St. Cloud v. Leapley, 18332

• Citation: 521 N.W.2d 118
• Decision Date: 31 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. 18332,18332
• Parties: Richard Norman ST. CLOUD, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Walter LEAPLEY, Warden of the South Dakota State Penitentiary, Appellee.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Page 118

521 N.W.2d 118

Richard Norman ST. CLOUD, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Walter LEAPLEY, Warden of the South Dakota State

Penitentiary, Appellee.

No. 18332.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued March 21, 1994.

Decided Aug. 31, 1994.

Timothy M. Gebhart, Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, Sioux Falls, for petitioner and appellant.

Mark W. Barnett, Atty. Gen. and John P. Guhin, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for appellee.

WUEST, Justice.

Richard St. Cloud (St. Cloud) appeals from the trial court's order denying his application for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand.

FACTS

St. Cloud is a Native American whose blood quantum is 15/32 Yankton Sioux and 7/16 Ponca Indian Tribe; thus, he is 29/32 Native American. As a child, St. Cloud was enrolled in the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska. In 1962, the U.S. Congress passed legislation terminating the Ponca tribe. Pub.L. No. 87-629 (1962) (entitled "Ponca Tribe of Nebraska: Termination of Federal Supervision" and codified at 25 U.S.C. Secs. 971-980). The legislation provided in pertinent part:

When the distribution of tribal assets in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter has been completed, the Secretary of the Interior shall publish in the Federal Register a proclamation declaring that the Federal trust relationship to such tribe and its members has terminated. Thereafter, the tribe and its members shall not be entitled to any of the special services performed by the United States for Indians or Indian tribes because of their Indian status, all statutes of the United States that affect Indians or Indian tribes because of their Indian status shall be inapplicable to them[.]

25 U.S.C. Sec. 980. Approximately twenty-four years after the effective date of termination (1966), Congress restored federal recognition to the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska in 1990. Ponca Restoration Act, Pub.L. 101-484 (1990) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. Secs. 983-983h). See generally Elizabeth S. Grobsmith and Beth R. Ritter, The Ponca Tribe of Nebraska: The Process of Restoration of a Federally Terminated Tribe, 51 HUM.ORG. 1-16 (1992) (hereinafter "Ponca Restoration Process" ). ¹ One of the first steps in the restoration process was taken only five years after the effective date of termination when the tribe was once again formed and incorporated in 1971. Ponca Restoration Process at 8. In 1986, the Northern ² Ponca Restoration Committee was formed and subsequently incorporated, receiving non-profit status from the Internal Revenue Service in 1988. Id. at 11. In April 1988, the Nebraska legislature passed Resolution # 428 which officially recognized the Ponca tribe, recognized the members as American Indians, and supported efforts for federal restoration. Id. The Ponca Restoration Act provides that the membership roll includes the names of those individuals listed on the published membership roll at the time of termination. 25 U.S.C. Sec. 983e (referring to the membership roll published at 25 Fed.Reg. 8235 (June 26 1965)). That published final roll includes the name of Richard Norman St. Cloud "as a male born October 27, 1947 who is 7/16 Ponca." See St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F.Supp. 1456, 1463 (D.S.D.1988) (St. Cloud I ) (citing 31 Fed.Reg. 8235). Thus, St. Cloud is presently a member of the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska. The Ponca Restoration Act provides that, "All rights and privileges of the Tribe which may have been abrogated or diminished before October 31, 1990, by reason of [the termination act] are hereby restored and such law shall no longer apply with respect to the Tribe or the members." 25 U.S.C. Sec. 983b.

In 1983, during the interim period when the Ponca tribe was terminated, St. Cloud applied for enrollment in the Yankton Sioux Tribe based on his 15/32 Yankton Sioux blood quantum. Due to a provision in the Yankton Sioux tribal constitution, he was ineligible for enrollment because he had been enrolled in the terminated Ponca tribe. St. Cloud I, 702 F.Supp. at 1458 n. 6. St. Cloud was married to an enrolled member of the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, lived on the Lower Brule Reservation from 1973 until 1986, and had several children enrolled as tribal members. Because St. Cloud was not an enrolled tribal member he did not receive general federal assistance; but did obtain treatment under the federal Indian Health Services program and likewise received several benefits of tribal affiliation. St. Cloud I, 702 F.Supp. at 1461-62.

In April 1986, St. Cloud was charged with the kidnapping and rape of a non-Indian woman within the exterior boundaries of the Lower Brule Reservation. For a statement of the facts surrounding this incident, see State v. St. Cloud, 465 N.W.2d 177, 178 (S.D.1991) (St. Cloud II ). St. Cloud pled guilty in federal district court to a reduced charge of involuntary sodomy under the Major Crimes Act, a federal law that authorizes jurisdiction over Indians charged with certain crimes committed in Indian country. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1153. ³ Following sentencing to a federal penitentiary, St. Cloud filed a motion in which he argued that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction to convict him. Specifically, St. Cloud argued that because he was enrolled in a terminated tribe, he was not an "Indian" for purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction. Although the federal district court found that St. Cloud is "virtually a full-blooded Native American" and "obviously is ethnically an Indian," the federal court found that St. Cloud was not subject to federal criminal jurisdiction under the circumstances of the case, and ordered St. Cloud released from federal prison to the custody of the attorney general of the State of South Dakota. See St. Cloud I, 702 F.Supp. at 1460-66.

St. Cloud subsequently pled not guilty in state court to charges of first-degree rape and kidnapping. His trial took place in Lyman County where the Lower Brule Reservation is located. In December 1989, a jury found him guilty on both counts and he was sentenced to the South Dakota State Penitentiary. St. Cloud's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal to the South Dakota Supreme Court. St. Cloud II, 465 N.W.2d at 182. Additional facts are noted within this opinion as necessary.

St. Cloud applied for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he is unlawfully imprisoned and detained by the warden of the penitentiary due to his conviction on the rape and kidnapping charges. The circuit court issued its memorandum opinion, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order denying St. Cloud's application. This appeal follows.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court has stated on numerous occasions that "in habeas corpus proceedings, the scope of review is limited because the remedy sought is in the nature of a collateral attack upon a final judgment." Aliberti v. Solem, 428 N.W.2d 638, 639 (S.D.1988); Satter v. Solem, 422 N.W.2d 425, 427 (S.D.1988) (Satter II ); Everitt v. Solem, 412 N.W.2d 119, 120-21 (S.D.1987); Podoll v. Solem, 408 N.W.2d 759, 760 (S.D.1987); Goodroad v. Solem, 406 N.W.2d 141, 142 (S.D.1987); Loop v. Solem, 398 N.W.2d 140, 143 (S.D.1986); In re Williams, 86 S.D. 208, 210, 193 N.W.2d 793, 794 (1972); In re Kiser, 83 S.D. 272, 283, 158 N.W.2d 596, 602 (1968); State ex rel. Burns v. Erickson, 80 S.D. 639, 645, 129 N.W.2d 712, 715 (1964); State ex rel. Anderson v. Jameson, 51 S.D. 540, 545, 215 N.W. 697, 699 (1927). " '[H]abeas corpus can be used only to review (1) whether the court had jurisdiction of the crime and the person of the defendant; (2) whether the sentence was authorized by law; and (3) in certain cases, whether an incarcerated defendant has been deprived of basic constitutional rights.' " Aliberti, 428 N.W.2d at 640 (citing Satter II, 422 N.W.2d at 427; Goodroad, 406 N.W.2d at 144; Burns, 80 S.D. at 645, 129 N.W.2d at 715). " 'For purposes of habeas corpus, constitutional violations in a criminal case deprive the trial court of jurisdiction.' " Satter v. Solem, 458 N.W.2d 762, 765 (S.D.1990) (Satter IV ) (quoting McCafferty v. Solem, 449 N.W.2d 590, 591-92 (S.D.1989) (citations omitted)).

We have also described the range of issues proper for review in a habeas corpus action:

Although habeas corpus is not a substitute for direct appeal, appellant may assert jurisdictional errors which render the first judgment void. In the context of habeas corpus, jurisdictional error is given an expansive construction. Of course, this includes personal and subject matter jurisdiction, but due process violations and compliance with substantive statutory procedures are also subject to challenge in habeas corpus proceedings.

Security Savings Bank v. Mueller, 308 N.W.2d 761, 762-63 (S.D.1981) (citations omitted). See State ex rel. Smith v. Jameson, 80 S.D. 333, 335, 123 N.W.2d 300, 301 (1963) (stating that habeas corpus actions deal with such defects, "as render the proceeding or judgment absolutely void"); State ex rel. Ruffing v. Jameson, 80 S.D. 362, 366, 123 N.W.2d 654, 656 (1963) (noting that claims of error and irregularities that may have been grounds for reversal on direct appeal are not properly reviewable in habeas proceedings; but "those actions in which the court may lose jurisdiction by a denial of due process" are properly reviewable in habeas).

This court explicitly delineated the standard of review for findings of fact and conclusions of law arising out of habeas corpus proceedings in Aliberti, 428 N.W.2d at 640. Looking to the federal courts for guidance, we noted that a lower court's findings of basic, primary facts are given "considerable deference" and stated that "[s]uch findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous." Id. (citing Blackburn v. Foltz, 828 F.2d 1177, 1181 (6th Cir.1987); Carter v. Rafferty, 826 F.2d 1299, 1304 (3rd Cir.1987); Butcher v. Marquez, 758 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir.1985); Meeks v. Bergen, 749 F.2d 322, 327 (6th Cir.1984); United States v. Auerbach, 745 F.2d 1157, 1161 (8th Cir.1984); Hayes v....