving construction to a statute, the court is bound, if it be possible, to give effect to all its several parts. No sentence, clause or word should be construed as unmeaning and surplusage, if a construction can be legitimately found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute. Ewing v. Tax Assessors, 90 R.I. 86, 90, 155 A.2d 61, 63 (1959); Black, Construction and Interpretation of Laws § 60 at 165 (2d ed. 1911).
The city argues that the instant case is controlled by Murray v. Rockaway Blvd. Wrecking & Lumber Co., supra, where we said: 'Regardless of whether a tax is attacked on grounds of overassessment or illegality, the taxing statutes provide the exclusive relief to any person aggrieved by any assessment of taxes against him by any city or town.' Id., 108 R.I. at 609, 277 A.2d at 924. The property involved in the Murray case was ratable property, and, as we have indicated, where the taxpayer owns any ratable property, he or she is confined to the remedies of §...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Donahue v. Rhode Island Dept. of Mental Health
...construction can be legitimately found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute." St. Clare Home v. Donnelly, 117 R.I. 464, 368 A.2d 1214, 1217-18 (1977). See also Blue Cross of Rhode Island, 589 F.Supp. at 1491; Montaquila v. St. Cyr, 433 A.2d 206, 214 (R.I.1981).......
-
Gott v. Norberg
...of a tax on property exempted from taxation necessarily results in malapportionment of that tax. See The St. Clare Home v. Donnelly, 117 R.I. 464, 468, 368 A.2d 1214, 1217 (1977). In such circumstances, the administrator exceeds his mandate to assess and collect taxes according to statute. ......
-
Blue Cross of Rhode Island v. Cannon, Civ. A. No. 83-0772 S.
... ... Clare Home v. Donnelly, 117 R.I. 464, 470, 368 A.2d 1214, 1217-18 (1977); see also Montaquila v. St ... ...
-
CIC-Newport Associates v. Stein
...exempt property is assessed for taxation, Graves v. McDonough, 264 Ala. 407, 409, 88 So.2d 371, 373 (1956); Cf. St. Clare Home v. Donnelly, R.I., 368 A.2d 1214, 1216 (1977); in which the assessors act entirely without jurisdiction, 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 513 at 983 (1954); in which the assess......